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THE LURE OF BEAUTY

FROM THE fifteenth century to the present day the western world has been drifting with more or less gay abandon from the solid moorings of truth and goodness. This vagrancy has been marked by two trends: an abandonment of scientific philosophy and theology in favor of the elevating experiences of esthetics, and a departure from classic Christianity under the guise of pursuing culture. The moderns give full expression to this now ancient vagabondage as they chant of the dawn of a new era of culture and revel in rhapsodies on art and beauty.

Now, the allurements of beauty are very old. But they become extravagant when man despises true wisdom and departs from moral goodness. The temptations of esthetics are many. The mind of man has a desire to penetrate the material world about him. In a limited way the esthetic experience satisfies this desire, but at the same time it feeds the false hope that man can exceed his intellectual perfection, which here below consists in universal truths, and rival the divine and angelic in-

tellects in their total exploitation of the concrete individual. In the face of a reluctance on the part of the material world to expose its inner self to the human mind man artfully contrives to give matter an intelligibility not its own in an attempt to elucidate the beauty of his world. Loving the child of his own mind fosters in man the temptation to rest in his image and exult in his own self-expression. In a way this flatters the same presumption that toppled Adam—that man can be the principle of his own perfection. And just as there is a possibility of confusing the merits of esthetic and philosophic knowledge, there is the possibility of confusing the beautiful and the good. Succumbing to this temptation leads to the modern cult of culture. Disregard for truth and goodness makes the modern an easy target for the wily one who capitalizes on any and all temptations. But sound doctrine can reduce the potentiality of these temptations and rob beauty of its deceptive lure. The fundamental ideas of St. Thomas on beauty are the surest road to a realization of the distinctions and limitations which belong to esthetics.

St. Thomas lived in a beautiful age, sometimes called the greatest of centuries. True, his observations on the beautiful are scattered through his works in terse phrases pregnant with meaning. He merely pauses to give a definition, to indicate beauty's relationship to the good or to assign its place in the Trinity. But this process is natural to the rapid pace at which a theological synthesis must travel. Furthermore, it is well to bear in mind that Divine Providence had definite designs upon the genius of the friar from Rocca Sicca. In doctrinal matters St. Thomas had one intent and purpose: to establish theology as a strict science, the most perfect of sciences. Ultimately this involved the production of a " summa " of Sacred Doctrine for beginners. The magnificence of this work has been recognized through the centuries, sometimes even with the silent encomium of resting on the shelves reserved for research and reference. Eric Gill once said " look after goodness and truth, and beauty will take care of herself." [1] The Angelic Doctor took care of truth.

[1] Eric Gill, *Beauty Looks After Herself*, Sheed & Ward, N. Y. 1933, p. 245.

Pope John XXII gave Thomas Aquinas the title of Saint. Pope Pius XI gave St. Thomas Aquinas the title of Universal Doctor. This paper is not undertaken in the pontifical spirit which would add the tile of Esthete to those of Saint and Doctor. But perhaps it may help to lead the moderns back to truth and goodness. Then " beauty will take care of herself."

I

In attempting to piece together the scattered fragments of St. Thomas' esthetics into an integrated whole, harmonious with the rest of his synthesis, the usual methodology of proceeding from the more known to the less known is indispensable. This procedure demands first of all that an accurate though indistinct notion of the basic formality of beauty be culled from the obvious.

From the viewpoint of logic and predication two facts are obvious. First, we predicate the term beautiful of totally diverse subjects. With a trace of poignance in the voice we say that a symphony is beautiful; with the trill of youth the same term is also predicated of certain characters of Hollywood fame. Some classes of men are quite lavish with the word when referring to flowers and sunsets; the more religious will reverently say that Mary is beautiful, that Christ is beautiful and that God is beautiful. The second obvious fact gleaned from our manner of speaking is that beauty, though predicated of diverse things, is not used to designate all the individuals of any one class. We say that certain individual women are beautiful, but we do not apply the term indiscriminately to all women. The inescapable truth is that some women are ugly. Though all enjoy the same nature and the same femininity, reliable opinion refuses to concede that all are beautiful. Thus it appears that beauty is actually a composite characteristic embracing considerably more than essential constituents. As might be expected, the observant Aristotle was quite aware of the strictly personal character of beauty and its peculiar incommunicability.[2] He noted that association with the beautiful does not

[2] Aristotle, *Problemata*, Bk. XXIX, 951a.

produce beauty any more than association with the healthy produces health.

In the order of experience two more facts are obvious. Quite certainly esthetic experience is knowledge of some sort. On the one hand sensile perception alone seems insufficient for the discernment of beauty. On the other, it stands opposed to the labored abstraction and discourse of reason typical of scientific knowledge. Knowledge of beauty is somehow intuitive.[2a] Hence, knowledge of the beautiful eludes the mode of truth which concentrates on the abstractive nature of the knowable. It penetrates deeper and tends to exhaust the concrete complexities of the individual. To sum it all up, this knowledge is intellectual, but somehow exhaustive and intuitive, like vision.

Our consciousness of beauty also includes delight. Esthetic experience is happy. It gives spice to work-a-day existence and refreshes the soul weighed down with care. Yet, this delight is something more noble than the joy engendered by tasty food and fine old wines. It is a delight consequent upon knowing the beautiful. We say we are delighted by the sunset. Actually we mean that we are delighted with the perception of the sunset. In his simple wisdom St. Thomas captured all this in four words: "Beauty is that which being seen pleases." [3]

To ponder the obvious in this way may seem useless. Yet only the obvious can provide the vague but all-important formalities which make it possible to plumb the depths of the obscure. In the case of beauty these initial reflections quite convincingly indicate that beauty involves the exhaustive intuition of the whole individual with a consequent delight in that intuition. "Beauty is that which being seen pleases." Equipped with this formal notion as with an instrument it is

[2a] It will be clear from the context that the term "intuition" is not employed in this article in the sense of an immediate intellectual vision of the concrete individual. St. Thomas denies the possibility of such a vision to the human intellect in its present state of union with the body. Here the term is used to indicate the direct experience of the individual that man is capable of through the united activities of his sense and intellectual faculties. Cf. "Notes on Intuition," by M. de Munnynck, O.P. in *The Thomist*, Vol. I (1939), pp. 143-168.

[3] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um: "id quod visum placet."

possible to clarify the more difficult concepts and answer questions of a more basic nature.

II

In natural philosophy the vague concept of motion makes it possible to formulate a more precise concept of nature wherein motion is found. Similarly a vague notion of the formalities specifying cognition enable one to discover the deeper truths about the faculty wherein cognition is found. In like manner the germinal observation that esthetic experience is a full intuition of the individual directly implicates the human intellect as the subject of that experience. This approach leads immediately to two problems: an analysis of the cognitive action already termed intuitive, and an analysis of the more intimate characteristics of the cognitive faculty itself.

Actually the person appreciates beauty. But in the genesis of this experience many faculties cooperate. The primary contact of man with beauty is established by the external senses. These are five in number: touch, sight, hearing, taste and smell. Sight and hearing play the most prominent role. St. Thomas notes that " those senses chiefly regard the beautiful which are most cognitive, viz., sight and hearing as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sounds and beautiful sights. But in reference to the objects of the other senses we do not use the expression beautiful." [4] Still, a lesser role can be assigned to the other senses without doing violence to St. Thomas. In referring to the work of these two senses he did not say " solely " (*solummodo*) but rather " chiefly " (*praecipue*) the senses of sight and hearing. Though tastes and smells are not ordinarily considered beautiful they do contribute in their own way to our complete sense perception of beauty. For example, we are charmed by the rose particularly because of its color and shape.

[4] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um: " Illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus ratione deservientes; dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum non utimur nomine pulchritudinis; non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores . . . "

However, its fragrance and texture also enter into our whole perception of the rose.

Sight and hearing are here of greater importance because they best serve the intellect and because through them most of our knowledge is acquired. This is especially true with regard to sight and the common sensibles. Since sight extends universally to all of them it is not only more efficacious but also more powerful.[5] We can certainly neither touch, smell, nor taste music, poetry and sunsets. Yet these are beautiful. By their situational and functional associations with nutrition, smell and taste are more at home in the dining room than at the opera.

The external sense representations of the concrete individual objects of beauty are then conveyed to the internal common sense and imagination, where they may be intensified and enhanced by fusion with the elements of previous experience. The reproductive and retentive functions of imagination are of considerable importance for this reason. The comparative development or dullness of this faculty largely accounts for the variations of taste among individual esthetes. Vivid imagination will bring a wealth of associated experience to each new discovery of beauty. Unresponsive imagination will even fail to grasp the totality of esthetic material offered by the senses. This phenomenon is entirely in consonance with the old philosophic axiom that " whatever is received is received according to the mode or capacity of the recipient." In connection with the internal senses of man special mention should be made of what the Angelic Doctor calls the particular reason. In man the particular reason substitutes for the functions of instinct in animals. It assembles and collects the individual intentions of sense perceptions just as the universal reason assembles and collects universal reasons. Furthermore, the particular reason apprehends the individual as existing under a common nature. This is possible only because of its intimate association with the intellect in one and the same person. The obvious ad-

[5] *Comment. In " De Sensu et Sensato,"* lect. 2, n. 29. " Per hunc etiam sensum (visus) magis cognoscuntur communia sensibilia; quia quanto potentia habet virtutem cognoscitivam universaliorem, et ad plura se extendentem, tanto est efficacior in cognoscendo; quia omnis virtus quanto est universalior, tanto est potentior."

vantage of this faculty is that it enables us to know this man precisely as this man.[6]

Next, this immediate sense perception confronts the intellect. In using the expression, "beauty is that which being seen pleases," St. Thomas did not wish to confine "being seen" to the strict meaning of an exercise of the faculty of sight, even though this is the primary signification of the term. According to his own interpretation, "the word 'sight' is originally applied to the act of sense, and then as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained through the other senses . . . and further it is referred to knowledge obtained through the intellect."[7]

He is careful to stress the predominant role of intellect in the apprehension of the beautiful. "Beauty refers to the cognitive faculty," he insists, in distinguishing it from the universal good.[8] But the exact nature of this intellectual act is not explicitly developed by the Angelic Doctor. However, there is general agreement that sensile perception is insufficient for the discernment of beauty. Animals are chronically unappreciative of the beauties of art and nature alike. Even the most pedigreed

[6] *In Aristotelis Librum De Anima*, II, lect. 13, n. 396-398. "Si vero apprehendatur in singulari, ut puta cum video coloratum percipio hunc hominem vel hoc animal, hujusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativum, quae dicitur etiam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis est collativa rationum universalium.

"Nihilominus tamen haec vis est in parte sensitiva, quia vis sensitiva in sui supremo participat aliquid de vi intellectiva in homine, in quo sensus intellectui conjungitur. In animali vero irrationali fit apprehensio intentionis individualis per aestimativam naturalem, secundum quod ovis per auditum vel visum cognoscit filium vel aliquid hujusmodi.

"Differenter tamen circa hoc se habet cogitativa et aestimativa. Nam cogitativa apprehendit individuum ut existens sub natura communi; quod contingit ei, in quantum unitur intellectivae in eodem subjecto; unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hic homo et hoc lignum prout est hoc lignum."

[7] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 67, a. 1: "sicut patet in nomine visionis, quod primo impositum est ad significandum actum sensus visus, sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem hujus sensus, extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum loquentium, ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum . . . Et ulterius etiam ad cognitionem intellectus."

[8] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4: ". . . pulchrum respicit vim cognoscitivam . . ."

dogs howl at a symphony. At the other extreme, there is agreement that this knowledge of beauty stands opposed to the difficult processes of scientific reasoning. It can readily be admitted, however, that these processes materially dispose the mind for the perception of more intellectual beauty. The acts of reason are essentially discursive. They move from the immediately known to the mediately known. Yet the newly acquired term is expressed in a judgment. Since sensile perception and labored discourse of reason are disqualified as constituting the esthetic intuition, the choice is limited to some kind of judgment. For all beauty is true and knowledge of the beautiful is true knowledge. But truth, which is the perfection of knowing, is found only in judgment. Obviously then, the intuition of beauty is basically some manner of judgment. However, it must not be considered as a simple judgment of principles nor as the conclusion of a well-reasoned syllogism. Rather, it belongs to the class of judgments associated with contemplation, a full intuition of the known. It exceeds the order of abstraction and utilizes the harmonious contributions of all the cognitive faculties of the person. Though the esthetic intuition ultimately consists in this act of the intellect, the internal and external senses must of necessity cooperate.[9]

Obviously the knowledge of truth is verified equally in esthetic and non-esthetic cognition. Beauty and ugliness have a common status relative to judgment. The peculiar note which specifies esthetic cognition is that it is somehow exhaustive of the known. It satisfies the mind. One can have true knowledge of the nature of the known and still be highly curious about its particular and individual notes. But when the intellect and conjoined faculties spontaneously exhaust the knowability of the beautiful, curiosity is absent. Only when knowability on the part of the object completely connatural to the cognitive

[9] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 84, a. 7: "Unde natura lapidis, vel cujuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem; et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum objectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem."

faculties captures the mind does esthetic experience occur. It grows out of an accumulative process and contains within itself all the perfections of the apprehension and judgment of truth but in a more perfect and complete way. This conjoined activity of the intellect and senses must be immediate (temporally), without doubt and without discourse of reason;[10] in a word, spontaneous. In this moment of the knowing process the cognitive aspect of esthetic experience is essentially complete. This is the basic meaning of the term " intuition " when applied to the contemplation of beauty. It is entirely unnecessary to invent either a new faculty or a new act of the intellect peculiar to the intuition of beauty and peculiar to only a few esthetes.

However, it would falsify St. Thomas and it would falsify experience to omit any mention of the grades of perfection found in esthetic perception. Having isolated the basic truths about this act, it is possible to expand their application without running the risk of confusion. Basically esthetic knowledge is contemplation or vision. It is concrete knowledge of the beautiful. It exploits the knowability of an object completely connatural to the mind of man. There are the common traits realized in the esthetic knowledge of peasant, poet and philosopher alike. Mention has already been made of the role of the internal senses in accounting for differences is esthetic tastes. Bodily dispositions, temperament, and experience all have an influence upon intellectual ability. However, over and above the level of sense certain characteristics of individual intellects also influence the operations of this faculty. The mind of man has a certain plasticity which enables it to acquire various habits or dispositions. These perfections in turn materially dispose the intellect to respond to a fuller measure of beauty. They attune the mind to the more intellectual aspects of the beautiful. The most important of these habits in the natural

[10] *Summa Theol.*, Suppl., q. 92(94), a. 2: " . . . sicut Socrates, et filius Diaris, et amicus, et alia hujusmodi, quae per se cognoscuntur in universali ab intellectu, in particulari autem a virtute cogitativa in homine . . . Hujusmodi autem tunc sensus exterior dicitur sentire, quamvis per accidens, quando, ex eo quod per se sentitur, vis apprehensiva (cujus est illud cognitum per se cognoscere) statim et sine dubitatione et discursu apprehendit. . . . "

order is philosophical wisdom or metaphysics. Inasmuch as metaphysics leads to the contemplation of the universal causes of being it transcends the proper object of the human intellect. It discerns deeper realities and considers diverse realities under a common aspect and does not descend to the proper notes of natural and moral objects. It reduces such diverse things as creator and creature to a unity, not of univocation but of analogy.[11] Because man is a speculative creature this presupposes the discipline of logic and physics. Because man is a moral creature it also presupposes the discipline of moral virtue, especially temperance.[12] The study of philosophy is not the work of a day. It is a lifetime effort. It demands intense and prolonged intellectual concentration. Lest man be lured from this devotion to thought, strong habits must moderate the unreasonable demands of his animal nature. Human experience bears ample witness to the inescapable connection between wisdom and temperance. There is a certain asceticism demanded in the esthete who would improve the natural endowments of his intellect. The intellectual facility and acumen which the habit of metaphysics brings to the mind of the esthete is not without labor and suffering.

The second of the intellectual habits which dispose the mind for fuller esthetic knowledge is peculiar to the Christian. By the infused habit of Faith and the acquired habit of theology, the Christian is enabled to approach God no longer under the aspect of being, but as He is in Himself. The ultimate perfec-

[11] *I Sent.*, Prolog. q. 1, a. 2 corp. et ad 2um: "Aliqua cognitio quanto altior est tanto est magis unita et ad plura se extendit: unde intellectus Dei qui est altissimus per unum quod est ipse Deus omnium rerum cognitionem habet distincte. Ita et cum ista scientia sit altissima et per ipsum lumen inspirationis divinae efficaciam habens, ipsa unita manens non multiplicata diversarum rerum considerationem habet, nec tantum in communi, sicut metaphysica, quae considerat omnia in quantum sunt entia non descendens ad propriam cognitionem moralium, vel naturalium. Ratio enim entis cum sit diversificata in diversis non est sufficiens ad specialem rerum cognitionem; ad quarum manifestationem divinum lumen in se unum manens, sec. Dion. efficaciam habet."

"Creator et creatura reducuntur in unum, non communitate univocationis sed analogiae."

[12] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 142, a. 1, ad 2um.

tion of theology as a science is the contemplation characteristic of theology as wisdom. This habit also demands definite intellectual and moral preparation. It was not mere chance that led the Beloved Apostle to write "Every one that loveth is born of God and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God."[12a] Moral virtues impede the vehemence of unruly appetites and quietly but firmly wall off the tumult of exterior distractions,[13] and prepare the way for acquired contemplation. In turn this is but an approach to the contemplation which proceeds from the gift of Wisdom, "the gift which makes us judge rightly of divine things by a certain connaturalness and union with God which is effected by Charity."[14] Under the egis of the Holy Ghost the soul is swept along through life and through death to the vision of the Triune God, the summit of esthetic experience, perfect and immediate union of the intellect and God. Night vanishes and eternal day appears. However, it is to be noted that theology in this life attains its object in a dark manner with relative and negative knowledge, since theology is based on Faith and Faith is of things not seen. The full vision of God is reserved for the blessed in heaven.

Though the name contemplation is common to connatural esthetic knowledge, metaphysical wisdom, theology and the Beatific Vision, the essential characteristics of esthetic knowledge are not realized in each. Metaphysics gives certain knowledge and contemplates reality. Yet metaphysics as such does not descend to the concrete individual. And the beauty that is connatural to man is to be found in just the precise characteristics that metaphysics abstracts from. Hence, the role of metaphysics in esthetics is simply to dispose the intellect and render it capable of discerning with ease the deeper aspects of the beauty which is connatural to man. Likewise, theology gives

[12a] I *Jn.* 4, 7 and 8.

[13] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 2: "Virtutes autem morales impediunt vehementiam passionum et sedant exteriorum occupationum tumultus. Et ideo virtutes morales dispositive ad vitam contemplativam pertinent."

[14] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 45, a. 4: "sapientia quae est donum Spiritus Sancti sicut dictum est facit rectitudinem judicii circa res divinas, vel per regulas divinas de aliis, ex quadam connaturalitate sive unione ad divina."

certain knowledge and contemplates reality. It has the further perfection of considering reality in its concrete individuality. It knows God under the very aspect of His Deity. However, in this life theology is based on Faith and not on vision. Though divinely certain, theology is obscure. Hence, even theology fails to provide the full intuition of its object which is characteristic of esthetic knowledge. Like metaphysics, theology disposes the mind to know deeper truths. However, its proper role is to prepare the mind for the esthetic contemplation of God in heaven. In this life, though we know that God is beautiful, we do not see His Beauty. While a wayfarer the theologian pursues the Beauty of God, but never captures it.

In this brief account of the contact of the soul with beauty a wealth of detail has been neglected. In analyzing the intuition of beauty the basic realities are of more importance. Having evidenced them the next step is to outline the inner characteristics of the faculty thus felicitously affected. Since it was asserted that knowledge of the beautiful was connatural to the knower, this serves as a valuable point of departure from which to undertake a study of the intellect itself.

Despite the needless friction between idealism and realism, all men are realists at heart. The human intellect cannot be satisfied with dreams about centaurs and peppermint mountains. When words fail even the most vociferous idealist picks up a club to do battle for the reality of his ideas. Generally speaking, the human intellect concentrates on two spheres of reality, forms and relationships.[15] Upon seeing a strange gadget for the first time one immediately asks what it is and what it is for. In covering reality the senses deal with the more material accidents since these are highly individual and individual matter itself is unintelligible. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that the human intellect is a potency having for its object real sub-

[15] Joannis a S. Thoma, *Cursus Philosophicus*, III, p. 114 b9ss: "Ex omnibus enim praedicamentis substantia et relatio per se pertinent ad intellectum, substantia quidam quia per se non potest movere sensum nisi per aliquod accidens externum quo reddatur sensibilis. Remota vero accidente sola substantia non est cognoscibilis nisi ut quidditas quod est proprium objectum intellectus. Relatio autem quia indiget collatione et ordinatione ut cognoscatur quae est propria intellectus."

stantial forms and relationships. In referring to the latter, St. Thomas says: "It is proper to reason to know order. Whereas the sense faculties know things absolutely, only the intellect or reason can know the order of one thing to another." [16]

In order to particularize these general statements about the intellect and its object, and in order to assign the natural basis for the various grades of perfection in esthetic cognition, several distinctions are necessary. First, the intellect has a twofold potentiality. Its natural potentiality regards those objects which can be known by its own natural agency. Since the natural agency of the intellect depends objectively upon the images presented by the senses, its natural potentiality is confined to reality which has some association with matter. Such reality is either associated with matter as a constituent part or has matter as a subject. It may also have an association with material things only by a certain similarity, as in the case of our relative and negative knowledge of God. However, over and above this natural potentiality, the intellect has an obediential potentiality relative to the agency of God. Thus even the vision of separated substances and God Himself can fall within the scope of the intellect.[17] The particular significance of this distinction to the esthete is that his Most Beautiful One cannot be seen with the eyes of his mind unless God Himself elevates the created intellect. This experience is reserved for the blessed.

[16] *In I Ethic.*, lect. 1: "quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cujus proprium est cognoscere ordinem. Nam etsi vires sensitivae cognoscant res absolute, ordinem tamen unius rei ad aliam cognoscere est solius intellectus aut rationis."

[17] S. Thomae, *Comp. Theol. ad Fr. Reginaldum*, I, c. 104: "Est autem aliquid in potentia dupliciter: uno modo naturaliter, respectu eorum scilicet quae per agens naturale possunt reduci in actum: alio modo respectu eorum quae reduci non possunt in actum per agens naturale, sed per aliquid aliud agens. . . . Sic autem et circa intellectum nostrum accidit. Est enim intellectus noster in potentia naturali respectu quorumdam intelligibilium, quae scilicet reduci possunt in actum per intellectum agentem, quae est principium innatum nobis, ut per ipsum efficiamur intelligentes in actu. Est autem impossibile nos ultimum finem consequi per hoc quod intellectus noster sic reducatur in actum: nam virtus intellectus agentis est ut phantasmata, quae sunt intelligibilia in potentia, faciat intelligibilia in actu. . . . Consequimur igitur ultimum finem in hoc quod intellectus noster fiat in actu, aliquo sublimiori agente quam sit agens nobis connaturale. . . ."

Again, it is necessary to distinguish between the proper and adequate objects of the intellect. The proper object of the intellect is connatural to man as human. The adequate object of the human intellect is connatural to man as intellectual. Thus, as precisely human, the intellect is confined to the essences of material beings. As a spiritual faculty potentially all things, however, it can and does transcend those limits by use of analogy and considers being as being, without regard to matter. St. Thomas says:

> It is connatural to us to know those things which have their being in individual matter inasmuch as our soul by which we know is also the form of some definite matter.
>
> However, this soul has two cognitive levels. One of them is the act of a corporeal organ and it is connatural to this faculty to know things inasmuch as they are found in individual matter, wherefore the senses know only singulars. The other cognitive faculty of the soul is the intellect, which is not the act of any corporeal organ. Hence it is connatural to us to know intellectually natures which do have their being in individual matter though they are not known precisely as existing in individual matter but as they are abstracted from it by the consideration of the intellect. Thus by the intellect we are able to know things universally, which is far above the faculty of sense.[18]

Since the intellect regards its object universally it can transcend the particular aspects of its object.[19] Thus being in all its totality

[18] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 12, a. 4: "Ea igitur quae non habent esse nisi in materia individuali, cognoscere est nobis connaturale, eo quod anima nostra, per quam cognoscimus, est forma alicujus materiae. Quae tamen habet duas virtutes cognoscitivas. Unam, quae est actus alicujus corporei organi. Et huic connaturale est cognoscere res secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, unde sensus non cognoscit nisi singularia. Alia vero non est actus alicujus organi corporalis. Unde per intellectum connaturale est nobis cognoscere naturas, quae quidem non habent esse nisi in materia individuali; non tamen secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, sed secundum quod abstrahuntur ab ea per considerationem intellectus. Unde secundum intellectum possumus cognoscere hujusmodi res in universali; quod est supra facultatem sensus."

[19] *Summa Theol.*, I. q. 79, a. 7: ". . . si aliqua potentia secundum propriam rationem ordinetur ad aliquod objectum secundum communem rationem objecti non diversificabitur illa potentia secundum diversitates particularium differentiarum. . . . Intellectus autem respicit suum objectum secundum communem rationem entis, eo quod intellectus possibilis est quo omnia fieri."

is opened up to the consideration of the mind. By its natural potentiality the intellect can transcend its proper object and explore with analogy, though in a limited way, even beings which lie only within its adequate object. However, the obediential potentiality of the intellect is exercised properly within the sphere of the adequate object.

These precisions relative to the knowing faculty establish several conclusions pertinent to the doctrine on beauty. First, esthetic knowledge need not be restricted to the material order as far as the intellect is concerned, though the connatural mode of knowing beauty will be confined to the proper object of the intellect, the physical world of matter and form. Second, the more intellectual varieties of beauty lie outside the proper object of the intellect and hence of necessity involve the use of analogy as far as our knowledge of them is concerned. Full intuition in this sphere is not the lot of mortal man.

In a rapid analysis of esthetic experience the connatural and properly human aspects are of prime importance. They provide the clues for making precise the confused concept with which an understanding of beauty must begin. With appropriate adjustments it is then possible to apply that concept of the loftier and more complex aspects of the question. Until the basic germinal notion is fully explicated, however, the strictures of method permit only a general consideration of the complexities.

III

It has been seen that the complete capture of the mind by beauty which constitutes the exhaustive intuition is conditioned ultimately by the knowability of the object. In natural philosophy any penetration of motion and nature leads ultimately to the principles of nature which make motion possible: matter, form and privation. In our analysis of the general concept of cognition and intellect, immateriality appears as the ultimate principle which makes cognition possible. Similarily a full understanding of the knowledge man has of beauty leads ultimately to the exterior principles which cause esthetic experience.

Since knowledge of the beautiful has something in common

with any intellectual perception, beauty itself will have the general attributes of knowability, reality, form, and order. In applying these attributes to beauty, St. Thomas rather constantly refers to them as integrity, proportion and clarity. In a typical passage he says, "For beauty three things are required. In the first place integrity or perfection, for whatsoever things are imperfect by that very fact are ugly; and due proportion or consonance; and again clarity—thus brightly colored objects are said to be beautiful." [20]

Integrity

Even to one uninitiated in philosophical terminology integrity connotes completeness. It has something to do with a nose on every face and two ears astride each head. This is also the sense in which St. Thomas uses the term. Ordinarily he associates it with the term perfection. For him perfection and integrity are really the same thing, differing only conceptually. It is a case of the bottle being half full or half empty. Perfection signifies positively what integrity signifies negatively. A thing is perfect so far as it has attained its full essential and functional stature. In respect to this same totality the term integrity signifies that no parts are lacking.[21]

The most tangible application of integrity holds for the quantitative order. When we think of parts and wholes we think first of these factors in respect to things having magnitude, like the pie and its pieces, the jig-saw puzzle and its pieces. An integral puzzle has no parts lacking. A pie half eaten is no longer a whole pie. However, integrity also applies to essential wholes, compounds of matter and form. In respect

[20] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8: "Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem integritas sive perfectio; quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas, unde quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur."

[21] *In de Div. Nom.*, c. 2, lect. 1: "Integrum et perfectum idem videntur esse; differunt tamen ratione, nam perfectum videtur dici aliquid in attingendo ad propriam naturam; integrum autem per remotionem diminutionis, sicut dicimus aliquem hominem non esse integrum, si postquam attingit propriam naturam, aliquo membro mutiletur."

to the essence of physical things, matter and form are parts just as essence and existence are the parts of spiritual substances.[22] For example, the soul is the formal part of man. When his soul departs he is neither integral nor beautiful. At least ordinarily we do not refer to cadavers as beautiful.

Furthermore, the Angelic Doctor distinguishes between operational and existential perfection and integrity. In his own words: "Integrity is twofold. One considers the primary perfection which consists in the existence (*esse*) of a thing; the other considers the secondary perfection which consists in operation." [23] Thus, for example, by the endowments of nature a man may lack nothing of his existential perfection as a man. Yet virtue and the acts of virtue add an operational perfection to him which gives him a positive fullness typical of truly human beauty.

Since the notion of integrity involves the whole and its parts it may be thought that it does not apply to God. To answer this difficulty St. Thomas distinguishes between a whole that depends on its parts and a whole that is prior to its parts. Thus, the material parts of a house are prior to the house and the whole house depends on them. The integrity consonant with this arrangement is typical of the whole created order. However, in the Platonic notion the whole precedes the parts after the manner in which we say that the parts of a house are in the mind of the builder which is a whole. In this sense integrity can be applied to God. It is the integrity which belongs to His nature.[24] And so it is ultimately with each nature. Each has

[22] *Summa Theo.*, I, q. 8, a. 2, ad 3um: ". . . totum dicitur respectu partium. Est autem duplex pars: scilicet pars essentiae, ut forma et materia dicuntur partes compositi, et genus et differentia, partes speciei; et etiam pars quantitatis, in quam scilicet dividitur aliqua quantitas."

[23] *IV Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4: "duplex est integritas. Una quae attenditur secundum perfectionem primam, quae consistit in ipso esse rei; alia quae consistit in operatione."

[24] *In de Div. Nom.*, c. 2, lect. 1: "Totum autem hic non accipitur secundum quod ex partibus componitur sed prout secundum platonicos totalitas quaedam dicitur ante partes, quae est ante totalitatem quae est ex partibus, utpote si dicamus quod domus quae est in materia est totum ex partibus, et quae praeexistit in arte aedificatoris, est totum ante partes."

an integrity proper to it. For example, man's nature calls for two arms and a head. Hence the Venus de Milo is no longer the statue of a woman, nor can she be called a beautiful woman. But it is the statute of a feminine torso and artists generally agree that it is a beautiful torso.

From this brief summary of integrity four conclusions can be adduced which pertain to the consideration of beauty. First, integrity has more than a mere quantitative denotation. It can be expanded to cover the whole scale of beings. Second, though integrity is very broad in its application it is not appropriated to all natures in precisely the same way. Third, in considering the integrity proper to any one nature the common notes of integrity must be coupled with the peculiar adjustments proper to that nature. Fourth, mutilation, privation and diminution are the trade marks of the ugly.

Proportion

Like integrity, proportion or consonance also has a variety of applications the first of which is quantitative. This priority, however, is only in the order of knowing. St. Thomas says, "Proportion according to the first imposition of the term signifies a habitude of quantity to quantity according to some determined excess or equation, but it is further translated to signify every habitude of anything whatsoever to another." [25] The two factors involved in the general notion of proportion are habitude and plurality. No one says, "I am just like me." In every proportion at least two terms are necessary.[26] Underlying this duality, of course, some type of unity is necessary.

Habitude or order, however, can exist on various levels. First, there is the familiar order of the parts of a body. As St. Thomas puts it, we say a man is beautiful when he has a "decent" proportion of the members of his body with respect

[25] *IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6um: "Proportio secundum primam nominis institutionem, significat habitudinem quantitatis ad quantitatem, secundum aliquem determinatum excessum vel adequationem, sed ulterius est translatum ad significandum omnem habitudinem cujuscumque ad aliud."

[26] *IV Sent.*, d. 16, q. 3, a. 1: "Et quia in qualibet proportione oportet esse ad inus duos terminos, nihil enim sibi ipsi proportionatur, sed alteri. . . ."

to quantity and situation.[27] His arms should be neither too long nor too short for the rest of his body; his nose neither too big nor too small for his face. Quantitatively he should be well proportioned. He also needs a certain graceful disposition of his limbs and parts. A gentleman tying his shoes, for example, generally assumes a somewhat unsightly posture. All physical beauty must realize this type of consonance even though each does it in his own way.

Over and above material proportion and bodily beauty in man there is also a consonance more proper to him as human. Virtues insure a conformity between his actions and his rational nature. Thus, virtue adds a special beauty to man. This is particularly true of the virtue of temperance. Temperance not only establishes an order in human life (all virtues do this) but it also restrains man from those deordinations which are typically bestial.[28] And whereas temperance puts a proper order in man with respect to what is animal in him, charity and the theological virtues rightly order him to what is above, God. Regardless of outward appearances the saint is always more beautiful than the sinner.

Again a difficulty arises in applying the ordinary notion of consonance to God. In God there is no real plurality. Still God does have consonance since He contains all proportions within Himself as in a cause. All created consonances are but manifestations of this consonance of the All Beautiful One who is the first cause of all order. It is impossible to outline the inexhaustable manifestations of God's consonant beauty. The world is full to overflowing with interwoven order. Ages upon ages of poets and painters and saints will never dry up this unfathomable well of beauty. Only with our heads in heaven

[27] *In de Div. Nom.*, c. 3, lect. 5: "Sic enim hominem pulchrum dicimus propter decentem proportionem membrorum in quantitate et situ."

[28] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 141, a. 2, ad 3um: "Pulchritudo conveniat cuilibet virtuti, excellenter tamen attribuitur temperantiae duplici ratione. Primo quidem secundum rationem communem temperantiae ad quam pertinet quaedam moderata et conveniens proportio. . . . Alio modo quia ea a quibus refrenat temperantia sunt infima in homine, convenientia sibi secundum naturam bestialem . . . et ideo ex eis maxime natus est homo deturpari. Et per consequens temperantiae, quae praecipue turpitudinem hominis tollit."

will we begin to gather the beauty of earth and heaven into our heads.

Even from these few ideas on consonance two conclusions rather obviously follow. First, with respect to proportion a thing may be beautiful from one point of view but not from another. A man may be well proportioned corporeally but if he has not subordinated his lower appetites to reason and his reason to God he is spiritually and literally as ugly as sin. Second, since consonance regards not only the proper nature of each but also the circumstances of each one's existence, it is not only a general but also a very particular attribute of the beautiful.

Clarity

The third metaphysical element of beauty offers no difficulties. It is simply brilliance or splendor of form. Brilliance is originally associated with light and color. Light and color render objects more visible. For example, in the dark it is unfortunately difficult to discern whether the door is open or shut or just ajar. Though clarity applies primarily to an accidental form, it is translated to apply also to substantial forms.[29] Forms or essences of things are not only their intrinsic principle of constitution but also the source of their intelligibility. In the world of corporeal nature these forms are mixed with their limiting counterpart, matter. Matter of itself is unintelligible. Hence, the more form succeeds in overcoming the limitation of matter and the less it is immersed in and restricted by matter the more brilliantly form appears to our minds. Since immateriality is the principle of intelligibility, there is an ascending gradation in clarity reaching from material beings to Pure Act. The clarity of God is the source of all clarity in creatures. They are but reflections from the " font of all light." However, God Himself, though He is the summit of intelligibility, immateriality and clarity, exceeds the capacity of our created intellects. In this life our minds are unable to perceive

[29] *In de Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 5: " Forma autem a qua dependet propria ratio rei pertinet ad claritatem."

His brilliance directly. They are like the eyes of the owl in the face of the noon-day sun.

The world of nature is situated between two sets of faculties, one human, the other divine.[30] On our side we know the truths of this world because they are true. We love the goods of this world because they are lovable. We delight in the contemplation of the beauties of this world because they are beautiful. With God it is different. Things are true because He knows them. They are good because He loves them. They are beautiful because He made them so. God imparts beauty to all created beauty according to three orders of causality: efficient, final and exemplary.

The divine beauty is efficiently causative in three ways: in imparting existence, in moving all things and in conserving all things in their being. From His beauty all things have received their existence. "From this beauty comes existence to all existing things."[31] But "clarity is also of the consideration of beauty. Every form through which a thing has existence is a certain participation of the divine clarity. . . . Similarly it is also said that consonance is of the reason of pulchritude. Whence all that pertains to consonance in any way whatsoever proceeds from the divine pulchritude . . . all concord of rational creatures as regards the intellect (for they who hold the same ideas are one in concord), as regards friendship, communion in action, and universally whatever union creatures have, they have in virtue of this beauty."[32]

[30] *Q. D. de Veritate XI*, q. 1, a. 2: "Res ergo naturalis inter duos intellectus constituta, secundum adequationem ad utrumque vera dicitur; secundum enim adaequationem ad intellectum divinum dicitur vera in quantum implet hoc ad quod est ordinata per intellectum divinum . . . ad intellectum humanum in quantum nata est de se formare veram aestimationem. . . ."

[31] *In de Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 5: "ex pulchro isto provenit esse omnibus existentibus."

[32] *In de Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 5: "Claritas enim est de consideratione pulchritudinis. . . . Omnis autem forma, quam res habet esse, est participatio quaedam divinae pulchritudinis. . . . Similiter etiam dictum est quod de ratione pulchritudinis est consonantia; unde omnia quae qualitercumque ad consonantiam pertinet, ex divina pulchritudine procedunt, et hoc est quod subdit quod propter bonum divinum sunt omnia rationalium creaturarum 'concordiae' quantum ad intellectum

What is the motive of this divinely beautiful Agent? " It is the nature of a perfect agent to act through love of what he has . . . Because (God) has His own proper pulchritude, He wishes to multiply it through communication of His own similitude." [33] God's beauty exercises final causality inasmuch as " all things are made that they may somehow imitate the divine pulchritude. Third, it is an exemplary cause because all things are distinguished according to the divine Beauty, and a sign of this is that none care to represent or make effigies unless they are beatuiful." [34] A man enthralled by the beauty of reality naturally tends to express his reaction. Beauty elicits his artistic operations. It enters into the very shape and form of his painting and poetry. So too, the Divine Artist imitates His essence outside Himself. Imitation, of course, involves exemplary causality.

IV

In sketching what St. Thomas has to say about the conditions which give the beautiful its intelligibility, the discussion leads quite naturally to the source of integrity, consonance and clarity. It is like following the stream back to the pure crystal spring whence it began. It is a progressive inquiry in the line of causality. Having reached the ultimate in that direction it is necessary to about face and seek out the proper effect of beauty and its intuition. St. Thomas says that " beauty is that which being seen pleases." To complete an appreciation of what he means by that formula an explication of the final term is indispensable. A brief consideration of his doctrine on appetition in general is fundamental to an understanding of the exact

(concordant enim qui in eamdem sententiam conveniunt), et amicitiae quantum ad affectum, et communiones quantum ad actum, vel ad quodcumque extrinsecum; et universaliter omnes creaturae quantumcumque unionem habet, habent ex virtute pulchri. . . ."

[33] *In de Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 5: " Omnia enim facta sunt ut divinam pulchritudinem qualitercumque imitentur. Tertio, est causa exemplaris, quia omnia distinguuntur secundum pulchrum divinum, et hujus signum est quod nullus curat effigiare vel repraesentare nisi ad pulchrum. . . ."

[34] *Ibid.*

nature of this delight. Having isolated it in its properly human mode, it will then be possible to delve into the more complex modes of delight in contemplation.

The Angelic Doctor distinguishes three kinds of appetite: natural, elicited sense and the elicited intellectual appetite which is the will.[35] The natural appetite is a tendency rooted in and identified with the nature of a thing for its proper good antecedent to apprehension. It has no need of apprehension because it is one with the determined nature. Hence it operates of necessity.

The elicited sense appetite is a tendency to a particular good convenient to animal nature, following its sensile perception. The objects of this appetite are singular concrete goods. It desires this particular delectable object but never moves toward goodness in the abstract. Its movements are always accompanied by corporeal changes in the organism, the emotions. Unlike natural appetite it does not have a simple necessity in respect to its object but necessarily moves toward its good only after the perception of that good by sense.

The elicited intellectual appetite is similar to the sense appetite in that it needs to be preceded by cognition. It differs in that it follows intellectual cognition which has for its object not only singular things but primarily universal essences. Because the intellect penetrates to universal truth it also penetrates to the universal reason of goodness. The only necessity associated with the will is in relation to this universal good, *bonum in commune*. As regards particular goods contained under this universal it is entirely free. Properly speaking, emotions are not found in the will, but its movements are parallel to those of sense appetite; hence we also speak of them as emotions: love, hate, fear, sorrow, joy, desire, hope, despair, anger and the rest.

Now, just as the cognition of beauty was an accumulative process involving many faculties and many acts of these faculties but issuing into completion only in the fullness of intellectual judgment, so the charm peculiar to the experience of

[35] *Q. D. de Veritate*, q. 25, a. 1.

beauty is also an accumulation of various appetites issuing in a special kind of delight. First of all, the natural appetites of sense and intellect are allayed. Beautiful things are proportioned in themselves and proportioned to the senses. "Sense derives pleasure from things duly proportioned, as being similar to itself, for sense too is a kind of *ratio* like every cognitive power." [36]

The intellect also has a natural appetite for reality which is satisfied only in judgment where truth is found. "Truth itself is a certain good as intellect is considered as a thing and truth as its end." [37] On the side of elicited appetition, the emotion of joy in the sensile order must remain extrinsic to what formally constitutes the delight associated with beauty. The reason for this is that sense is incapable of any but a direct relation to the good. Its delight necessarily terminates in the object of sensibility rather than in the contemplation of that object. To assign the delight of knowing the beautiful to this faculty is to identify the beautiful and the good, a confusion certainly foreign to the mind of St. Thomas, who insists on their rational distinction.[38] The presence of emotion in the esthetic sentiment is undeniable. However, as a disposition it contributes to the integrity rather than to the essence of the experience. Emotion also enters into esthetic delight by way of overflow from the well-being of higher faculties.

Joy in knowing the beautiful is the satisfaction of our intellectual faculty of desire, the will, reposing in the proper good of its cognitive counterpart.[39] The happy exercise of the intellect coupled with a fullness of knowledge or truth produces the metaphysical well-being or perfection of this faculty, thus satisfying its natural appetite. This flowering of the intellect is

[36] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um: "Unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus cognoscitiva."

[37] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 3, ad 1um: "Unde et bonum quoddam verum est. Sed rursus et ipsum verum est quoddam bonum, secundum quod intellectus res quaedam est, et verum finis ipsius."

[38] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1: "Bonum dicitur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cujus apprehensio placet."

[39] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1.

immediately gathered up by the will, which then rests contented in the contemplation which its neighbor enjoys. For " the end and perfection of every other faculty is contained in the object of the appetitive faculty as the particular is enclosed in the general." [40] Beauty is thereby established in direct contact with the intellect and indirect and mediate contact with will. This complex relationship saves it from identification with either truth or goodness.

" The beautiful is the same thing as the good, differing only conceptually. That being good which all things desire, it is of the nature of good that the appetite is allayed by it: but it is of the nature of the beautiful that the appetite is allayed by the sight or knowledge of it . . . and so it is clear that the beautiful adds over and above the good a certain order to the cognitive potency. So, let that be termed good which simply gratifies the appetite; but let that be termed beautiful the mere apprehension of which gives pleasure." [41]

To summarize briefly the connatural mode of delight in the beautiful: there is a natural soothing of the senses charmed by colors or sounds. There is a satisfaction of the intellect's natural desire for existent reality. The perfect vision of the intellect is gathered in by the subject's own elicited appetite which delights in it as in a good. Furthermore, as cognition of the beautiful is particularized, so too will be the delight. This accounts for the delight connected with the properly human mode of appreciating beauty. It completes the explication of the Thomistic definition of beauty as that which being seen pleases.

[40] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2um: " . . . perfectio et finis cujuslibet alterius potentiae continetur sub objecto appetitivae sicut proprium sub communi. . . . Unde perfectio et finis cujuslibet potentiae, in quantum est quoddam bonum, pertinet ad appetitivam; propter quod appetitiva potentia movet alias ad suos fines, et ipsa consequitur finem quando quaelibet aliarum pertingit ad finem."

[41] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um: " . . . pulchrum est idem bono sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus. Sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in ejus aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus . . . unde sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum quemdam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam; ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui, pulchrum autem dicatur id cujus apprehensio placet."

Again it would be unfaithful to St. Thomas and experience to pass over without comment the more perfect modes of delight in contemplation. Just as there are various and progressively more perfect grades both in knowing and in the knowable, there are also fuller and more perfect realizations of the delight associated with contemplation. The Angelic Doctor approaches his discussion of these latter by carefully and precisely distinguishing a twofold joy found in contemplation.[42] The first springs from the very perfection of the cognitive act itself. "Delight follows upon a perfect operation."[43] The second is rooted in the object inasmuch as the beautiful is also the beloved. This is not a distinction between two totally different kinds of delight. Again it is a matter of accumulation. The delight in seeing the beloved adds a new formality to the delight of perfect operation. For example, a man may delight equally in seeing two women of equal beauty. Yet if one of them is his wife he takes a special delight in seeing her. There are two reasons for this augmentation. Love stimulates the mind to an ever fuller knowledge of the beloved. It is characteristic of lovers to have lengthy conversations. They are anxious to find out more about each other, to know each other better. Again, love effects a material disposition in the will which blends itself into all the future movements of that faculty. Love makes the will capable of new and intense desires, new hopes, new fears, and fuller joys.

[42] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 7: ". . . aliqua contemplatio potest esse delectabilis dupliciter. Uno modo, ratione ipsius operationis, quia unicuique delectabilis est operatio sibi conveniens secundum propriam naturam vel habitum. Contemplatio autem veritatis competit homini secundum suam naturam, prout est animal rationale. Ex quo contingit quod omnes homines natura scire desiderant: et per consequens et cognitione veritatis delectantur. Et adhuc magis fit hoc delectabile habenti habitum sapientiae et scientiae, ex quo accidit quod sine difficultate aliquis contemplatur.—Alio modo contemplatio redditur delectabilis ex parti objecti, in quantum scilicet aliquis rem amatam contemplatur; sicut etiam accidit in visione corporali quae delectabilis redditur non solum ex eo quod ipsum videre est delectabile, sed etiam ex eo quod videt quis personam amatam. Quia ergo vita contemplativa praecipue consistit in contemplatione Dei, ad quam movet caritas . . . inde est quod in vita contemplativa non solum est delectatio ratione ipsius contemplationis, sed etiam ratione ipsius divini amoris."

[43] Aristotle, *X Ethic.* IV, 6, 1174, b23.

Obviously the delight which enters into the definitive formula of beauty is the delight concerned with intellectual operation. The joy in knowing is the proper effect of the natural mode of esthetic experience. Certainly this natural mode is greatly enhanced when the beautiful one is also the beloved. This love should be understood as the natural emotion of friendship. Just as human science, both metaphysical and moral, disposes the intellect and makes it capable of appreciating more intellectual beauty, so too human love disposes the will and makes it capable of an added delight in contacting the beautiful. Thus the full and integral stature of the natural mode of esthetic experiences emerges, no longer isolated in a definition, but adequately expanded to cover the totality of normal experience. This experience is common to good men and evil men alike. However, for its full appreciation one should be disposed by a certain amount of logical and moral discipline, and one should have the appetites well rectified.

Mention has already been made of another mode of contemplation reserved for the good Christian. There is also a contemplative delight that is typically theological. With regard to this delight the same distinction between joy following perfect intellection and joy following upon knowing the beloved applies. However, the delight in simply knowing is not the precise formality of theological contemplation as it was in esthetic experience. Theological contemplation must have charity for its motive. Still this does not mean that it ceases to be contemplation, i. e., intellectual. It only means that the moving principle of this intellectual action is in the will.[44] And just as it has its motive force from the affections it also terminates in affection. Yet, antecedent to this termination in the will another virtue intervenes to solidify the contact between man and God. The first effect of contemplation upon the will is to elicit an act of

[44] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 1: "Et propter hoc Gregorius constituit vitam contemplativam in 'caritate Dei' in quantum scilicet aliquis ex dilectione Dei inardescit ad ejus pulchritudinem conspiciendam. Et quia unusquisque delectatur cum adeptus fuerit id quod amat, ideo vita contemplativa terminatur ad delectationem, quae est in affectu, ex qua etiam amor intenditur."

devotion from the virtue of religion.[45] Before the will of man can fully rejoice in the knowledge of God he must surrender himself to the principle and end of his existence by devotion. The price of his joy is an enslavement to God, the will of promptly abandoning himself to whatever pertains to divine worship.[46] Only when thus clothed can spiritual joy seize upon his soul.[47] He must not only be a lover of the Divine Goodness but a slave to the Divine Principle before he can hope to experience the Divine Beauty. And " this contemplation of divine things which is had by wayfarers though imperfectly is more delightful than all other contemplation however perfect it may be, because of the excellence of the one contemplated." [48] This experience develops in the life of a Christian as the gifts of the Holy Ghost become more operative and finally terminates in the vision of God in heaven of which the Psalmist says, " They shall be inebriated with the plenty of thy house; and thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of thy pleasure." [48a]

Obviously the devotional approach to theological beauty is inescapable. Without the theological and moral virtues there can be no godly esthete. These virtues must " make straight the way " in the human will. Only he that loves is born to God and knows God. Theology itself no longer gropes after God under the common aspect of being. By building upon the principles of Faith which have fallen from His own lips it reverently contacts its object under the very aspect of His Deity. In this life it is limited by the darkness of Faith. Still it is a beginning of the full vision of the Triune God in Heaven.

Even these few considerations of esthetic experience and theological contemplation point out quite definitely two differ-

[45] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 3, ad 1um: " Consideratio eorum quae nata sunt dilectionem Dei excitare, devotionem causant."

[46] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 1: " Unde devotio nihil aliud esse videtur quam voluntas quaedam prompte tradendi se ad ea quae pertinent ad Dei famulatum."

[47] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 4: " . . . devotio per se quidem et principaliter spiritualem laetitiam mentis causat."

[48] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 7, ad 3um: " Sed contemplatio divinorum quae habetur in via, etsi sit imperfecta, tamen est delectabilior omni alia contemplatione quantumcumque perfecta, propter excellentiam rei contemplatae."

[48a] Ps. 35, 9.

ent ways of looking at beauty, two different approaches to "that which being seen pleases." One attains the beauty that is connatural to man. The other pursues the beauty that is connatural to God. Theology has God for its proper object. God is the focal point of Sacred Doctrine. The beauty of this world falls within the embrace of theology only inasmuch as it has an order to God who is the efficient, final and exemplary cause of all created beauty. On the other hand, the natural mode of esthetic experience concentrates on the beauty of this world which lies within the proper object of the human mind. Since man himself is most connatural to man, human persons and human affairs occupy the center of this stage. Ultimately these two approaches to beauty differ because the mind can take two different attitudes toward reality and can terminate in two different ends. In contemplating an image the mind can terminate upon the image itself, its colors and proportions, its intrinsic properties. But the mind can also approach an image precisely as an image and terminate in the thing for which it is an image.[49] For example, the local photographer and the proud father both gaze upon a photograph. The photographer centers his thoughts upon the photograph itself, the lights and shadows and arrangement. But the father centers his thoughts upon the bouncing baby boy of which the picture is but an image. The theologian approaches this world as an image of God. For him the beauty of creation is but a symbol of the beauty of the Creator. His thoughts and affections do not terminate in the creature but tend toward God. The natural esthete concentrates upon the beauty intrinsic to the world. He takes the world quite literally. His thoughts and affections terminate in created beauty. This is the fundamental distinction between the two approaches to beauty. One takes the world literally and the other takes the world symbolically. One terminates in the beauty that is connatural to man. The other tends toward the beauty that is connatural to God.

[49] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 103, a. 3, ad 3um: "motus qui est in imaginem in quantum est imago refertur in rem cujus est imago, non tamen omnis motus qui est in imaginem refertur in eam in quantum est imago. Et ideo quandoque est alius motus specie in imaginem, et motus in rem."

V

The step by step procedure from the obvious to the obscure in delving into the meaning of " that which being seen pleases " leads to a fuller appreciation of that formula in all its varied aspects. The gradual ascent of the mind brings ever more complex applications into view. However, this procedure has to be reversed before moral science can be brought to bear on these complexities. A full understanding of the morality of esthetic experience involves a descent from the vantage point of metaphysics.

The metaphysician universalizes the factors of cognition, appetition, integrity, proportion and clarity. He reduces them to their basic characteristics. For him appetite is neither natural, sensile nor rational, but simply appetite. However, his generalizations do not proceed from logical confusion but from formal discernment. Only from this point of view is it possible to understand St. Thomas' statements about beauty and good.

Beauty, like goodness, is primarily in things, in objective reality. The Angelic Doctor says, " The beautiful is the same thing as the good, differing only conceptually. That being good which all desire, it is of the nature of good that the appetite is allayed by it; but it is of the nature of the beautiful that the appetite is allayed by the sight or knowledge of it . . . and so it is clear that the beautiful adds over and above the good a certain order to the cognitive potency. So, let that be termed good which simply gratifies the appetite, but let that be termed beautiful the mere apprehension of which gives pleasure." [50]

The first thing to note about this text is that being is the basic point of reference. The same reality is both beautiful and good. However, they are not to be totally confused. Each has a proper formality. Good adds to the notion of being a transcendental relation to the appetite. Beauty adds to a being a transcendent intelligibility which contacts the cognitive potency directly and the appetite indirectly. In differentiating goodness from beauty the cognitive and appetitive potencies are intro-

[50] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um.

duced as correlative points of reference. In this passage, St. Thomas does not probe into the reasons in being which underlie the different relations. In other places he consistently assigns integrity, consonance and clarity as the proper reasons of beauty.[51] In speaking more deliberately of the good he also consistently assigns mode, species and order as the proper reasons of good. By mode he understands a commensuration to material and efficient principles prerequisite to form. Being outside these causes the form has existence; by species he understands the specifying form itself; by order he understands an inclination to an end, or a final cause.[52]

Mode, species and order are the reasons in being underlying its transcendental relation to appetite which constitutes the good. Good thus has the character of a final cause. Integrity, consonance and clarity are the reasons of beauty which order beauty to cognitive potency. This gives beauty the character of a formal cause. In reality beauty and goodness are the same thing. Conceptually they differ. This is the general outline of the metaphysical analysis of beauty and goodness.

For a fuller understanding of the connection between beauty and goodness, and in order properly to synthesize the two, it is necessary to delineate with accuracy the precise roles of mode, species and order in good, and integrity, consonance and clarity in beauty. First, as regards good St. Thomas says that the word has a double signification. It signifies not only the relationship of perfectibility but also the basis or cause of that relationship. He says that order is the relationship itself, species and mode the cause. Species and mode materially dispose the object and render it remotely appetible. To be an end, to be perfectible of another, is what formally completes the reason of good.[53] This order or transcendental relation in good to reduce

[51] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8.

[52] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 5.

[53] *Q. D. de Veritate XI*, q. 21, a. 6: "Et per hunc modum ratio boni respectum implicat: non quia ipsum nomen boni significat ipsum respectum solum, sed quia significat id ad quod sequitur respectus, cum respectu ipso. Respectus autem qui importatur nomine boni, est habitudo perfectivi, secundum quod aliquid natus est perficere non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed secundum esse quod habet

an appetite into efficiency is the formal element among the three proper reasons of good. Order is what gives the good the character of a final cause.

Beauty also signifies both a reference or order to cognitive potency and the basis or cause of that reference. Clarity is what formally completes the reason of beauty. Integrity and proportion materially dispose the object. For example, color is the material cause in the object of sight, but light is what formally completes the reason of visibility.[54] Clarity itself implies a relationship to cognitive potency just as order itself implies a relationship to appetite. Integrity and consonance are the dispositions for clarity just as mode and species are the causes which render the good perfectible of another. The assimilation of beauty by a cognitive potency presupposes integrity and consonance. But information actually takes place because of the clarity of form. This element of beauty which enables it to inform or actualize a cognitive faculty is the formal complement among the three proper reasons of beauty.

St. Thomas gives the basis for synthesizing these various reasons of good and beauty by taking appetite as the basic point of reference. "That the appetite terminates in good, in peace and in beauty does not mean that it terminates in diverse things. From the very fact that one desires the good one also desires beauty and peace: beauty inasmuch as the thing is modified and specified in itself, which is included in the reason of good: but good adds the order of perfectibility to another.

in rebus. . . . Sic igitur inter ista tria quae Augustinus ponit, ultimum, scilicet ordo, est respectus quem nomen boni importat; sed alia duo, species scilicet, et modus, causant illum respectum. Species enim pertinet ad ipsam rationem speciei; quae quidem secundum quod in aliquo esse habet, recipitur per aliquem modum determinatum, cum omne quod est in aliquo sit in eo per modum recipientis. Ita igitur unumquodque bonum in quantum est perfectivum secundum rationem speciei et esse simul, habet modum, speciem et ordinem. Speciem quidem quantum ad ipsam rationem; modum quantum ad esse; ordinem quantum ad ipsam habitudinem perfectivi."

[54] *I Sent.*, d. 45, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1um: "in objecto alicujus potentiae est duo considerare: scilicet illud quod est materiale, et illud quod formaliter complet rationem objecti, sicut patet in visu: quia color est visibile in potentia, et non efficitur visibile in actu nisi per actum lucis. Similiter dico quod illud quod formaliter complet rationem voliti est finis, ex quo est ratio boni. . . ."

Hence whoever desires the good by that very fact desires beauty." [55] From this it is clear that the proper reasons of beauty, both formal and material, are regarded by the appetite as the material reasons of good. However, since the formal element of beauty has the character of a formal cause it is properly related to cognitive potency just as the formal element of good which has the character of a final cause properly relates it to appetite. But what is formal in beauty is only material in the good.

From this metaphysical point of view the reasons of beauty are an approach to good and the inseparable companion of the good. However, as these reasons are contracted and applied to different subjects important adjustments must be made. When God is the subject of beauty and good they are reduced to unity. In God there is no distinction between the reasons of goodness and His Good, between the reasons of beauty and His Beauty. "In the first cause, namely God, a distinction must not be made between beauty and pulchritude (the reason of beauty) so that His Beauty would be something different from His pulchritude. This is because the first cause contains all things in oneness because of His simplicity and perfection. Though in creatures beauty and pulchritude differ, in God they are contained as one and the same thing. . . ." [56] God is supersubstantially beautiful and the supreme and only purely honest good, the final cause of all that is. The enjoyment of His Beauty is inseparable from the love of His Goodness.

In creatures, however, the reasons of beauty and goodness are contracted and participated in multiplicity. Creatures have beauty and goodness. They are not beauty and goodness. Furthermore, in creatures there are various levels of beauty and

[55] *Q. D. de Veritate XI*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 12um: "appetitum terminari ad bonum et pacem et pulchrum non est terminari in diversa. Ex hoc enim ipso quod aliquid appetit bonum, appetit simul pulchrum et pacem: pulchrum quidem in quantum est in seipso modificatum et specificatum, quod in ratione boni includitur; sed bonum addit rationem perfectivi ad alia. Unde quicumque appetit bonum, appetit hoc ipso pulchrum. . . ."

[56] *In de Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 5: ". . . in causa prima, scilicet Deo, non sunt dividenda pulchrum et pulchritudo, quasi aliud sit in eo pulchrum et pulchritudo; et hoc . . . propter sui simplicitatem et perfectionem. . . ."

goodness. There is a physical beauty of body and a spiritual beauty of soul. Certainly the truly beautiful man will be a complexus of these various participations though the mind can isolate one or another according to its tastes. There is also a created participation of the honest good. Virtue is sought for its own sake. But actually even virtue has an aspect of útility in that it is a means to beatitude. The entitative good of existence, of course, is common to all. Corporeal beauty is often associated with utter uselessness. Feminine charm can lead the soul of man away from God. The best cooks are sometimes quite ugly. In creatures the beautiful and the good are not necessarily one and the same thing as in God. The isolated beauty of the creature is not always the infallible approach to man's true good.

The morality of esthetic experience depends ultimately on the coincidence of beauty and goodness. There is no problem about the morality of beatitude. Nor is there any problem about the theological approach to beauty. Theology has God for its object and views created beauty as a symbol leading to fuller knowledge and deeper love of God. God is the infinite and ultimate honest good. Knowing Him and loving Him and serving Him is the highest moral perfection of man. Only pride can turn this to man's condemnation. But the case is quite different with the natural mode of esthetic experience, which takes created beauty quite literally, rests in its isolated perfection and enjoys its soothing effects. When beauty is taken out of its divine context and severed from the commensuration of the honest good, it is not necessarily good in itself. It can be good or bad depending upon the attitude man takes toward it. Prudentially considered, this type of esthetic experience is only a useful good. It is for man's recreation. It is a remedy for the pain of weariness from the day's toil. It refreshes the soul in preparation for tomorrow's work. And work is ordained ultimately to contemplation. Only when thus ordered to the honest good does the natural mode of esthetic experience assume the character of true moral goodness.

VI

But this unfortunately is not the way the moderns look at beauty. Their historic disregard for the truths of philosophy and theology makes them easy prey to the lure of beauty. With unfailing ingenuity they confuse the natural and the sublime and level of perfections which should remain sharply distinct. The modern approaches the beauty that is connatural to man with all the devotion that belongs to the beauty that is connatural to God. He endows the natural mode of esthetic experience with all the advantages and none of the disadvantages of theological contemplation. Since the analytical notion of contemplation applies somehow to both he drops out the perfections of each and picks and chooses to his heart's content. Apparently in possession of all the grandeur of theology and philosophy, he becomes progressively more confirmed in his distaste for " scholastic encumbrances." The palpitating satisfactions of a mangled esthetic are readily available to the ingenius and the artistic. But the unfortunate result is that a mind which was made to know God is satisfied in knowing itself. For infatuated with the child of his own intellect, the modern distains that " Child " of the mind of God, the Incarnate Word which is the only source of fallen man's return to wisdom.

Having abandoned the solid moorings of truth and goodness it is little wonder that modern artists have turned to cultivating the ugly. With self-expression as a first principle their art necessarily conforms to themselves. In a measure the beauty of nature satisfies man's desire to know the concrete individual. Its effulgence and intelligibility make this possible. However, to emphasize the common notion that esthetic experience is intuition of the material individual and to deny the further limitation that this presupposes beauty in the object paves the way for the art of ugliness. The next step is to eliminate the conditions of beauty and impose by art an intelligibility that is neither true nor good. Hence, in the interests of complete freedom the modern masterpiece is utterly ugly.

Furthermore, in the very rational and analytical notions of

beauty and good there is a certain coincidence which is realized fully only in God. The modern applies that coincidence quite shamelessly to the creature. This confusion completes his abandonment of classic Christianity and rounds out his new religion of culture. He makes man's perfection consist in a life devoted to beauty for its own sake. Since his beauty is automatically good there is no need for the rigors of religion and the discipline of the sacraments. There is no need for virtue. There is no need for mortification. His cult is culture. Deep insights, intuitions and genius are his code. Beauty for its own sake is his creed. Like the chemist who isolates oxygen, the modern pursues beauty in a free state, liberated from God and liberated from the Church. But what the modern makes his perfection the Saints have shunned for folly. The Saints first looked after goodness and truth and beauty took care of herself. What the moderns need is a return to goodness and truth, to virtue and theology, then "beauty will take care of herself."

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INSTINCTIVE ESTIMATION OF PRACTICAL VALUES

PLANTS, animals, and men are contingently vital beings, and as such are subject to constant attacks by other forces which threaten to deprive them of their perfection of vitality. They must be able to orientate themselves properly to the world of external reality if they are to continue on in a state of life. Activity of many sorts is incumbent upon all of them if they are to live; but the activity demanded for life is not a disconnected, random activity, nor is it merely a speculative activity concerned only with contemplation of truth as such. In the plant domain there is no knowledge, no possibility of self-determination—in short, there is no psychic consciousness of any sort. But in the animal and human kingdoms there is a conscious life. The animal and the man must become aware of values, of subtle overtones accruing to each and every object of external reality existing in the milieu in which animal or man must seek the conditions needed for maintenance of life. This knowledge is not a speculative knowledge, it is interested rather in action. But art and prudence also are interested in action, and as a consequence it might be objected that there is confusion here in our distinction. Let it suffice to note that art and prudence are virtues of an intellectual nature, that their knowledge has a certain rational element which differentiates it from the pure sense knowledge which we encounter on the first level of psychic life. Moreover, the knowledge of art and prudence is orientated toward supplying the conditions for a higher type of life, a type not demanded for the simple predication of life on the physical level. The knowledge and consequent activity which men and animals share are concerned with the maintenance and propagation of physical life; their proper causality never rises above the sentient order. These capacities

for knowledge and action on the sense level are traditionally called instincts, and our purpose is to investigate their nature.

To categorize briefly the methods of considering instincts, we may say that instincts can be considered as psychophysiological phenomena of the cognitive order, or as biological functions. Those adopting the latter point of view may be divided into the mechanists and the vitalists. We are not as yet interested in investigating the nature of the knowledge of instincts, the transcendental relationship existing between this type of knowing power and the external world. We are here on the first level of abstraction where we shall consider properties of material vital forms by that abstraction proper to the biological sciences.

Instinctive activity is a phenomenon that has been one of the first properties of animal life remarked by all observers of vital activity. And among the striking characteristics of instinctive activity, its purposeful and unlearned method of functioning is paramount: from the very moment of birth creatures endowed with locomotion move about in their environment in such wise as to seek and appropriate those things which are conducive to the maintenance of life. The sensations that rush pell mell are in some manner sifted and judged, whereupon the useful are responded to positively and the harmful negatively. That is the fact—the explanation is more doubtful. Is there some factor in the instinctive process which is not to be predicated of the matter as such, but rather is a principle entangled in the matter of the body? We have arrived at the point whence arose two schools of biological thought, the Mechanists and the Vitalists.[1]

With the doctrine of Descartes the great dichotomy of reality was effected: all things could be classed either as spiritual, or thought, reality—in this realm all extension was excluded, or as matter, or extended reality—here all thought was excluded. The psychic was co-extensive with the realm of thought, and all outside of the psychic was to be equated with matter.

[1] I do not intend to go into a historical study of the doctrines on instinct held by various philosophers and psychologists. An excellent historical treatise on this matter can be found in the book of J. Drever, *Instinct in Man*, cc. 1-3.

Descartes is the first man we wish to consider, not so much because of any important doctrine that he might be able to render on the nature of instincts, as because he is a source of influences that were later to bear upon the development of the concept of instincts. The passions of the soul are to be distinguished, according to him, from those of the body. The passions of the soul are all those perceptions or cognitions found in us which are not caused by the soul, and which derive from things from without.[2] But to be a passion of the soul properly so called, such a perception cannot have any cause other than the soul. Of such a nature are joy, anger, and other psychic states caused either by excitation of the nerves or by some other cause.[3] The perceptions or passions of the body are hunger, thirst, and other such natural appetites, to which affective states such as " pain, heat and other affective states which we experience in our members " can be joined. These affective qualities are not in the objects outside us, but in ourselves.[4]

Descartes did not interest himself in a psychological investigation of these perceptions or passions, for he considered the passions explicable in terms of animal spirits which were transmitted along the nerves.[5] He did, however, have some idea of what shall later be refined into the concept of an instinct. The external world arouses in us various passions not because of qualities in the physical objects, but because of the different manners in which they aid or harm us. The passions dispose the soul to desire things which are by nature of use to the organism, and which ordinarily dispose the body to execute actions whereby we shall carry out some activity encompassing a useful end.[6]

[2] Descartes, *Les Passions de l'Ame*, part I, art. 17.

[3] *Ibid.*, part I, art. 25.

[4] *Ibid.*, part I, art. 24.

[5] *Ibid.*, part I, arts. 27 and 46.

[6] *Ibid.*, part II, art. 52: " Je remarque outre cela, que les objets qui meuvent les sens n'excitent pas en nous, diverses passions à raison de toutes les diversité qui sont en eux, mais seulement à raison des diverses façons qu'ils nous peuvent nuire ou profiter, ou bien en général être importants; et que l'usage de toutes les passions consiste en cela seul qu'elles disposent l'âme à vouloir les choses que la nature dicte nous être utiles, et à persister en cette volonté, comme aussi la même agitation des esprits qui a coutume de les causer dispose le corps aux mouvements qui servent à l'exécution de ces choses. . . . "

This is an important observation by Descartes, for it is pregnant with meaning for the theory of instinct. But Descartes is more important in the history of the theory of instinct because of the framework of thought which he set up, and within which he confined all speculation on vital phenomena. We should not be deceived, by the statements set forth by Descartes in his treatise on the passions of the soul, into thinking that he is a vitalist. For Descartes there were only two realities, extension and thought. These were mutually exclusive. Thought and all psychic processes—passions, sensations, etc.—were the attributes of the soul; and the soul was predicated of man alone. All that was below man, even though it exhibited vital phenomena, was not psychic but only mechanic, determined by laws of chemistry and physics. Thus was set up a dichotomy of reality which forced all investigators to attribute vital manifestations to the rational soul alone, and to deny all vital predicates to those beings which are not rational. This means that the animal nature was to be regarded as a machine incapable of any psychic activity. With the philosophical tenets furnished by the Cartesian teachings, biologists could approach the study of nonrational, or animal, life with the preconception that all phenomena found there would be explicable by the same principle used in the realms of physics and chemistry.[7]

In the more elaborated forms of the mechanistic interpretation of vital activity, we find two chief trends: one explains life on the basis of tropism, the other on the basis of reflex action. Of the tropism theory, Loeb may be cited as the chief proponent among modern biologists, while Spencer and Pavlov are well known for their advocacy of the reflex theory.

[7] Malebranche, a direct disciple of Descartes' teaching, gives fine expression to the logical results of the Cartesian dichotomy when he says: "Les animaux n'ont donc ni intelligence ni âme, comme on l'admet habituellement. Ils se reproduissent sans le savoir, ils ne souhaitent rien. Ils mangent sans satisfaction, ils crient sans souffrances, ne craignent rien, ne connaissent rien et, lorsqu'ils agissent d'une façon qui semble indiquer de l'intelligence, c'est parce que Dieu a creé les animaux pour les maintenir en vie et qu'il a formé leurs corps de telle façon que machinalement et sans crainte ils evitent tout ce qui pourrait amener leur perte." Quoted by F. Buytendijk, *Psychologie des Animaux*, 279.

According to Loeb the current idea of instincts as manifestations of purposeful behavior irreducible to physico-chemical principles is a " diehard " remnant of the old *a priori* doctrine of " design " in the universe.[8] The truth can be learned about instincts by showing that they are founded on principles which are valid in physics. The most striking phenomena to prove the purely material nature of instinctive activity are to be found in cases of heliotropism. There are other types of tropisms which play an important part in instinctive action, such as chemotropism and stereotropism, but Loeb has dealt primarily with the heliotropism in his book *The Organism as a Whole.* The positively heliotropic animal cannot tear itself loose from the attraction of light, for it is bound to seek the light with the same blind determinism that marks any chemical or physical reaction. Thus Loeb explains the basis of his theory:

. . . Animals possess photosensitive elements on the surface of their bodies, in the eyes, or occasionally also in epithelial cells of their skin. These photosensitive elements are arranged symmetrically in the body and through nerves are connected with symmetrical groups of muscles. The light causes chemical changes in the eyes (or the photosensitive elements of the skin). The mass of photochemical reaction products formed in the retina (or its homologues) influences the central nervous system and through the tension of energy production of the muscles. If the rate of photochemical reaction is equal on both eyes this effect on the symmetrical muscles is equal, and the muscles of both sides of the body work with equal energy; as a consequence the animal will not be deviated from the direction in which it was moving. This happens when the axis or plane of symmetry of the animal goes through the source of light, provided only one source of light be present. If, however, the light falls sidewise upon the animal the rate of photochemical reaction will be unequal in both eyes and the rate at which the symmetrical muscles of both sides of the body work will no longer be equal; as a consequence the direction in which the animal moves will change. This change will take place in one of two ways, according as the animal is either positively or negatively heliotropic; in the positively heliotropic animal the resulting motion will be toward, in the negatively heliotropic from, the light. Where we

[8] J. Loeb, *The Organism as a Whole,* 233.

have no central nervous system, as in plants or lower animals, the tension of the contractile or turgid organs is influenced in a different way, which we need not discuss here.[9]

That these tropistic actions are beneficial to both the individual and the species—thus fulfilling all the purposes for which the concept of instincts was instituted as an explanation of a particular type of vital activity— is proved by Loeb from his experiments with the caterpillars of *Porthesia chrysorrhea*.[10] Loeb's theory, therefore, reduces all explanations of vital phenomena to a strict mechanism, and offers as corroboration of its tenets definite experimental proof. But biologists have not been unanimous in their acceptance of his explanations. Buytendijk and Jennings have examined the statements of Loeb and have found them insufficient; consequently, our attention must now turn to the refutation of the tropism theory.

Jennings has done extensive work in investigating the validity of the tropism theory, and through his experiments with infusoria he has added many facts which cause doubt to be thrown upon this theory.

According to Jennings there are two main points in this theory: (1) All movements of organisms, be they approach or flight, can be attributed to orientation, by which is meant that, without any self-determination on the part of the organism, it must either approach or withdraw from the source of stimulation. (2) The stimulating force controlling movement does not produce its effect upon the whole body but only upon that

[9] *Ibid.*, 257-258.

[10] Cf. *ibid.*, 280-283. Loeb extends his tropism theory to explain certain activities in higher animals such as man. For instance the love a man has for a woman is only a complex tropism consisting of secretions of the sexual glands into the blood stream, coupled at the same time with memory images of the beloved. Removal of the sex glands will cause the disappearance of the affection. "L'amour constant d'un homme pour un sujet féminin déterminé nous peut apparaître comme un exemple de volition persistante et pourtant c'est un tropisme compliqué, par lequel des substances des glandes sexuelles sont déversées dans le sang et, des images mémoratives définies en sont les facteurs determinants. L'ablation des glandes sexuelles fait disparaître l'amour et la substitution des glandes sexuelles d'un sujet par celles d'un autre sexe conduirait à l'inversion totale des instincts sexuels." Quoted by Buytendijk, *op. cit.*, 53-54.

part where it directly impinges. In those parts of the body which are directly affected, it causes direct changes in the state of contraction of the motor organs of the directly affected part of the body, and to these direct changes is due the movement of the organism.[11] The problem, then, shapes up into two questions to which an answer must be sought: (1) Is the behavior we observe in these organisms brought about by orientation in the manner demanded by the tropism theory? (2) Is there conclusive evidence that the stimulus acts directly up the motor organs of that part of the body which the stimulus affects? We shall here set down the results obtained by Jennings from his experiments in which he subjected small organisms to various types of stimuli.

1. Reactions to mechanical stimuli. The mechanical stimuli consisting of touching or striking the body with a hard object over a definite area do not serve too well to set up the conditions necessary for a tropistic reaction; but they will serve to give us some general information on the reaction to stimuli.

Mechanical shock as a rule causes animals to turn away from the source of the stimulus, and in higher animals the turning away is usually from the side stimulated. What is worthy of note is that Jennings finds that in ciliate infusoria the movement of avoidance is not due to an external but to an internal factor: sylonychia turns to the right whether it is stimulated on the right or the left side, the dorsal area, or the anterior end. Consequently, we cannot say that the action is merely upon the motor organs of the part stimulated, for if this were so there would be no explanation for this constant turning to the right

[11] Jennings, *Behavior of Lower Organisms*, 92. In the same place he gives the following quotation from Loeb in which these two points are set forth: "The explanation of them (the tropisms) depends first upon the specific irritability of certain elements of the body surface, and, second, upon the relations of symmetry of the body. Symmetrical elements at the surface of the body have the same irritability; unsymmetrical elements have a different irritability. Those nearer the oral pole possess an irritability greater than that of those near the aboral pole. These circumstances force an animal to orient itself toward a source of stimulus in such a way that symmetrical points on the body surface are stimulated equally. In this way the animals are led without will of their own either toward the source of stimulus or away from it."

no matter where the stimulus is applied. The organism must react as a whole, and directly, to the stimulus—not partially and indirectly. How else can this constancy of action be explained? [12]

Studies on the reaction of the flatworm to mechanical stimuli have been made by Pearl, and from his experiments he concludes that when the flatworm turns towards the source of stimulation in a positive reaction the cause is not to be sought in the simple explanation of the motor organs of the stimulated part reacting alone and directly, but rather in the unified response of the organism.

> A light stimulus, when the organism is in a certain definite condition, sets off a reaction involving (1) an equal bilateral contraction of the circular musculature, producing the extension of the body; (2) a contraction of the longitudinal musculature of the side stimulated, producing the turning toward the stimulus (this is the definitive part of the reaction); and (3) contraction of the dorsal longitudinal musculature, producing the raising of the anterior end. In this reaction the sides do not act independently, but there is a delicately balanced and finely coordinated reaction of the organism as a whole, depending for its existence on an entirely normal physiological condition.[13]

Such experimental data serve to throw no little discredit upon the postulate of the tropism theory in which it is stated that all movement is explicable by the reaction of the motor organs in the part directly stimulated. For here we see the entire musculature reacting with a unified movement in response to a stimulus.

2. Reactions to chemicals. Considering reactions of this type as they bear upon the postulate concerning the orientation to stimuli which the organism is forced to assume by the nature of the stimuli, Jennings concludes from his studies in various sorts of Ciliata, Bacteria, Flagellata, Rotifera, and flatworms, that nowhere has the typical reaction been found to take the form demanded by the tropism theory. In these organisms he has observed a certain motor reflex consisting of a

[12] Jennings, *op. cit.*, 94-95. [13] Quoted by Jennings, *op. cit.*, 95.

backing away, followed by a turning toward a structurally defined side, but without any regard for the direction whence comes the diffusion of the chemical. According to the tropism theory, the organisms should assume a definite position to the stimulating source, which should figure as the dominating factor in determining action of these organisms, but the facts deny this postulate.[14]

3. Reactions to light. The phenomenon manifested in the reaction to stimuli of light has served as the chief basis for the theory of tropisms. In the presence of light the organism usually shows a definite orientation towards the source of the stimulus: the axis of the body will usually move parallel to the light, be it in approaching or retreating from the light. This fact appears to serve as fine corroboration of the tropism theory, but the matter must be more thoroughly investigated. The question remains whether or not this orientation takes place with the determinism characteristic of the physical laws which the tropism theory claims explain all vital activity. In the case of bilateral animals, it is found difficult to test the theory because the animals may turn toward either side, and, consequently, it is a problem whether the turning is due to the direct action on the motor organs of the part affected, or is the result of the organism reacting as a whole to a stimulus because of some physiological change induced by the stimulus.[15]

Jennings has carried on experiments with Stentors having a negative phototaxis; the point he wished to show was that these animals turned away from light not in a reaction to a difference in illumination, as the tropism theory demands, but rather in reaction to a structurally defined side without any regard for the direction whence the light comes, or for the side of the

[14] Jennings, *op. cit.*, 96, quotes the following from Pearl's study on flatworms' reaction to chemicals: "Planaria does not orient itself to a diffusing chemical in such a way that the longitudinal axis of the body is parallel to the lines of diffusing ions. Its reactions to chemicals are motor reflexes identical with those to mechanical stimuli. The positive reaction is an orienting reaction in the sense that it directs the anterior end of the body toward the source of stimulus with considerable precision but it does not bring about an orientation of the sort defined above."

[15] Jennings, *op. cit.*, 98-99.

animal upon which it falls. The typical motor reaction of a Stentor which appears in the response of the animal to mechanical, chemical, and heat stimuli, is to stop or swim backward a short way, then turn to the right aboral side, and continue its forward motion. When a Stentor moves from the shaded area into a lighted area, Jennings has observed the following positions of the animal and the respective reactions from each position:

A. Reaching the lighted portion with its aboral side directed toward the light, the Stentor performs its usual turn toward the aboral side, thus swinging its anterior end toward the source of light. But this is in opposition to the orientation postulated by the tropism theory, for that posulate states that the animal will always assume a position in which its body axis is parallel to the rays of light. What actually happens is that the anterior end is swung past the point where the light falls on it directly until the animal is again directed into the shadows.

B. The Stentor may arrive at the lighted portion with its aboral side directed away from the light, whereupon, turning as usual to the aboral side, it swings the anterior end away from the light source.

C. Again upon entering into the light with the aboral side directed upward or downward or in some other intermediate position, the Stentor will turn to the right aboral side no matter which way this side is directed.[16]

Jennings has concluded, therefore, that the reaction of Stentor is one of the whole organism, resulting from an illumination of the whole organism. The direction of the light makes no difference in the reaction: the reaction is always the same, i. e., turning towards the right aboral side until the anterior end is removed from the light. There is not observable any fact showing that direct orientation to the light is present, as demanded by the tropism theory. According to this theory the turning of the organism should be directed into the line of the external source of energy, should be determined by the side upon which

[16] Jennings, *op. cit.*, 76-77.

this force impinges. But, in fact, the reaction is not determined by external factors, rather it is regulated by internal factors; that is to say, the animal determines its reaction to the stimulus and is not the inert pawn of a material force acting upon it. In the Stentor the typical reaction to a light stimulus is not that demanded by the tropism theory. For instance, in a Stentor placed at a right angle to a source of light falling upon its right side, the tropism theory would state that the reaction would consist of a ninety-degree swing of the anterior end, facing away from the stimulus. What actually happens is that the anterior end is swung in an arc towards the light until the anterior end has somewhat passed the hundred and eighty degree angle, and is pointing diagonally away from the stimulus.[17]

From these experimental data passed in review here, we may safely conclude that the postulates of the tropism theory are not borne out in reality. Orientation, as understood by the proponents of the tropism theory, cannot account for the movements of animals into, or out of, certain regions; for these movements are not orientated with a strict determinism imposed by the external agent. Rather they are movements depending upon internal factors of structure and of conditioning by experience. Even in the case of phototaxis, where it seems that tropism has some basis for its assertions, there is not a determinism, but rather a typical movement or motor reaction independent of the source of the stimulus is observable. Again, the facts deny the assertion that the organism does not react as a whole to the stimulus, but that only the motor organs of the part stimulated react directly. No matter upon what side the Stentor receives the stimulus, its typical motor reaction is towards the right aboral side. In these experiments with mechanical, chemical, and light stimuli, the organism has always appeared to react as a whole, and not as a part, to the new element introduced into its vicinity. Armed with the experimental data afforded by Jennings we may turn to answer two questions: Is the positive or negative movement of an animal imperative or forced? Are

[17] Jennings, *op. cit.*, 43-45. For diagram illustrating the last statement see page 44 of same work.

all changes in direction of movement to be explained by the unequal action of some stimulus upon the sides of the body? Clearly, the movements are not determined imperatively by the external factor, as is shown by the Stentor who may take any direction in swinging its anterior end away from the light. If these movements were determined as are physical phenomena, there could be no variation in the course of reaction followed. Nor can the second question be answered in the affirmative, for the Stentor carries out its typical motor reaction of turning toward the right aboral side no matter what side of the body is stimulated.

Beside the tropistic mechanists may be placed the reflex mechanists who explain vital phenomena on the basis of reflex action. This form of mechanism differs from the tropistic form in that it is limited to those vital beings in which a nervous system is discernible. The advocates of this theory deny any factors in behavior that transcend the material. The milieu in which the animal moves, and to which it must orientate itself, has no significance, no potentialities for activity upon the organism, beyond the physical energies with which it bombards the senses of the animal. But, be it noted, in delving into the nature of the environment, or object, determining the animal's activity, we have at the same time been gaining insight into the animal's powers of apprehending external fact. For between an operative power and its object there is a perfect proportion, so that neither the power nor the object has any meaning without reference to the other.[18] Consequently, if for the reflex mechanists the environment of the animal is a mass of merely physical nerve stimuli, then it follows that the animal is nothing more than a mass of in some way coordinated afferent and efferent nerve fibres connected to appropriate receptor and effector organs.

Spencer begins his treatment of instinct by describing it as a compound reflex action.[19] Instinct is to be distinguished

[18] Aristotle, *De Anima*, 425 b, 26-27: *ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐστι ἡ αὐτὴ μέν καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐταῖς.*

[19] H. Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, I, 432.

from simple reflexes in which a single impression is followed by a single contraction; nor is instinct merely a more developed form of reflex in which a single impression is followed by a combination of contractions. In instincts there is both a combination of impressions and a combination of contractions; both the directive and executive side are complex and grow more complex the higher the instinct is.[20]

But Spencer does not place instinct on the same level as simple reflex action as the latter is found in internal visceral functions. He sees in instinct a reduction of many diffused simultaneous stimuli into a unified system of impressions. This unity is brought about by the rapid procession of the stimuli through some ganglion which is subject to the influence of all of the stimuli, and to the particular change characteristic of the action of each. These changes, he thinks, are recorded in some sort of rudimentary consciousness. Moreover, instinct differs from simple bodily activity in that it answers to more specialized features of the environment, while the simple reflex will react to the general relations existing between all organisms and their environments.[21]

In the course of evolution certain internal states—whose nature is difficult to determine—have come to follow each other in a certain order, and each time they become more closely joined until finally these states become inseparable. Subsequently one state cannot be aroused without having the joined states spring into being at the same time. Here, then, is the evolution of an instinct: the repetition of certain psychic states arranged in a definite order becomes embedded in the nature of a species after generations in which the identical experience has been repeated. Eventually there is an automatic connection set up between the modes of reaction and the external relations constantly experienced. Instinct, therefore, results from the closer and closer adhesion of definite inner states in response to definite objects in the environment exercising a physical influence upon the subject. Instinct is the expression of a heredi-

[20] *Ibid.*, I, 433-434. [21] *Ibid.*, 434-435.

tary relationship of subject to object evolved by generations of identical experience.[22]

For Pavlov and most members of the Russian school, there is no source of motivation except the physiological one, and all internal and external activity can be considered successfully "from a purely physiological angle." All activity can be explained on the basis of neurological facts, for the nervous system is that physiological factor which integrates all parts of the organism within itself and orientates it in regard to the environment in which it finds itself, tending to set up an equilibrium between the two. Pavlov distinguishes between the two functions by terming the former, the inner synthetic process, the *lower* order of activity; and the latter, that concerned with behavior, the *higher* order of activity. Motion is the visible manifestation of the higher animal behavior. It results from the skeleto-muscular activity in which there is a hierarchy of functions; on the lower levels there is activity of single muscles, while on the higher level there are small groups of muscles acting as functional units. As we rise in the order of activity, we encounter locomotor acts in which there is a higher integration. Besides this activity there is an activity of the organism of a special type. It consists of movements destined to propagate the species and preserve the organism. These functions consist of motor and secretory reactions. Such actions consist of two distinct aspects: there is a complete synthesis between activity of internal organs for the carrying out of a definite type of external motor activity; secondly, these synthesized movements are ruled by a rigid law which makes them susceptible to the influence of only definite kinds of stimuli. These mechanically determined movements are "unconditioned reflexes," called by some "instincts, tendencies, inclinations, etc." [23]

[22] *Ibid.*, 436-442.

[23] I. P. Pavlov, "A Brief Outline of the Higher Nervous Activity," *Psychologies of 1930*, 207: "At the present moment, on the basis of thirty years of experimentation carried out by me together with my numerous co-workers, I feel fully justified in asserting that the total external as well as internal activity of a higher animal, such as a dog, can be studied with complete success from a purely physiological angle, i. e., by the physiological method and in terms of the physiology of the

The anatomical basis of these activities is to be found in the basal ganglia and the cerebral hemispheres. The basal ganglia of themselves are not capable of executing the proper " analysis and synthesis of the external milieu " without the aid of the cerebral hemispheres. These hemispheres gather together the various stimuli, differentiate between them or combine them so as to make of them " signals of basic and necessary conditions of the external milieu." With this refining of the influences from the external world, the ganglia, whose activity is towards this world of outer reality, can adjust their activity so that it can orientate the organism in its activity towards the objects about it in the way best suited to the interests of the organism.[24]

nervous system. . . . The activity of the nervous system is directed, on the one hand, towards unification, integrating the work of all the parts of the organism, and, on the other, towards connecting the organism with the surrounding milieu, towards an equilibrium between the system of the organism and the external conditions. The former part of nervous activity may be called *lower* nervous activity in contradistinction to the latter part, which because of its complexity and delicacy, may justly take the name of higher nervous activity, which is usually called animal or human behavior. The chief manifestation of higher animal behavior, i. e., its visible reaction to the outside world, is motion—a result of its skeleto-muscular activity accompanied to some extent by secretion due to the activity of glandular tissues. The skeleto-muscular movement, beginning on the lower level with the activity of separate muscles and of small groups of muscles on the upper, reaches a higher integration in the locomotor acts, in the equilibrium of a number of separate parts, or of the whole organism in motion, with the force of gravity. Moreover, the organism in its surrounding milieu, with all its objects and influences, performs special movements in accordance with the preservation of the organism and of its species. These constitute reactions to food, defense, sex, and other motor and, partly, secretory reactions. These special acts of motion and secretion are performed, on the one hand, with a complete synthesis of the internal activity of the organism, i. e., a complete synthesis of the internal organs for the realization of a given external motor activity; on the other hand, they are excited in a stereotyped way by definite and not numerous external and internal stimuli. We call these acts *unconditioned*, special, complex *reflexes*. Others attribute to them various names: instincts, tendencies, inclinations, etc. The stimuli of these acts we shall call correspondingly *unconditioned* stimuli."

[24] *Ibid.*, 208: " The anatomical substratum of these activities is to be found in the subcortical centers, the basal ganglia nearest to the cerebral hemispheres. These unconditioned, special reflexes constitute the most essential basis of the external behavior of the animal. However, alone these responses of the higher animal without any additional activities, are not sufficient for the preservation of the individual and the species. A dog with extirpated cerebral hemispheres may manifest all these responses and yet, abandoned, it unavoidably perishes in a very short

Pavlov's doctrine is a pure expression of the most radical theory of mechanism as the ruling principle of all animal and human activity. By setting up the basal ganglia and the cerebral hemispheres as the judges at whose decisions the organism responds to the inrush of the external stimuli, he has with the utmost directness reduced all life to a reciprocal action of chemical and physical forces in which there is no room for self-determination. At best the physico-chemical forces, under the modality of living matter, exhibit the phenomenon of being conditioned to respond to other stimuli than the naturally ordained stimulus. But this ability of modified, conditioned response is not due to an essential or radical difference between living and inanimate matter; there are certain properties of matter which can be realized only under the conditions accruing to what we call life.

As a point of departure in our brief consideration of the mechanist doctrine, we should note that mechanism reduces the animal to a mere reflex machine. The animal is one expression of physical phenomena. Yet in decerebrated animals we have evidence which does not entirely justify the mechanistic hypothesis. For such animals, although there is a reaction to physical stimuli, the sensations have no meaning; there is no perception in the proper sense of that word. For instance, a decerebrated falcon will leap at a mouse introduced into her cage, but once the mouse is seized nothing further happens.[25] For animals thus

time. In order that the individual and the species be preserved a supplementary apparatus must, of necessity, be added to the basal ganglia—the cerebral hemispheres. This apparatus makes a thorough analysis and synthesis of the external milieu, i. e., it either differentiates or combines its separate elements in order to make of them or their combinations numberless signals of basic and necessary conditions of the external milieu, towards which is directed and set the activity of subcortical ganglia. In this manner the ganglia have the opportunity to adjust, with fine precision, their activity to external conditions—finding food where it may be found, avoiding danger with certainty, etc. Moreover, a further important detail to be considered is that these numberless external agents, now isolated and now combined, are not permanent but only temporary stimuli of subcortical ganglia, in accordance with the incessant fluctuations of the environment, i. e., only when they signal correctly the fundamental and necessary conditions for the existence of the animal, which conditions serve as unconditioned stimuli of these ganglia."

[25] M. Prince, *The Unconscious*, 235.

maimed there is no difference between objects as far as significance is concerned. These facts, of course, seem to substantiate the mechanistic hypothesis concerning animal behavior. Yet this is too simple and shallow an explanation. The decerebrated animal does not prove conclusively that animal behavior is the result of merely mechanical activity. It shows that for the perfection of animal action there is demanded as a prerequisite a perfect neural foundation including as its most important factor an intact cerebrum. That the neural basis is necessary as a partial cause cannot be denied by anyone; but there is a great difference between attributing to the cerebrum the function of a partial cause and predicating the cerebrum as the proper and only cause of animal activity.

Animal activity is marked by an apparent teleology which cannot be explained satisfactorily on a purely neurological basis. It is objected that teleology is a concept read into animal activity by the human; but by teleology in animal action we mean only that there is observable in animal functions that action resulting in attainment of goals beneficial to both species and individual, and this is a type of action identical with that action of ourselves which we term teleological. That the cerebrum and all neuro-muscular and skeleto-muscular apparatus in the animal is necessary as a partial cause in the functioning of the animal is not denied. But that the cerebrum or any other part of the physiological organism can be predicated as the proper cause of animal activity, we say, is not apparent. The experiments with decerebrated animals are not conclusive proofs of the mechanistic theory. Indeed, even a man such as Loeb has recourse to an entity like memory to account for the anomalies in the action of these maimed animals.[26]

These decerebrated beasts act without purpose yet they still have their "inherited neural arrangements and dispositions." But even with these assets the animal cannot behave with that teleology which is observable in the activity of a normal organism. The crucial point is not that the actions of the animal are

[26] Prince, *op. cit.*, 275-276.

interfered with, but that the direction of these actions has been destroyed. It is difficult to believe that the cerebrum, which does not differ essentially, but only in complexity, from the subcortical levels, should be able of itself to induce into a milieu the distinctly immaterial note of significance or meaning. Schraeder eloquently states that for the pigeon deprived of its cerebrum

> . . . everything is only a mass of matter in space, it moves aside for every pigeon or attempts to climb over it, just as it would in the case of a stone. All authors agree in the statement that to these animals all objects are alike. They have no enemies and no friends. They live like hermits no matter in how large a company they find themselves. The languishing coo of the male makes as little impression upon the female deprived of its cerebrum as the rattling of peas or the whistle which formerly made it hasten to its feeding place. Neither does the female show interest in its young. The young ones that have just learned to fly pursue the mother, crying unceasingly for food, but they might as well beg food of a stone.[27]

As the quotation states, relations such as that of enemy and friend, or mother and offspring, no longer exist for this animal which has become a physiological reflex automaton. But in the cerebrum we would only have had a greater synthesis of the physical energies given off by the corporeal or material part of that object known by the animal to be a friend or an enemy, an offspring or one not of the brood. There is here some element not contained in the purely physical energies, something that cannot be sensed. By no power of synthesis of nervous impulses can there be introduced the note of friend or enemy. To account for this more subtle aspect of an object which determines the reaction of a normal animal to this object, we must look to some other factor, a factor not allowed for by the pure mechanist. That the cerebrum is a partial cause in animal activity is to be conceded completely, and consequently its destruction will hinder the animal in its functions. The hindrance will not be, however, on the directive side, but only on the motor side. To account for the lack of direction we must have some power that can interpret the meaning of the impulses received and

[27] Quoted by Prince, *op. cit.*, 236.

synthesized by the cerebrum—there must be a psyche, a vital force, capable of giving direction to those motor acts begun by the impulses that are received in and synthesized by the cerebrum. Only a double causality consisting of a psychic as well as a physiological, which is primarily neural, activity can account for animal behavior.

With this final consideration of mechanistic theories we have come to the end of the part of this study in which we have been able to consider the question of instincts with the abstraction proper to biological sciences. Heretofore we have been involved in an investigation whose principal concern was to sift out principles from the mass of sense data furnished us from observation of animal life. We have now reached the point at which we go behind the wall of sense data to investigate the source of these activities that we have observed. Here we encounter the difference between the mechanistic and the vitalistic biologists: the former deny that there is a " beyond the material " realm in which to seek for the source of the animal's activity; while the latter posit the existence of some immaterial principle residing within the vital material being as the source of its mode of activity. But even the vitalistic biologist cannot pierce the veil of phenomena to consider this immaterial principle—that is proper to the philosopher of nature whose *habitus scientiae* is such that it fits him to consider the nature of this vital principle, this form whose connatural mode of existence is in matter.[28]

[28] The division of sciences, laid down by Aristotle in his treatise *De Anima*, I, 403 b, 9-16, and later elaborated by St. Thomas in his *Commentarium super Boethii de Trinitate*, q. 5, is of special relevance for those engaged in studies of biology, epistemology, or psychology. The confusion of these three fields and the consequent invalidation of conclusions arrived at, is largely due to an ignorance of the proper orientation of the respective sciences, of the principles commanding each of these sciences, and of the application of these principles in these three departments of knowledge. Both the biologist and the psychologist find their proper place in the first sphere of abstraction where forms are considered which can neither be thought of nor exist without a relationship to matter. In this sphere one abstracts entirely from the individuality proper to material beings, and considers them as material beings *qua* such. Yet within this sphere whose proper object is *ens mobile seu sensibile*, the investigator can follow an ascending or descending progression; i. e., insofar as one follows the ascending progression the analysis will emphasize the term *ens*, the investigation will concern itself not with that which is more material

In all of the theories so far reviewed there are certain elements of truth, but they have failed to analyze the specific nature of instinct with sufficient acuteness. In the instinct it is true that the reflex mechanism is of essential importance, but this activity is not to be equated with instinct. It is true that instinct seems to be somewhere between pure reflex activity and intelligent operation; and, too, the idea that instincts are a sympathetic intuition or divining of one object by another has a place in a theory of instinct. But in none of these attempts to explain instinct has there been a sufficiently accurate analysis and specification of instinct. It is the purpose of the following portions of this article to give a more accurate description of the instinct as it exists in all beings sharing in the animal nature. But our task must go further: each instinct is one element of a higher power of the animal nature. The animal is endowed with a certain discrimination constituted by an amalgamated whole of instinct modified by experience. Our immediate problem, however, is: What is instinct?

Two recent scholars, McDougall and Buytendijk, have done very much to clarify the concept of the instinct. A summary of their views may be stated in the following manner: the instinct is an inherited or innate disposition of the psycho-physical entity, by which the organism is determined to be attentive to certain objects in its environment, to experience a certain tone

but within that which is more formal. Such is the procedure of the philosopher of nature, in our case the psychologist, whose purpose is not to content himself with the manifestations of the vital principle, but rather to investigate the nature of this principle which is the most formal aspect of vital material being. The biologist, on the other hand, will proceed by the descending analysis, stressing the *mobile seu sensibile* aspect, until he has arrived at the purely phenomenological facts which refuse further analysis. The biologist is concerned with the material manifestations of the activity of the psyche: he will observe manners of local motion, of feeding, of generation, colors, size, etc., of various animals.

The field of the epistemologist is that of the third order of abstraction, where one considers forms which do not depend upon matter either for existence or intelligibility. Here is classed the transcendental relation which is proper to knowledge, since knowledge is such a relation between the object and the knowing power. Neither knowing power nor object of knowledge is intelligible without this relation to each other; while the actuality or perfection of the knowing power is that of the object.

of feeling upon the perception of this object, and to react, or at least to experience an impulse to react, in a certain manner to this particular object. The reaction does not take place at all times and everywhere, but is conditioned by spatio-temporal relations and involves a certain excitation from outside as well as certain internal forces. The instinctive action ordinarily involves a complexity of acts which follow each other according to certain definite laws and depend upon each other in the execution of the whole process.[29]

We must emphasize the fact that the instinct is not merely an innate disposition to certain kinds of movement; as Buytendijk remarks, it is a psychic basis for various kinds of activity. The specificity of an instinct is not to be sought in physiological mechanisms but rather in the psychic life. The physiological factor is an essential part of instinctive activity but it is of the essence of instinct in function of material cause. A material cause can never account for the specificity or intelligibility of anything; its role is that of the determinable. Insofar as instinct is physiological it is on the same level as any other physiological activity; yet since the physiological factor is a part of the essence of the instinct, we cannot neglect it. Between the structure of an animal and its instinctive actions we find a very close bond, so that the structure of the animal will make possible and facilitate the performance of the instinctive action. As an instance of this we may cite the field-spider which, when its foot is seized by an enemy, can detach this member immediately from the rest of the body, and thus

[29] W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 30: "We may, then, define an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action."

Buytendijk, *op. cit.*, 109: ". . . Il est préférable de définir l'instinct dans le sens le plus large, comme la base psychique d'un complexe d'actions que l'animal exécute par nature (inné), sous des conditions spéciales de temps et de lieu, actions prevenant d'excitations extérieures et d'influences internes de l'organisme. Ce complexe d'actions est constitué d'une serie d'actions élémentaires, qui dépendent les une des autres suivant des lois fixes et qui se succèdent les unes les autres."

flee its assailant. But the detached member continues to give evidences of life by a continuance of its contractions; and these movements are of the greatest help to the field-spider, for its traditional enemies—coleopters, etc.—will eat only that food which is living. Consequently the attacker occupies himself with this pseudo-vital appendage while the field-spider escapes.[30]

From the structure of an animal or insect we may often deduce the operations which the organism will perform in its instinctive action. An instance of this is given by the silk glands of the spider. From the existence of these glands, productive of a silk-like fluid, we may deduce the fact that this organism will spin a web; but the form of this web cannot be determined. The form of the web is to be according to that which is useful or harmful to the spider—and it is psychic factors which determine this. Again, it is only by a close cooperation between the structure of the animal and the actions of instinct that the end of the instinct can be attained. Excellent examples of this are the cases of mimetism where we find animals and insects using idiosyncracies of their color or configuration to enable them to escape enemies by blending into their surroundings either in color or in shape.[31]

A further, and quite trenchant, analysis of the part played by physiological elements in instinctive activity is given by McDougall. Between the psychical and physiological aspects of instinct there is a fine balance, a complete correlation, so that on each level we may distinguish three phases in the activity.

[30] Buytendijk, *op. cit.*, 110.

[31] Buytendijk, *op. cit.*, 110-111. Buytendijk points out that the physiological and the psychical elements in an instinct are indissolubly bound together to attain an end useful to the organism. Hence any theory of heredity such as that of the variation or the acquired characteristics theory is invalid, since there must be a concomitant change of both activity and structure: " . . . Il en résulte que structure et manière d'agir sont luées indissolublement dans un même but d'utilité. Ceci nous donne une indication importante sur la theorie de l'origine des instincts. Certes, la conception simpliste que les instincts, même que les particularités corporelles, seraient issus d'une selection de variations ou par l'hérédité de propriétés acquises, trouve dans ces faits des objections quasi irrefutables. En effet, la structure devrait varier avec la conduite. Avec l'acquisition d'une nouvelle habitude, la structure de l'organe devrait egalement être modifiée héréditairement."

The physiological activity is in every instinct to be divided into an afferent, a central, and an efferent phase.[32] It is noted at once that this is a division commonly used when dealing with the nervous system. Such a division is found formally in those animals possessing a neuro-muscular system, but the same concepts may be applied to those in which there is no such structure, for their activity also presupposes these three physiological phases, no matter what may be the structures by which they occur. To receive the impressions that pour in upon the sensory apparatus there is the mechanism of the nervous system; but under certain circumstances we find that the animal reacts to the situation at certain times and in certain places in a unique manner, a manner that shows purpose in the entire course of the action. Out of the melange of influences pouring in upon the neuro-muscular organism some have been singled out as of prime importance, and it is these influences that set off the activity of the animal. There are at the afferent inlet certain sets or patterns of nerves fitted to receive the impulses set up in the end organs. These neurones elaborate the impulses, and according to the manner in which these neurones are constituted, and according to their way of acting, the content of the sensory part of the psycho-physical process is determined.[33] Following upon this initial reception and elaboration of a stimulus by the afferent neurones, the excitation spreads to the central part of the nervous set-up. In the neuro-muscular animal this central part consists of spinal and brain centers whose function is to elaborate and correlate the excitations received by the afferent nerves and to distribute them to the various end organs by means of the efferent fibres. This correlation and distribution is necessary so that the impulses may be shunted into those channels which will aid in the most effective carrying out of the instinctive action. The terminus of the

[32] McDougall, *op. cit.*, 33.

[33] Sensation is not constituted nor explained by this sensory functioning, nor are we here explaining the process of sensation. The present discussion is concerned only with the physiological basis of instinctive activity; there is a psychical correlate where the problem of sensation has its proper place.

excitation is finally reached when the impulses have been shifted into the efferent phase by the administration of the central part. This is the motor phase of the instinct complex, and consists, in the higher animals, of glands or muscles. Either a gland or a muscle is set into action to effect the appropriate activity according as the structure of the central part has directed the impulse received into one or the other.[34]

We must, however, remember that the physiology of instinct is the material cause, the undetermined part, the unintelligible aspect. The three phases of instinctive activity can be specified and fully understood only because of their correlation with the three phases of the psychic activity which constitutes the specificity and consequent intelligibility of the instinct. The psychic correlate of the receptive or afferent physiological activity is cognition; of the central activity it is the affective phase; and of the efferent or motor activity, it is the conative phase.[35] Since knowledge must proceed analytically, and, as Bergson says, cannot catch life in its upspringing, we must consider these three phases of instinct separately. Instinct as actually found in living beings, comprises an affective and a cognitional aspect.

[34] McDougall, *op. cit.*, 34. McDougall states that the instinctive process is modifiable both on the afferent and efferent sides, but not in the central part. The principal methods by which the afferent side may be conditioned are listed by McDougall as: (1) A specialization of the afferent inlet evidenced by the fact that animals will no longer flee at a certain sound made by an object if no harmful effect follows from the object. (2) A modification " in accordance with the principle of association in virtue of temporal contiguity," and this we find evidenced in the case of wild creatures which at first do not fear men until the appearance of the human is accompanied by the report of a gun and the death of some of the animals: soon the mere appearance of the human incites the instinct of fear even before or without the noise of the gun. (3) A modification by " reproduction of similars "; in this case a sense-impression bearing certain resemblances to the native excitant object of the instinct serves to excite the instinct in virtue of the resemblance it bears to the specific object. An example of this is seen in a horse shying away from a stick in the road because of the resemblance it bears to a snake.

Regarding the bodily movements by which the motor phase of the instinct is accomplished, there is an equal capacity for modifications. The movement complexes of the animal are of many and varied types, but the brute's movements are relatively limited as compared to the many combinations that can be built up in man by training. Cf. *ibid.*, 33-34.

[35] McDougall, *op. cit.*, 27.

But let us say here and now that the most formal phase of instinct is not its appetitional, but rather its cognitional, aspect. Instinct is not primarily a striving for, but a knowing of, the object. The striving for or the affective attitude toward the object is secondary to the knowledge.

We shall then in the first place consider this conative aspect of instincts. This conative aspect is a psychic entity, an impulse, an urge to action which drives the organism to act. The preceding parts of the instinctive activity—cognitional and affective—are orientated towards this striving aspect, which is the terminal activity. Closer analysis of conation will require that we first answer the question whether or not the conative phase is conscious activity. The answer to this question must be prefaced by the following distinction: the conation characteristic of all instincts must be conscious impulse since it is the result of two previous conscious states, perception and affective tonality. That the summation of the instinctive process could be outside the field of consciousness is contrary to fact; instinct is essentially a bipolar phenomenon consisting of a relationship between two objects or, more properly, between two dynamisms. With the perception of the stimulus object the agent immediately becomes conscious of a desire or aversion according to which it reacts to the object. The object of an instinct is not a pure object of knowledge, it is an end-object, i. e., one that *per se* generates some sort of affective state which of its very nature implies that action be instituted in regard to the object. But consciousness is not necessary for the existence of an instinct: we possess instincts even when we are not conscious of them, for certainly we never lose the instincts of sex, hunger, desire for self-preservation, but we are not always conscious of them. What do we mean when we say we have instincts even though we are not conscious of them?

McDougall and Nunn have spoken of the horme as that principle within us which accounts for the purposeful dynamism evidenced by instinctive activity; and Nunn has distinguished between hormic activities, as those embracing all purposeful activities of men and animals, be they conscious or unconscious,

and the properly conative actions embracing only the conscious purposeful activities.[36] This distinction, however, can also be found in the Aristotelian philosophy of nature, for Aristotle has pointed out that the ontological substratum of all physical things may be considered either as an underlying, sustaining, and permanent substratum of the accidental qualities of the being, in which case it is called substance; or as a dynamic, an orientated principle of activity, in which case it is named nature.[37] This horme, therefore, spoken of by McDougall

[36] T. P. Nunn, *Education, Its Data and First Principles*, 22-23: "We need a name for the fundamental property expressed in the incessant adjustment and adventures that make up the tissue of life. We are directly aware of that property in our conscious activities as an element of 'drive,' 'urge,' or felt tendency towards an end. Psychologists call it *conation* and give the name conative process to any train of conscious activity which is dominated by such a drive and receives from it the characters of unity in diversity and what Bosanquet called 'coherent adaptiveness and progressiveness' . . . (Nunn then refers to many unconscious activities expressing themselves in action.) None of these purposive processes may be called conative, for they lie below, and even far below, the conscious level; yet a super-human spectator, who could watch our mental behavior in the same direct way as we can observe physical events, could see them all as instances of the same class, variant in detail, alike . . . in the general plan. In other words, he would see that they all differ from purely mechanical processes by the presence of an internal 'drive,' and differ from one another only in the material in which the drive works and the character of the ends towards which it is directed. To this element of drive or urge, whether it occurs in the conscious life of man and the higher animals, or in the unconscious activities of their bodies and the (presumably) unconscious behavior of lower animals, we propose to give a single name—horme (ὁρμη). In accordance with this proposal all the purposive processes of the organism are hormic processes, conative processes being the sub-class whose members have the special mark of being conscious."

McDougall, "The Hormic Psychology," *Psychologies of 1930*, 31: "The hormic theory projects a completely systematic and self-consistent psychology on the basis of its recognition of the whole of the organized mind of the adult as a structure elaborated in the service of the hormic urge to more and fuller life. Every part of this vastly complex structure it regards as serving to differentiate the hormic impulses, and to direct them with ever-increasing efficiency towards their natural goals in a world of infinite complexity that offers a multitude of possible routes to any goal, possibilities among which the organism chooses wisely according to the richness of its apparatus of sensory apprehension and its span of synthetic integration of many relations, the effective organization of its memory, the nicety of its discriminatory judgment, and its sagacity in seizing, out of a multitude of possibilities offered by sense-presentation and memory, the possibilities most relevant to its purpose."

[37] Aristotle, *Physica*, II, 192 b, 18-23.

and Nunn, is the Aristotelian nature. The vital, sentient organism is not merely a conative urge nor a dynamism, for these are merely manifestations of some principle that constitutes the essential being of the organism. Here, then, in the nature of the organism we find the basis for that conation or urge that is manifested in the purposeful activity in instincts.

The instinctive activity is what the Aristotelians would call the actualization of the potency. In its potential state the instinct exists as an appetite when considered in this conative phase, a tendency of the specific nature of which it is a determination. Returning to the question of whether or not instincts are conscious, we find that Drever has supplied us with a very helpful distinction.[38] In instinctive functions there is no consciousness of the ego. To catch the ego demands that the being be capable of disinterested reflective thought, that the being know without adopting any affective attitude towards the object known—and this is predicated of a rational being only. Such consciousness is " personal consciousness." But there is a lower level, " subpersonal consciousness," in which two divisions exist: in the first the sentient being is not conscious of the ego, but only of the affections attaching to the ego when confronted with some perceptual object. For instance the dog is probably

[38] J. Drever, " Instinct and the Unconscious," *British Journal of Psychology*, 1919, 33: " . . . The unconscious or subpersonal consciousness will be consciousness mainly at or below the perceptual level, and therefore consciousness in which appetite and instinct will have the fullest play, but to identify the unconscious with instinct is impossible. The unconscious is wider than instinct, though undoubtedly instinct plays in the realm of subpersonal unconsciousness a part that is certainly more prominent, if not more important, than in the realm of personal consciousness. I might represent the strata of consciousness schematically in some such way as the following:



not conscious of his ego when food is presented to him; it is only the desire for food, the restiveness of the awakened impulse within him, that floods his consciousness. Here on this perceptual level is the actuality of instinct, for with the perception there is set up an emotional tonality accompanied with an impulse of desire. Here is the horme, the conation, the nature in act. But below the perceptual level exists what Drever calls appetite. This is the dormant dynamism of the nature. The appetite is the tendency of the nature, the horme, the conation in potency, and for its actuation it stands in need of perception. Appetite is not a conscious phenomenon; it exists undoubtedly, but existence and consciousness, or existence and activity, are not to be equated.

There is one objection, however, that may be lodged against the division of the psychic factors concerned in instinctive activity as McDougall states it. While the physiological aspect of instinctive activity corresponds to this threefold division into an afferent, central, and efferent phase, the psychological activity of instinct is not quite so definitely divisible. We have spoken of the conative aspect of instinctive activity, we have stated that this hormic activity is the actualization of certain appetitive potencies possessed by the principle accounting for sense life within the organism. But what is the difference between this conation and emotion, which is given by McDougall as a second—the central—phase of instinct? If there is to be a real distinction between conation and emotion, they must be the works of separate faculties. But then to conclude thus would be to set up a tripartite division of the sentient psyche for which there seems to be no adequate foundation. We would have, then, a cognitive—represented by the act of sensation; an appetitive—represented by what we called the conative activity; and some medium or hybrid faculty — represented by what we named emotion. This, it appears, is an extravagant and uncalled-for interpretation. Emotion is an accompaniment and strengthener of conation, it is a mental state of an affective character by which the individual responds to a particular situation because he is aware of its pleasant or painful character;

this response is not of the psychic part only but includes intrinsically response of the physical part also.[39]

But in this very definition we find terms such as " pleasant " and " painful," which need explanation. The definition is not wholly intelligible because an emotion is an effect dependent upon a cause. It is only after we have investigated the cause of the emotion that we shall be able fully to understand the nature of emotion. As McDougall pointed out, there is a phase of the psychical activity in instinct which precedes emotion, namely, the cognitive or perceptive phase. It is now our duty to consider this.

Knowledge is not a concept that can be applied univocally to each knowing being. Even in the intellectual realm knowledge exhibits its analogical character: there is a knowledge which in itself finds its perfection and there is another knowledge which is truncated until it is carried out in some sort of action. Both are knowledge, but they share in a community containing intrinsic and irreducible differences. But on still another plane we may use the term knowledge—that of the senses. The sensations we have are one form of knowledge; and through them a *rapprochement* of the most intimate kind is effected between the world about us and our own ego. The colors, tastes, sounds of objects come to exist within us exactly as they exist in the outer world, except that their modality is different. From this humble source—the colored or sounding or tangible object—arises all knowledge.

But note how dispersed the activity of sense knowledge is: it is exercised through five different powers, whereas intellectual knowledge is exercised through the intellect alone. The individual senses, then, are manifestations of the sentient psyche, channels through which its activity flows. The nature of the sentient psyche is such that it does not enjoy that unity of action, that indivisibility, that the rational psyche displays in the process of thought. When we exercise our powers of thought we can, in certain privileged instances, pierce straight to the

[39] In this definition I have not added materially anything to that given by R. Allers in his article, " The Cognitive Aspect of Emotions," *Thomist*, IV, 1942, 590.

core of an essence; with one act we can embrace its intelligibility to the extent it is granted the human mind to know; and this knowledge can be set forth in a definition.[40] The intelligibility of an object on the intellectual level is unified, it is contained within the essence. There is no need of ancillary intellectual powers to aid the reason in its activity.

But what of the sensible qualities of the object? Here we do not find the same unity: sensible qualities are dispersed, they exist under varied modalities. More than one act of knowledge is required to gather together the full sensible attributes of an object; nor, moreover, can we speak of the perfection of knowledge on the sense level until we know all these various modalities as constituents of one object. Hence the need for the diversified activity of the sentient psyche becomes apparent: the eyes know the object as colored, the ears as sounding, etc., but no one of the senses fully embraces the object as sensible.

To clarify the question still more we may cite the division of sensible attributes. To each of the senses there is assigned some one defined sensible quality—color to sight, sound to hearing, etc. Each sense power is capable of itself of knowing this particular attribute of an object. But, over and above this knowledge, we know such sensible facts as magnitude, movement, shape, all of which we know by the senses, but all of which demand the activity of more than one sense. These objects are called common sensibles, and by their nature need more than one sense power to exercise its activity if they are to be known.[41] A third class is composed of objects that are sensible only *per accidens*: here we come to a judgment of the relation between sensible qualities and an attributed quality transcending the sensible intelligibility as such. For instance when the sheep sees the brown wolf and flees because it knows the wolf

[40] I do not, of course, intend to imply that that which cannot be defined is unintelligible. This would make of the first principles of all sciences nothing but nonsense. For who can define the principle of contradiction?

[41] Cf. B. Muller-Thym, "Common Sense, the Perfection of Pure Sensibility," *Thomist*, II, 1940, 321-322, for an excellent discussion, supported by many texts, of the fallacy of the teaching in which it is contended that the object of the central sense is the common sensible.

to be inimical to its well-being, the knowledge of the harmfulness of the wolf is in no way intrinsically connected with the brown color of the wolf. The connection or relation between the color and more intangible note of enmity is purely accidental.[42] The sensibles, then, are the object of the external senses, and the common sensibles are perceived by two or more of these senses. Thus this division serves to show the impossibility of explaining the knowledge of a sensible object through the activity of only the external senses. We may sum up at this point by saying that in the external senses we find sense knowledge in an imperfect state; it is in some way truncated. The knowledge possessed by each sense is in a state of progression, orientated by its very nature to a greater perfection and synthesis. The sensible world is neither color nor sound nor taste nor touch—but it is rather a combination of all these.

As we have already remarked above, sense knowledge is characterized at its first level—that of the external senses—by a diverse modality of action. Yet all the senses have a certain common character: they can know sense qualities; consequently we may conclude that they have some common root, some central point, in which they all commune. In this central sense we may expect to find the imperfect activity of each of the external senses synthesized by a single act into the highest perfection of sense knowledge. It is, therefore, in the central sense that we have the solution to the problems that have presented themselves.[43]

The existence of this sense was considered and accepted by Aristotle when he considered the psychological fact that, although each particular sense was fitted by nature to know its proper sensible and to discern differences between its proper sensible and other sensibles, we could distinguish between the sweet and the red—and this not in a *per accidens* manner as

[42] Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 425 a, 1-425 b, 4.

[43] I have chosen to translate the traditional phrase *sensus communis* by the phrase "central sense." I consider this preferable to "synthetic sense" since the latter seems to emphasize too much an activity—synthesis—which, although of prime importance, is not the specific property of this sense. The central sense is a power of knowledge, and as such its specific action is not synthesizing but knowing.

one who sees a red apple and knows from past experiences that it is sweet.[44] A distinction of this latter type is explicable psychologically by association; but how we can know the difference between taste and sight is a question of critique.

For a judgment of the sense, therefore, there is a central sense. It does not rise essentially above the external senses, for its knowledge is confined to the individual, to the object as subjected to the conditions of space and time which accrue to it by its material condition. The judgment in which we set forth the difference of white from sweet is the apprehension of an interior state. It is the awareness and subsequent statement of the fact that the percipient subject has undergone a change; and for the apprehension and statement of this fact there must be a single power of knowledge. To suppose that a discernment of the difference between two sense qualities could arise from the exercise of separate powers is as contradictory as to say that two separate men, of whom one experienced the white and the other the sweet, could judge between these two qualities as being different. Judgment always presupposes a common subject perceiving and judging an act of existence in which two essences either share or do not share. Although on the sense level there is not a perception of the abstract essence, yet there is needed for a sense judgment a common subject of such a nature that it is capable of perceiving sensible existence as participated in by particular sensible modalities. It is in this central sense, therefore, that we find a power capable of perceiving both sensible existence and the various kinds of participation in this existence; it is, consequently, a power that is able to make judgments on the sense level.[45]

[44] Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 425 b, 11-427 a, 15.

[45] St. Thomas, *In De Anima*, III, Lect. 3: "Posset enim aliquis credere quod discernamus album a dulci non quadam una potentia, sed diversis: ut scilicet inquantum gestu cognoscimus dulce, et visu album. Hoc autem excludit dicens quod non contingit discernere quod dulce sit alterum ab albo, separatis potentiis, id est diversis; sed oportet ad discernendum ea, quod secundum aliquam unam potentiam manifestum sit nobis. Ita enim esset si diversis potentiis sentiremus dulce et album, sicut si diversi homines sentirent. Hoc autem posito, manifestum est quod altera sunt ab invicem dulce et album, quia aliter patior ego a dulci quam tu ab albo. Sed tamen diversitas ista non erit nobis per sensum manifesta; sed oportet quod

When the central sense has been actuated we have arrived at the peak of that order of intelligibility which concerns itself with the forms of knowledge transmissible by physical forces such as heat, light, taste, sound, etc. This action of the central sense is but one on the way to building up a perception—it exhausts the *intentiones sensatae*.[46] Hence the knowledge of the central sense results in an immediate experimental knowledge of an objective quantitative being. Within this knowledge of the central sense we may distinguish a proper and common sensible — these are the *intentiones sensatae*. They cause a change in either one or more of the sense faculties according as they are proper or common.

If, therefore, the action of the central sense is specified by knowledge of an objective qualitative configuration, inclusive of both the proper and common sensibles, where in our economy of sense knowledge can we place the accidental sensible qualities such as concrete relations, particular value judgments, etc.? These do not enter into the field of sensible knowledge until we have reached a further integration.

All knowledge of the external sense level is experimental knowledge, that is to say that it demands the physical presence of the object known—such is the only type of knowledge of which these senses are capable. But this experimental knowledge is further divisible into immediate experimental knowledge

unus sit, qui dicat quod alterum est dulce ab albo. Hoc enim est aliquid unum verum, scilicet quod alterum sit dulce ab albo: ergo oportet quod illud unum ab eodem dicatur. Sed dictio est interpretatio interioris apprehensionis: ergo sicut est unus qui dicit, ita oportet quod unus sit qui intelligat et sentiat, alterum esse dulce ab albo. . . . Sicut igitur oportet quod unus homo, qui dicit alterum esse album a dulci, sit qui cognoscit utrumque, ita oportet quod una potentia sit, qua agnoscitur utrumque. Nam homo non cognoscit nisi per aliquam potentiam. Et hoc est quod concludit ulterius palam esse quod non est possibile judicare 'separata' idest quod aliqua sint diversa, 'separatis' idest diversis; sed oportet quod sit eadem potentia, quae utrumque cognoscat."

[46] Of course, the imagination also includes among its functions that of preserving these *intentiones sensatae*; but, since this is not a psychological study but rather a critical one, I do not think it necessary here to enter into a discussion of the place of the imagination in the economy of the internal senses. Likewise the memory will not be dealt with explicitly except insofar as it is necessary to explain the functioning of the cogitative or estimative power.

and " discursive experimental " knowledge. In the case of immediate experimental knowledge the term applied is " perception "; in that of discursive experimental knowledge it is " experience " (*experimentum*). The difference between perception and sensation is constituted by the fact that the object of sensation is either the proper or common sensible, but the object of perception includes over and above this the " meaning " of the whole context, the accidentally sensible quality. The discursive experimental knowledge differs from perception in that it is not an intuitive act but one of " reasoning," one of gathering bits of material from the present situation and from memory—all of which enter into the formation of the judgment concerning the here and now situation and the affective attitude which should be taken toward it.[47]

The accidentally sensible object which specifies both perception and experience as distinct cognitive phenomena is not an object causing any physical change in the sense organ. Consequently none of the external senses is capable of perceiving this type of sense quality. Knowledge of the accidentally sensible object is of a particular—and seemingly contradictory—nature: there is always a need for a concomitant substratum of pure sense knowledge which acts as a vessel in which to bear this more abstract and immaterial knowledge. The relationship between the particular type of proper sensible and the accidentally sensible quality is completely arbitrary: it may be a white man or a yellow man.[48] The accidentally sensible quality,

[47] *S. Th.*, I, 43, 5, ad 2: " Perceptio autem experimentalem quamdam notitiam significat." Perception is limited to that which is immediately knowable beyond the tangible sensible qualities; its object is " statim quod ad occursum rei sensatae apprehenditur." St. Thomas, *In De Anima*, II, Lect. 13.

St. Thomas, *In Post. Ana.*, II, Lect. 20: " . . . Ex memoria autem multoties facta circa eandem rem, in diversis tamen singularibus fit experimentum; quia experimentum nihil aliud esse videtur quam accipere aliquid ex multis in memoria retentis. . . . "

[48] St. Thomas, *In De Anima*, II, Lect. 13: " Secundum accidens sensibile dicitur, ut si dicimus quod Diarus vel Socrates est sensibile per accidens, quia accidit et quod sit album. Hoc enim sentitur per accidens, quia accidit ei quod sentitur per se: accidit autem albo, quod est sensibile per se, quod sit Diarus, unde Diarus est sensibile per accidens. Unde nihil patitur sensus ab hoc, in quantum hujusmodi. . . . "

therefore, stands in a unique position in the hierarchy of knowledge: it can be known or conveyed to the knowing being only through the instrumentality of the ordinary sense qualities, yet it is in no way dependent upon any particular sense quality either for its being or intelligibility. That is to say that the relation between the particular color, sound, etc., and the meaning it conveys to the percipient subject is not determined: the sheep experiences fear whether the wolf is gray or brown, whether the wolf is seen or its howl is heard or its scent is caught. We seem to have here a case of the common nature so entangled in the web of matter that it cannot tear itself free.[49]

Examples of the accidentally sensible quality are hatred, enmity, the concrete relationship of offspring to parent and *vice versa*, concrete value judgments, etc. All of these can be reduced to the general categories of relationships of utility or harmfulness between object and subject.[50]

[49] John of St. Thomas, *Phil. Nat.*, q. 8, a. 3; Reiser 265, b, 9-32: "Supponimus dari species in sensibus internis, sicut datur cognitio. Quodsi illae potentiae internae sunt altiores in cognoscendo, etiam requirunt altiores species vel autem altiori modo ordinatas, ut cognitio elevatior elici possit. Specialiter autem quando objecta repraesentata sunt altioris abstractionis, ut intentiones insensatae, requirere videntur aliquas species perfectiores et elevatiores repraesentantes tales intentiones, sicut odium, inimicitiam, filios, parentes, etc. Istae enim formalitates non repraesentantur in sensibus externis, et tamen cognoscuntur ab internis, ergo datur aliquod principium repraesentativum illarum, quod non debet esse ita materiale et imperfectum, quod sistat in ipsis rebus sensatis, sicut sistunt sensus externi; ergo perfectior species debet esse quam species sensus externi, quae solum repraesentat res sensatas. . . ."

St. Thomas, *In De Anima*, II, Lect. 12: ". . . Sciendum est igitur quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit sensibile per accidens primo requiritur quod accidat ei quod per se est sensibile, sicut accidit albo esse hominem, et accidit ei esse dulce. Secundo requiritur quod sit apprehensum a sentiente: si enim accideret sensibili quod lateret sentientem, non diceretur per accidens sentiri. Oportet igitur quod per se cognoscatur ab aliqua alia potentia cognoscitiva sentientis. Et hoc quidem vel est alius sensus, vel est intellectus vel vis cogitativa, aut vis aestimativa. Dico autem quod est alius sensus; sicut si dicamus, quod dulce est visibile per accidens inquantum dulce accidit albo, apprehenditur visu, et ipsum dulce per se cognoscitur ab alio sensu, scilicet a gustu. Sed, ut proprie loquamur, hoc non est universaliter sensibile per accidens, sed per accidens visibile, sensibile autem per se. Quod ergo sensu proprio non cognoscitur, si sit aliquid universale, apprehenditur intellectu; non tamen omne quod intellectu apprehendi potest in re sensibili, potest dici sensibile per accidens, sed statim quod ad occursum rei sensatae apprehenditur. . . ."

[50] Intelligible objects such as substance, relations, etc., also are *sensibilia per*

What then is this cognitive power by which these *intentiones insensatae*, these intangible qualities, are reached on the sense level? It must be a sense power since its object, though more abstract than that of either the external or other internal senses, does not lose the note of singularity. To this power of perceiving the significance, the meaning, the "form," of a concrete situation, the name of *estimative* or *cogitative power* — the former reserved for irrational animals, the latter for men—has been given. In their essential nature and function the estimative and cogitative powers do not differ; however, there is a difference in the range of the activities because the one cohabits with an essentially distinct and higher power, that of abstract thought; while the other is the highest power of knowledge existing in the being.[51] This influence of the rational principle upon the sensible powers of cognition is of very great importance in the matter of the estimative and cogitative powers, and perhaps here better than in any other phase of psychology we can see the repercussions on the sense level of the rational principle. Both the cogitative and estimative power have as their proper object the accidentally sensible quality, but their method of considering this object differs.

Upon seeing a particular object, the rational being knows it as, for instance, "this dog," and upon this perception there ensues a feeling of kindliness or fear toward this particular dog for it has been classed under the heading of the useful or harmful to this particular man. But there is more here than meets the eye: in the very perception of this dog, the rational being is not

accidens; but here we are not interested in them. We merely wish to locate the *intentiones insensatae* in their proper category of sensible qualities, namely, the *sensibilia per accidens*.

[51] J. of St. Th., *Phil. Nat.*, q. 8, a. 2; Reiser, 257, b, 19-37; ". . . Potentiae vero apprehensivae distinguuntur penes diversam abstractionem seu immaterialitatem, secundum quam trahat res ad se, et haec diversa, secundum quod magis vel minus est dependens ab ipsa materiali praesentia objecti. Sequitur tertio cogitativam et reminiscentiam in homine non distingui ab aestimativa et memoria sed esse ipsamet potentias cum quadam perfectione participata ex conjunctione ad rationem, secundum quam discurrere possunt circa sua objecta singularia, quod quidem pertinet ad diversum modum operandi, non diversam potentiam quae solum ex diversa immaterialitate objecti diversificatur per se. . . ."

wholly concerned with the beast as a principle or term of action, for by the very fact that he recognizes it as a particular member of the animal species of dog, it is evident that a higher synthesis has taken place, a synthesis that is not restricted to a mere consideration of the relative harmfulness or utility of the animal; but this particular object is known under the heading of a common nature.[52] The collaboration between the intellect and the sense powers at this particular level of knowledge is most intimate. A " box piled on box " psychology, that is, a concept of the powers of human cognition of such a nature that the principle of each type of knowledge is completely independent of all the rest, and works in isolation from any other principle, shows its inadequacy when faced with knowledge of the type obtainable by the cogitative power. The intellect is the principle and source of all cognitive activity in man, its influence is all-pervasive, so much so that, although essentially sense knowledge in brutes and man is the same, yet the sense psyche is profoundly influenced in its functions by reason of the fact that it exists in a rational being; its activity is ancillary and must be suited to fit the needs of the reason.[53] Here in the case of the cogitative power the force of the intellect is so powerfully felt that in many ways this sense power seems to share in the privileges of the reason. The cogitative power does not merely perceive the utility or harmfulness of a particular object, it sees the relationship existing between the present object and the other objects of a like nature. The knowledge of the cogitative power is not of an inferior sharing in a universal: such knowledge is natural to the intellect alone — the cogitative power cannot predicate a universal of a singular. It does not abstract a uni-

[52] Our problem is not one of psychology but of critique; consequently we do not consider how we know the individual in intellectual knowledge. For an excellent article on the subject of intellectual cognition of the particular substance, see R. Allers, " The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars," *Thomist*, III, 1941, 95-163.

[53] *Summa Theologica*, I, 78, 4, ad 5: " Illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis, sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quamdam refluentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliae vires, sed eaedem perfectiones quam sint in aliis animalibus."

versal concept, it cannot rise above the particular, the here and now; but it does have a certain power of speculation. It knows the object to be an object of knowledge, the modality under which its apprehension of the object takes place is primarily that of action, namely, the knowledge of the object calls for some sort of action—either attraction toward or flight from the present situation — but the knowledge of the cogitative power is not as immediately and narrowly determined to action as is that of the estimative power. Before acting we know the object as a particular manifestation of something that is useful or detrimental; the object is an object of knowledge. On the contrary, the knowledge of the estimative power shows more determinism: the object is not one of knowledge, but purely of action.[54]

Another difference—again one of degree and not of essence—between the cogitative and estimative powers, following from the greater indetermination of the cogitative power due to the profound influence exerted on it by dwelling in a substantial unity with the intellect,[55] is the ability of the cogitative power

[54] St. Thomas, *In De Anima*, II, Lect. 13: ". . . Si vero apprehendatur in singulari, utputa cum video coloratum, percipio hunc hominem vel hoc animal, hujusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam, quae dicitur etiam ratio particularis, eo quod est collative intentionum individualium sicut ratio universalis est collativa rationum universalium. Nihilominus tamen haec vis est in parte sensitiva; quia vis sensitiva in suo supremo participat aliquid de vi intellectiva in homine, in quo sensus intellectui conjungitur. In animali vero irrationali fit apprehensio intentionis individualis per aestimativam naturalem, secundum quod ovis per auditum vel visum cognoscit filium, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Differenter tamen circa hoc se habet cogitativa et aestimativa. Nam cogitativa apprehendit individuum ut existens sub natura communi; quod contingit ei, inquantum unitur intellectivae in eodem subjecto; unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hic homo, et hoc lignum prout est hoc lignum. Aestimativa autem non apprehendit aliquod individuum secundum quod est sub natura communi, sed solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicujus actionis vel passionis; sicut ovis cognoscit hunc agnum, non inquantum est hic agnus, sed inquantum est ab ea lactabilis; et hanc herbam, inquantum est ejus cibus. Unde alia individua ad quae se non extendit, ejus actio vel passio nullo modo apprehendit sua aestimativa datur animalibus, ut per eam ordinentur in actiones proprias, vel passiones prosequens vel fugiendas."

[55] It must always be remembered that we do not argue that the cogitative power is of a higher order *per se* than the estimative. The difference between them is only in their mode of operations: the action of the cogitative power, because of its dwelling in an intellectual nature, is a final activity in an order that is not final-

to gather and correlate the data of individual perceptions in such wise that from these purely contingent individual perceptions it can arrive at a substratum of necessity. This necessity, of course, is not that which is predicated of essences as known by the intellect. We have differentiated above between perception and experience, stating that perception is of the nature of an intuition while experience is a conclusion arrived at by reasoning from material presented by the memory, imagination, and the present situation.

Perception precedes experience both temporally and naturally, for it is only by many perceptions that the sentient nature can come to that cognition we call experience. When first the animal nature is confronted by the world of objects that lies about it, there are within the organism no sources of knowledge and action save the innate dynamism of its own nature. These sources of knowledge and action are the instincts: in the young, raw animal psyche they are not correlated, not disciplined by any higher force than themselves. From birth the animal nature is given, with the gift of life, an urge to perpetuate its own life, and for this purpose it possesses the rudimentary powers of knowledge which we call the cognitive phase of instinct. By these powers of knowledge the force of the instinctive action is set off, as Lloyd Morgan's chicks showed when, upon coming fresh from the egg, they began pecking at bits of corn. But as perception follows upon perception, a profound modification of activity occurs: this is the development of animal intelligence, a synthesis brought about on a higher level of cognition than that of the individual instinct. From perception experience has been derived: the colors of objects have not changed nor have their shapes been altered, but a deeper muta-

it is always oriented toward a higher and more terminal act of knowledge, that of the intellect. Thus its mode of action is profoundly modified as compared to that of the estimative power, whose action is not oriented toward a higher order but is completely terminal.

J. of St. Th., *Phil. Nat.*, q. 8, a. 2; Reiser, 257, a, 37-b, 2: "... Unde eadem potentia intellectus procedit et cum discursu in aliis sine variatione potentiae et appetitus sensitivus in nobis participat aliquid libertatis ... et tamen non est alia potentia specie diversa ab appetitu sensitivo non habente talem libertates."

tion has occurred—namely, in their significance.[56] It should not be thought that we consider the animal intelligence to be a collective being made up of the cognitive powers of the individual instincts; nor do we mean by the animal intelligence a power distinct from the cogitative or estimative power—they are the same. Instinctive knowledge is the primitive functioning of the cogitative or estimative powers, it is analogous to the knowledge of the first principles of being and truth on the intellectual level. Instinctive knowledge is not innate *qua* knowledge any more than is the knowledge of the principle of contradiction; but it is more readily and immediately generated *qua* knowledge than is the principle of contradiction, because sensible knowledge is more easily gained, is more connatural to us than is abstract knowledge.[57]

[56] Buytendijk, *op. cit.*, 104-105: " . . . La perception de formes et la qualité complexe des representations prouvent que l'animal ne reagit pas a une association d'excitations extérieures, mais à la " signification " que cette association possède pour lui, de même que pour nous, les objets conservent une signification spéciale indépendament de la gradeur et de l'emplacement, de la couleur, le l'éclairement, etc. Dés la naissance cette signification des objets existe déjà chez de nombreux animaux. La proie est reconnue immediatement comme telle par beaucoup d'animaux, dès leur venue au monde. Mais par contre, la signification de diverse objets n'est acquise que par l'experience. . . . Toutefois, par l'experience, les objets perçus acquièrent une signification différente et, a un âge plus avance, l'animal conçoit donc son entourage d'une tout autre, façon qu'apres la naissance. . . . "

[57] Such an explanation of instinctive knowledge is in harmony with the continuity of perfections throughout all of creation. There is no abrupt breaking point where suddenly a perfection of being is found that was not at all adumbrated at some lower level of being. Even where there is an essential difference between strata of being, we still find in the higher levels of the lower stratum a hint of what we shall find in its essential perfection on the next higher stratum. For instance the difficulty of determining the borderline cases existing between the animate and inanimate universe is well-known to botanists and biologists. How this principle of continuity holds in knowledge is well expressed in this quotation from Aristotle, *Historia Animalium* (translated by D. W. Thompson), 8. 1. 588 a, 1-588 b, 4: " In the great majority of animals there are traces of psychical qualities or attitudes, which qualities are more markedly differentiated in the case of human beings. For just as we pointed out resemblances in the physical organs, so in a number of animals we observe gentleness or fierceness, mildness or cross temper, courage or timidity, fear or confidence, high spirit or low cunning, and, with regard to intelligence, something equivalent to sagacity. Some of these qualities in men, as compared with the corresponding qualities in animals, differ only quantitatively: that is to say, a man has more or less of this quality, and an animal has more or less of

What is the nature of this knowledge that we call experience? In the first place it is not merely memory: memory contributes its wisdom gathered from the past but it is concerned only with the past, it cannot correlate the present and the past. From the many perceptions the cogitative power comes to realize that there is a certain community between objects of one class. Sensation presents us with a certain situation, memory supplies vestiges of past like experiences, and from this mass of information the cogitative power is able to group certain objects under definite headings.

This grouping of classes of objects is the " reasoning " that the cogitative power is capable of.[58] But this classification, this reasoning, must have a basis, a *ratio operandi*, that cannot be the universal nature—for only the intellect can know this—but rather the *ratio* must be of a sensible, singular character.

Animals also have a knowledge which is analogous to experience—this is exemplified by Kohler's experiments with apes in their attempt to reach food, or in the maze-running of rats—but again there is a difference in the " reasoning " process of the cogitative and estimative powers. As we have said above, the object is considered by the estimative power purely as a principle or term of action, but by the cogitative power it is known as a particular manifestation of a common nature before it is considered as a term or beginning of action. Consequently, we cannot speak at all of any " reasoning " in the case of the estimative power, for it does not reach the object under the modality of knowledge, but primarily and only as an object that is harmful or useful. For instance, when an animal modifies its

some other; other qualities in man are represented by analogous and not identical qualities: for instance, just as in man we find knowledge, wisdom, and sagacity, so in certain animals there exists some other natural potentiality akin to these. The truth of this statement will be the more clearly apprehended if we have regard to the phenomena of childhood: for in children may be observed the traces and seeds of what will one day be settled psychological habits, though psychologically a child hardly differs for the time being from an animal; so that one is quite justified in saying that, as regards man and animals, certain psychical qualities are identical with one another, whilst others resemble, and others are analogous to each other."

[58] Cf. Aristotle, *Post. Ana.*, II, 100 a, 4-6; St. Thomas, *In Meta.*, I, Lect. 1.

way of doing a particular action, it is not because the same action is considered as performed more pleasurably one way than another. In other words, the animal cannot see a common nature existing under two different modalities. It only knows one type of action or one object as more pleasurable than another. The animal knows that acting this way impedes the movement less, or this object satisfies some appetite better, than does some other mode of action or some other object of appetite. The animal knows two things exercising in some particular way the relation of a term—for example, a dog recognizes bread and meat as two terms of its desire for food, but it does not recognize them as of a common nature sharing differently in this common nature.[59] Bread and meat are known to him as two terms of an activity of which one is more pleasant and satisfying than is the other, hence the dog is prone to eat the meat rather than the bread. The estimative power of the animal can know signs—the dog cowers when it sees its master holding a stick—but it knows the sign as a representation of either a pleasant or painful concrete experience. Never does the estimative power know the object as pleasurable or painful.[60]

[59] Cajetan, *In S. Th.*, I, 32, 1: ". . . Ovis novit agnum ut terminus lactationis, non quod oportet eam apprehendere ipsam relationem termini, quod esset apprehendere in actu signato; sed quia apprehendit agnum ut exercentem relationem termini lactationis. Et simile est in aliis. Ex talibus enim apprehensionibus relationum causantur passiones."

[60] J. of St. Th., *Log.* II, q. 21, a. 6; Reiser, 685 b, 7-686, a, 12: ". . . 'Ex memoria praeteritorum flagellorum vel beneficiorum contingit, ut bruta apprehendant aliquid quasi amicum et prosequendum vel quasi inimicum et fugiendum.' . . . Ratio hujus praeter quotidianum experientiam qua videmus bruto moveri signis, tum naturalibus, ut gemitu, balatu, cantu, etc., tum ex consuetudine, ut canis vocatus nomine consueto movetur, qui tamen impositionem non intelligit, sed consuetudine ducitur. Praeter hoc, inquam, videmus brutum uno viso in aliud distinctum tendere sicut percepto odore insequitur aliquam viam, vel fugit viso ramo vel igno transverso in via divertit, audito rugitu leonis tremit aut fugit, et sexcenta alia, in quibus non sistit brutum in eo, quod sensu exteriori percipit, sed per illud in aliud dicitur. Quod plane est uti signo, scilicet repraesentatione unius non solum pro se, sed pro altero distincto, a se. Et quod hoc etiam extendatur ad signa ex consuetudine, ex supra dictis constat, quia cum aliqua bruta sunt disciplinae capacia, non statim a principio aliqua percipiunt, quae postea consuetudine procedente cognoscunt, ut canis non statim a principio movetur, cum vocatur tali vel tali

The cogitative power, on the contrary, does not know merely two pleasurable things, but by reason of its position as a ministerial, a non-terminal power whose activity is directed to the higher activity of the intellect, it can exercise a higher mode of intellection. It knows the thing as pleasurable or painful—and such knowledge is different from that wherein we know a pleasing or painful thing. The latter presupposes no greater immaterialization of knowledge, no power of comparing two things as contained under the common nature. But the former is capable of distinguishing the substratum, the reason, from the pleasure or pain. Such a statement appears to grant to the cogitative power a degree of abstraction that puts it exceedingly close to the intellect's ability, but further consideration will show that such is not the case. In the first place the cogitative power never knows anything under the modality of goodness—this is strictly an intellectual activity—nor does it ever penetrate to the substantial form in which this goodness inheres as an attribute of being. The sphere of knowledge of the cogitative power is circumscribed by the useful and the harmful which are represented in the consciousness of the sentient being as the pleasurable and painful. The cogitative power does not know pleasure as such—this would be to know the universal; but it does know the object as a value object.

The intellect can apprehend the absolute form of an object as good, and this is a knowledge which can be obtained by the intellect *per se*. Moreover, this goodness is inherent in the object itself, accruing to it by the very reason of its existence; it is an absolute goodness. On the sensory level we do not find absolute goodness any more than we find absolute truth.[61] The cogitative power does not penetrate to the absolute form, it is

nomine, et postea movetur habita consuetudine. Ergo utuntur aliqua bruta signis ex consuetudine; nam ex impositione ipsa nominis non moventur, quia non innotescit illis impositio ipsa, quae ex voluntate imponentis dependet."

[61] The interesting phenomenon of a colored object which under one type of light is of one color and under another type of light changes its hue, shows the mutable character of the intelligible object on the sense level. We cannot speak of the "true" color in the same sense as we do of the truth of an essence. Truth, like being, is analogous.

stopped in its operation much before that. Its duty is to form value judgments of particular objects. But these value judgments on the sense level have none of the disinterested quality that is shown in a judgment of the intellect about the good. The knowledge of the cogitative power is intimately connected with the orective activity of the sentient soul which in turn is regulated by a harmony existing between the object and the subject. This harmony, or connaturality, between object and subject is not an absolute attribute of the object known, rather it is a relationship which has no existence unless there be a knowing subject endowed with orective powers. That is why the good on the sense level does not enjoy the absolute quality possessed by the good on the intellectual level. Indeed, on the sense level we cannot speak of the good, but rather of the useful and the pleasurable. There is, therefore, in the object some *ratio agendi*, some formality causing an orective activity on the part of the subject, which is not existing absolutely but demands a knowing subject. Value at the level of the cogitative power means the arousal of pleasurable emotions upon the perception of an object. The cogitative power knows the *rationes agendi* in an object, it knows the value of an object, but it knows it not in a disinterested manner for its activity is always accompanied by an orective or affective state.[62] The knowledge of the cogitative power is perfected not in knowing, but in directing the activity of the appetite. The useful and the harmful are not absolute attributes of being as is the good, but they are pure relations. These are not relationships of an abstract order, but they are concrete relations. They are relations founded not on the ontological, absolute nature of the object and the subject, but upon the physical nature of both. The object of the cogitative and estimative powers is the good of the sense level—which is the useful—and it is no more absolute than is the true on the sense level.[63]

[62] For a discussion of the role of emotion in knowledge see the article of R. Allers, "The Cognitive Aspect of Emotions," *Thomist*, IV, 1942, 589-648.

[63] Cajetan, *In S. Th.*, I-II, 32, 1: "Et quod forte fallit putantes oppositum, est quia non advertunt quod relationes sunt in genere formarum activarum ut apprehensae; quamvis non sint in genere activarum formarum ut existentes. Et qui

The central sense, as we have seen, mediates the knowledge which is analogous to truth on the intellectual level; the value side of sensible being, the *rationes agendi*, is known by the cogitative power. This knowledge of the cogitative power, like that of the estimative, releases an orective movement; but unlike the estimative, the cogitative power can distinguish between the *ratio agendi* as an object of knowledge and as a term of the orective activity. This does not imply a knowledge of the category of relations: the cogitative power can distinguish between the aspect of value as knowable and as the term of activity. On the contrary, once the estimative power has cognized the object as a term of activity and the orective activity has been released, this power has accomplished its task. Of course its influence is exerted in a guiding of the activity of the appetites in their seeking of the object. The estimative power is a terminal power in an order that is terminal; for in the irrational animal there is no higher power to which the activity of the estimative power is subordinated. Like the cogitative power, the estimative power is accompanied in its activity by affective states, and with the arousal of the affective states, the value perception is not dulled but rather becomes more distinct. These powers of value perception become more open to the reception of the knowledge of the value aspect of the object. But by reason of its being rooted in a rational nature, the cogitative power enjoys a greater immateriality, a greater indetermination in action, than does the estimative power. Both are supreme in the order of sensory evaluation, but the estimative power proceeds in a more material manner than does the cogitative power: its term is never known as an object of knowledge, but always as a term of action. Its whole activity is in directing the appetites in their seeking of, or fleeing from, the object; it does not know the object as causing the arousal of the appetites. The cogitative power, on the contrary, is cognizant of the object perceived under its value aspect, as causing the arousal of the appetites. The cogi-

neget hoc, neget quoque aestimativam, cujus objectum sunt intentiones insensatae, elicitae ex sensatis, ut utile, amicum, inimicum, etc.; ex quibus causantur passiones in animalibus."

tative power, by reason of the greater immateriality it enjoys by dwelling in the rational soul, is capable of a certain reflection so that it knows the concrete situation as a particular manifestation of the useful or harmful. It perceives the concrete situation under a common nature, which is not the universal, but is this more proximate, this sensible formality, namely, the value aspect of the *ratio agendi* of the object. Its knowledge is not the pure contemplation exercised by the intellect when it knows the good, for the knowledge of the cogitative power is inevitably accompanied by an orective state; but the cognitive and orective are not mingled together in an inextricable union as occurs in the irrational animal where the object is apprehended solely as a term of action. In the cogitative power the act of knowledge, the value perception, predominates, so that, despite the constant concomitance of the orective state, the object is first and always considered as an object of knowledge, and the act of knowing is always distinguishable from the affective states accompanying it.

Instinctive knowledge, therefore, is analogous to knowledge of the first principles of the practical intellect. But as this is knowledge on a lower level — that of sense — the instinctive knowledge is generated immediately upon perception of the value aspect of an object or situation. The knowledge whence springs instinctive actions is the primitive operation of the cogitative and estimative powers; it is not a perfect knowledge in the sense that it cannot be modified by experience, but it serves as a foundation, a principle according to which the cogitative or estimative power can evaluate all experience that it may later have. Instinctive knowledge is quite as inadequate, it needs further determination quite as much as does the principle, " Do good and avoid evil." In the determination of these general principles of the sense level, these intuitions of the sensory good, the cogitative power is capable of a much higher and more refined result than is the estimative. For the estimative power, lacking that power of reflection whereby its act of knowledge—the value-object existing in the subject as an object of knowledge—is distinguished from the accompanying affective state,

cannot rise to a knowledge of the *rationes agendi*, the sensible forms of good, and thus comprehend, by a process of combination of data supplied by the memory and the present situation, a common nature under which certain individuals are contained. On the other hand, the cogitative power is capable of this distinction between its own act—a knowledge of the *rationes agendi*—and the concomitant affective states. It does not reflect upon its act in the pure manner of the intellect, for the knowledge of the cogitative power is always one of value, one somehow having a reference to affective tonality. Its knowledge of its own act is mediated by means of the accompanying affective states. Even in the act of knowing its own operation, therefore, the cogitative power is not entirely divorced from affective tonality. It is because the cogitative perceives its act as the reason for the affective activity, as the *ratio* giving rise to the emotions, that it can know its own act. And in knowing its act as the *ratio* for the emotional reaction, it can distinguish between the formality of a sensible good as formal cause—object of knowledge—and this same formality serving as final cause—term or principle of action. We speak in terms proper to the intellect, but to elucidate somewhat more we may say that the object known to the cogitative power as a formal cause is not known *qua* formal cause; rather it is known as an object possessing the sensible form of good, that which is the term or principle of activity. It is because the cogitative power can by its reflection know the difference between the object as a sensible formal cause—an object of knowledge which is the term of its own activity—and the object as a sensible final cause, the *de facto* sensible good existing here and now, the term of the activity of the affective state. These two aspects of the individual object or situation are distinguished by the cogitative power.

The cogitative and estimative powers, therefore, are the faculty of animal intelligence; the instincts are the primitive functionings of these respective faculties. But the role of the cogitative power is of much higher order than is that of the estimative power, for the cogitative power is profoundly modi-

fied and orientated in its operation by the fact that it is subservient to a higher order of cognition, the intellect. The full significance of the estimative power is known when the animal has reacted to a useful or harmful situation; the nature of the cogitative power is not entirely clear until we have considered the higher end toward which it is directed and under whose hegemony it operates, namely, the intellectual virtue of prudence.

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THE VALUE OF CREATION

THE OLD Testament is cosmologically as well as historically incomplete without the New. For it is only in the Revelation of the Trinity that the distinctive Mosaic doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* becomes capable of satisfactory articulation. The Name of Yahweh was indeed told to Moses. But in the Plenitude of Being, which is the Godhead, creation is obviously gratuitous. It is only in the generation of the Word that the Deity is necessitated, as it is only in the Subsistent Love of Father and Son that the Generative Act is necessarily adequated. Moreover, it is because of the Eternal Act of self-fulfillment that creation becomes intelligible. If God is substantially One but subsistently Three, the separate subsistence of created substances is still gratuitous but no longer inexplicable, as it remains in non-Christian thought. In Christian thought God is One and Other and therefore the possibility of others who are not one with Him becomes at least tenable. Thus Christian cosmology is freed of the rigid Hellenistic rationalism, as neither the Hebrew nor the Mohammedan cosmologies could be.

It is, then, the distinctive note of non-Christian thought that its wisdom is always of creation and never of God as He is in Himself. It is by the contemplation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity that the philosopher may discover the meaning and value of the existential universe, i. e., of God and His creatures. All doctrines of the One remain ultimately unintelligible unless the One is the Three in One. For the manifestation of the Good which is expressed by creation is inexplicable in its origin unless the Good is primarily self-fulfilling. Creation as such is inadequate for the Creator except insofar as He is Creator. Yet, unless God is self-fulfilled *intra se*, namely, by the Trinity, He is necessitated to become self-fulfilled *extra se*, which is by emanation, not creation. If, however, He is self-

fulfilled *intra se*, the creative movement is clearly understood as free. But it is only as a free action that creation is intelligible. As necessary, it is, of course, untenable.

This is not to say, however, that the solution of the problem of the One and the many becomes self-evident. Rather it is given existential status which no Christian dialectic can deny. For if creation is worth the price of the Redemption it can hardly be a kind of emanation which occurs and recurs inevitably. If all things are one with the One, the Incarnation and the Redemption are both meaningless. But while the Incarnation and the Redemption explain the creation as we know it, the meaning and value of creation must be sought as it was in the beginning.

That God made all things for Himself is an immediate corollary to the statement that He made all things. The question being asked herein is why He made things at all when He was obviously free not to do so. By a common agreement among Christian thinkers the *process* of creation is the outpouring of Divine Goodness in *mode, species, and order*, to use the classic phrase of St. Augustine. I do not find, however, that any Christian philosopher has answered adequately the question as to the *motivation* of the creative process, the *why* which the *how* presupposes. Certainly God does not need creation to show His Goodness, since He is Good, i. e., self-fulfilled, without creation. Yet He does create.

It seems to me that God wills proximately, i. e., from our point of view, to create on account of the possibility of the goodness of things as they are to exist *outside God*. Although the Trinity Itself is a Plenum of Being, Truth, and Goodness which is incommunicable as such, yet It is communicable and communicated imperfectly as separately created and subsistent essences. These are of, by, and for God. However, they are not in God as subsistent essences but only according to their modes of being, truth, and goodness. Although the Divine Essence includes all possible essences in the sense that their proper perfections are verified in a higher way in God's essence, yet it does not include them as they are in themselves according to

their limitations and imperfections. Therefore it is as they are in themselves that they receive existence from God. He wills them on account of the possibility of their goodness as separable and subsistent. And since this separable goodness is other than the Divine Perfection Itself, God is free to create or not to create. But God loves each and all things less than He loves Himself, hence ultimately on account of Himself.

Thus, while creatures exist for God, by God, and in God (according to the modes of created being) they also exist in themselves, each according to its mode. And they have value as such for God, not only as in the Divine Perfection of God Himself. Moreover, the value of creation is limited for God to the total possibilities of the separate essences actually existing in His Eternal Presence. Even humanly speaking, this is a great value. For God it must be much more valuable. Again, from the point of view of every creature which has not been self-corrupted, both its own being and the created universe are of intrinsic value, since they are both independent and interdependent. But from the point of view of the intelligent and non-vitiated creature, creation is not limited in value to the totality of creation. For the modes, species, and orders of creation are so complex as to indicate an Absolute Infinity which creates and conserves them for the terms of their existence. And in grasping the necessity of the Absolute Infinity, the created intelligence transcends the limitations of creation to see through a glass darkly the Being, Truth, and Goodness of the Creator.

Historically considered, Christian existentialism arises initially from the Revelation given to St. Peter that the Old Law no longer applies to the followers of the New.[1] But St. Peter was a Pope and therefore inclined to move slowly. It was the philosopher, St. Paul, who forced the issue publicly.[2] By insisting that the Church be Catholic, not Mosaic, St. Paul forced the revolution in human thought out of which developed eventually the concept of the integrity of the individual existent as such. But that concept is still revolutionary in practical human

[1] *Acts of the Apostles*, x-xi.
[2] *Galatians*, ii-iv.

affairs, and has been by no means fully developed even in speculative philosophy. Yet a totalitarian universe, as well as a totalitarian state, is alien to Christian philosophy. It is in God, not in the universe, that the Beatific Vision is found.

Since religion is, after all, a practical human affair, with its own preoccupations, the ontological concept of the individual existent appears somewhat late in Christian thought. Even in the highly fecund philosophy of St. Augustine, the intrinsic existential values of creation are always implied rather than explicated. St. Augustine shares perhaps uniquely in the benevolence of God toward creation. But he lacks the divine assurance that each creature is, under God, a going concern, a subsistent essence. St. Augustine meditates on the wonders of creation only in order to leap from them to the wonders of the Creator. For St. Augustine the imperfect is of value only as it manifests the Perfect. But, from the point of view of God Himself, the separately existing created beings, even though imperfect, are themselves lovable, not indeed with an Augustinian-Platonic love but certainly with an Aristotelian love. By Aristotelian love I mean, of course, a love which desires *the good of the other*.[3]

God, then, desires the existence of created being, even though its existence is, from the point of view of God, imperfect. He sees the possibility of the less than perfect *outside Himself* as the possible good of created being. These possibilities are infinite in God but become finite in themselves when established outside God. Yet even as finite they partake of the Infinite Being of God. They adhere and inhere to God according to their respective modes of being. In creating, God is manifesting Himself outside Himself. The Divine Essence is not imitable. But It is *donable* or else it is not participible. Even in creating, God does not depart entirely from Himself. He maintains some

[3] *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII, 3, 1156b, 5-10. For me the capital text here is οὗτοι γὰρ τ' αγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἀγαθοί, αγαθοι δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτούς. (For they wish the appropriate good to each other as good, and they are good in themselves.) Aristotle is describing only the love of human friends for one another. But I think the text also describes the love of God for His creatures and of intelligent creatures for God.

giving of Himself outside Himself. The Essence of God is both donable and participible.

Yet, since God is moved to create by the possibility of the creature as good in itself, the creative act is not the manifestation of the Divine Goodness as such. It is the manifestation of the goodness of the creature as existent. St. Augustine tried to express the situation by maintaining that creatures are not *de illo* (of God); they are only *ab illo* (by God).[4] But although St. Augustine stated the opposition between creationism and emanationism by his use of *ab* and *de illo*, his distinction did not settle the problem definitively. For a creature which is only *ab illo* and not *de illo* is antinomious in Christian philosophy.

Indeed, by identifying the *Nous* of Plotinus with the *Logos* of St. John, transforming the Ideas of Plato into Divine Exemplars, and then finding the Stoic *rationes seminales* as the historic expression of the Exemplars, St. Augustine himself made the universe also *de Deo* in one way or another. Thus, since creation is both of and by God, its existence apart from God is good in the sight of God. Yet, since the modality of the creature is a determinate essence, the existence of the essence is also determinate. And, as determinate, the individual existent has its own autonomy, its own incommunicability or integrity, its own subsistence.

Hence it is Boethius rather than St. Augustine who is the philosopher of the Incarnation. For it is Boethius' original doctrine of subsistence which provides the ontological foundation for the doctrine of the Hypostatic Union. However, the Boethian doctrine of subsistence not only throws light on the Incarnation; it also explains creation. For, since, as St. Thomas says, " properly speaking, subsistent things are truly created," [5] the value of creation for God is in the subsistent essences. God does not love His creatures because He needs them, or even because they need Him. He loves them because they are lovable in themselves.

Since the essence is *of* God and the existence is *by* God, the

[4] *De Natura Boni*, Cap. I.
[5] *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 45, a. 4, c.

necessity for a real distinction between essence and existence has been apparent since Boethius first made the distinction.[6] What is not so apparent, although it is a commonplace of philosophic discussion, is the real distinction in the subsistent essences of matter and form. Aristotle, of course, is the author of this most famous distinction of them all. And, in re-examining the validity of Aristotle's discovery, the historical background of that discovery seems to me most important. The careful examination of his own background which Aristotle himself makes regularly before resolving disputed questions has made it a " common notion " in the history of philosophy that Aristotelianism represents a final synthesis in the progress of human inquiry. And the Aristotelian doctrine of matter and form is certainly a distinctive and definitive doctrine of the Philosopher. However, it is no denial of the greatness of Aristotle to note that he failed to solve satisfactorily many important questions in philosophy. And, although he solved the question of matter and form in a manner which has been accepted generally as satisfactory for twenty-three hundred years, the Aristotelian analysis of individual substance seems to me unacceptable in a creationist ontology. For, in common with every other type of natural wisdom, Greek wisdom, including Aristotle, is incapable of having a valid ontology because it lacks the concept of creation.

Aristotle shares with the Milesian philosophers the notion of a primary but concrete substratum from which and to which all physical change is ordered. The still unanswered question put by Aristotle to Plato: whatever do the Ideas contribute to sensible things,[7] springs from this autochthonous concreteness of Aristotle. So far as I know, however, no one has asked Aristotle what the substratum contributes to sensible things. I, however, do ask the question. And in neither Aristotle nor any Aristotelian do I find a satisfactory answer. Certainly the God of Moses and St. John does not need any indeterminate

[6] *Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint, cum non sint substantialia bona.* Rules II, VI, and VIII.

[7] *Meta.*, I, 9, 991a, 10.

substratum in order to manifest His Goodness. Nor does He need a matter co-created with the form, as St. Thomas can be construed to suggest,[8] in order to establish the order of creation. For if we reject both Platonic Forms and Aristotelian matter as unverifiable and unwarranted abstractions, we are still left with simple essences proceeding translucently from the Divine Essence.

The finding of translucent essences proceeding from the Divine Essence by the free creative fiat of the Divine Will reiterates the historic Christian doctrine of the value of the individual existent in itself. The direct and immediate ontological relation of every creature to his Creator is found only in the Judaeo-Christian culture, with its distinctive creationist basis. If, however, all subsistent essences, spiritual and physical, are simple rather than composite, the Peripatetic solution of the problem of generation and corruption must also be denied. For that solution is, of course, based on the assumption that there *is* an indeterminate substratum common to all substantial change, called prime matter. Now the history of prime matter is a long and rather honorable one. Since Aristotle used it to get the Forms down to earth, the concept of prime matter has survived, with some variations, until today. Matter has been satanized by Plotinus [9] and deified by David of Dinant. Against the Gnostics, Clement of Alexandria exorcised it of evil.[10] Then St. Augustine [11] gave to matter the substantial character which Aristotle had refused it merely by saying "No," after he had almost reasoned himself into saying "Yes." [12] The substantiality of matter remains as a common assumption of medieval thought until St. Thomas revived the historic Aristotelian concept of the indeterminate substrate. But, while St. Thomas defended the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world as logically possible, his acceptance of creation in time as historically true led him to construe matter as intrinsically co-substantial in the Augustinian manner rather than extrinsically co-substantial in the Aristotelian. But the systematic develop-

[8] *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 44, a. 2.
[9] *Enneads*, I, 8, 5.
[10] *Stromata*, VII, 3.
[11] *Confessions*, 12, 7.
[12] *Meta.*, VII, 3.

ment of matter as the principle of individuation by St. Thomas is authentically Aristotelian, in opposition to the Augustinian-Franciscan insistence on matter as a concrete potency, *prope nihil* (almost nothing) rather than *prope aliquid* (almost something).

But whether as *prope nihil* or *prope aliquid*, the concept of matter as substantial still persists in Western thought. Even the Berkeleian rejection of materialism, while furnishing an illuminating and fruitful moment in the progress of human inquiry, is defective by reason of its confusion of substance with matter. The affirmation of the ontological character of individual substance remains a pre-requisite to any valid account of the universe and is eminently indispensable to the account which is suggested herein. For, unlike Berkeley, I accept the common experience of mankind as pre-emptive in philosophy.

The basic insight of common experience consists in the discovery of similarity and diversity in the complex of existence. If only from the practical necessities of human living there is manifested a more or less orderly dynamism of distinctive essences. It is the task of practical wisdom to understand as far as possible the diversity of apparent similars and the similarity of apparent diversities in order that men may enjoy a life which is truly good by the proper employment and enjoyment of things as they are. Again, the task of speculative wisdom is properly that of discovering a fundamental unity of purpose in the diversity of experience in order that this diversity may be ultimately intelligible. Thus it seems that the ends of practical and speculative wisdom are the same. To get in tune with the universe, one must be in tune with the entire complex of existence, including Creator and creation. And since the Creator must have wanted something different from Himself through His creative activity, a fundamental pluralism is an inevitable conclusion of speculative as well as practical wisdom.

The reality of substantial change is the fundamental insight of Aristotle as the fundamental pluralism of being was Plato's. But the common error of these two great thinkers was the doctrine that forms as such are fixed and immutable. It is true that forms *as we know them* are fixed and immutable. But the

essences themselves are *per se* contingent. For there is a real distinction between essence and existence even in the spiritual order of created existence. The incorruptibility of spirit can mean, *properly*, only that it is not subject to the physical laws of change. For, since it does not have in itself the basis for its own existence, the spirit is forever dependent for existence on its Creator. We do not need faith to hold the immortality of the spirit, i. e., to know that it is not subject to physical death. But we do need faith to hold with positive certainty that finite spirits persist forever in existence.

Both physical and spiritual essences, then, are subject to change. But they are not indiscriminately mutable. Both their actualities and their possibilities are limited. Neither spiritual nor physical essences are immutable and universal forms limited by the potency of matter to individually less perfect existences than the forms themselves maintain in the Divine Essence. All created essences are limited by the mode of their existence, which is *outside* the Divine Essence. To repeat, God does not need an indeterminate substratum which limits the perfection of creatable essences as they exist in the Divine Intellect. For *as created* the essences are *per se* limited, although subsistent. Each subsistent essence is individual, contingent, perfectible, and non-eternal. The universality, necessity, immutability and permanence which characterize the ideas by which we know the essences are, of course, fundamentally *in re*. But actually there exist only the subsistent essences, which have transcendental, generic, specific, and particular qualities according to their singular modes of being. There is a community of beings, which includes God as the One Who made the many. But there is no community of being. For each being is singular, although only God is unique.

We have, then, both the Unicity of God and the intrinsic unity of each created being. Each creature is *in* God but it is also in itself. For it acts by its own power. That power is limited to the activities proper to the creature, to its internal and external capacities. And these are more or less determinable. To tranfer our own cognitional inadequacies to the things we know, by considering them as either indeterminate or inde-

terminable, is, it seems to me, another kind of ontologism. For the progress of human thought indicates that the mystery of the universe is subjective rather than objective. We do not know all there is to know about anything. But we certainly do know more and more about everything. And whatever may be the historical derivation of any particular existent, it is limited to a mode, a species, and an order of existence which are revealed to diligent search.

That the present mode, species, and order of things will continue to exist we do not know. That they will be replaced by a different existential situation we also do not know. There is no present evidence that they will be, although there is, of course, evidence available that the mode, species, and order of things have changed in the past. But we do know that the subsistent essences persist in existence *each as itself*. Things are not just " haecceities," as the Scotists maintain. They are rather " ipseities," to use a new term in philosophy.

By the use of the term " ipseity," I intend to indicate apodictically that things *subsist in themselves*. This, of course, neither idealist not materialist will admit. For the idealist knows only God, not the ipseities which God creates. The world is too much for the idealist, as it hardly is for God. Even the exuberant dialectic of the Subtle Doctor could never get him out of the Divine Essence. And, of course, Scotus didn't want to get out. However, to paraphrase the comedian Durante, " everyone does *not* want to get into the Act." For the Pure Act which is God has also its Integrity, its Unicity. God created the ipseities *to be themselves*, not to become absorbed in Him. For He does not need us. Moreover, we must remember our materialistic brethren, who will have nothing to do with Him. For them neither God nor the ipseities exist. They find a great deal of activity but no actuality. Matter, matter, everywhere, and never a sign to show it as it really is.

The ipseities, then, are generally distinguishable but they are imperfectly known even *in concreto*. They are autonomous. But they are not monadic. For they interact with one another. And in these actions they are *entelic*. They have functions and ends which are approximately determinable. However, al-

though they are purposive, the ipseities are also incompetent in themselves. For they are self-subsistent extrinsically only, not intrinsically. Not only the individual but also the species may vanish from the earth. And since things are self-subsistent, but only extrinsically, therefore they require a Creator to account for their production and persistence in existence.

I have now returned to the Divine Essence whence I came. For, since the ipseities are determined to a limited autonomy of being, there must be a transcendent Power which determines them. And that Power is Itself determined or not determined, that is, finite or infinite. If it is finite, it is determined by some other being. And so on until the Infinite Being is found. For, as Aristotle pointed out, "those who maintain the infinite series, eliminate the good without knowing it." [13] Moreover, the ipseities themselves cannot be construed as limiting or determining God, because it is they who are limited themselves and this in the very fundament of their being. Again, there is no eternal Law in the universe except the Law of the Love of God. There is no universal finite order evident to us by which the Creator might be determined. There is no Reason in us nor in things. But there are *rationes* or finite *orders* both in us and in things. And thus it seems to me that there must be an Infinite Reason both in and above the various finite *rationes* present to us. And this is the Immanent and Transcendent God.

I am, then, attempting to induce herein to an infinite and irresistible Purpose from the preliminary generalization that there are countless finite purposes, some of which are attained and some not attained. I infer that there is a Purpose. But my knowledge of It is approximate. For, if my inference is correct, God knows exactly what He is doing but we do not. We are, however, evidently expected to inquire, since we each have an intelligence which is capable of doing so. Moreover, since our minds are discursive, not intuitive, we must expect to change them sometimes.

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[13] *Meta.*, II, 2, 994b, 12.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

BY JOHN OF ST. THOMAS *

Translated from the Latin by

JAMES M. EGAN, O.P. and WALTER D. HUGHES, O.P.

> And though the last lights off the black West went
> Oh, morning, at the brown brink eastward, springs—
> Because the Holy Ghost over the bent
> World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings.
>
> —GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS.

"Send forth thy spirit and they shall be created and thou shalt renew the face of the earth." These words suggest the background of a dead and dreary world, a chaotic mass of unformed matter. No order or meaning reveals itself to the mind. No minute beauties catch the eye, no glorious vistas lead it off to far horizons. But down from the heavens sweeps the Spirit of God, and as He passes order springs out of chaos, beauty out of ugliness. With loving gentleness, the Spirit of Love conquers the inertia of matter and creates a world of mystery and splendor. What a moment before seemed an impossible task is accomplished, because God sends forth His Spirit and renews the face of the earth.

The inertia of matter is superable as wax in comparison with the hardness of a human heart turned from God. The original chaos somehow seems ordered in contrast to the chaos existing in the minds and hearts of men today. It is a fact that we cannot escape. And we must do something about it. At present the burden of our Faith and the burden of our Charity lie heavily upon us. Constantly

* EDITOR'S NOTE: In publishing this English translation of John of St. Thomas' treatise on the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, THE THOMIST is departing from its usual practise of presenting only works of original speculation. However, since this year marks the tercentenary of the publication of the treatise (published by Didacus Ramirez, O.P.), the editors wished to honor the great Thomistic commentator by making one of his finest works available to the English-speaking public. To the translation have been prefaced an historical introduction by Walter D. Hughes, O.P. and a theological introduction by James M. Egan, O.P. The outlines that appear in different places throughout the work are not to be understood as being a part of the original text of John of St. Thomas; they are original with the present translators.

we pray God to send forth His Spirit and renew the face of the earth.

In the first transition from chaos to order the Spirit worked alone; this is no longer universally true. By preference, He now works through and with others. In fact, He works through the Catholic Church, the mystical body of Christ, of which He is the soul. That is why the Catholic Church is the principal agency in bringing about the kingdom of God on earth. If order is to be restored to the world, it must be brought by the Spirit of God working in the Church and in her members.

The Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Love, is also the all-pervading Spirit of Wisdom. "For wisdom is more active than all active things, and reacheth everywhere by reason of her purity. For she is a vapour of the power of God and a pure emanation of the glory of almighty God. . . . For she is the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of his goodness. And being but one, she can do all things; and remaining in herself the same, she reneweth all things, and through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets. For God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom. For she is more beautiful than the sun, and above all the order of the stars: being compared with the light she is found before it. For after this cometh night, but no evil can overcome wisdom. She reacheth therefore from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly."[1]

It is about time, therefore, that we realized the need for a new outpouring of the Holy Ghost, Who alone can guide us in the extraordinarily complex task of winning the world back to Christ and to His Church. The more we realize the need of the Holy Ghost's aid, the more we should desire it and pray for it. But further we must be sure that we are prepared to receive His assistance when He gives it. A renewed study of the traditional doctrine on the gifts of the Holy Ghost is necessary at the present time; we receive these gifts at our baptism, we hear about them during catechetical instruction, and then forget about them for the rest of our lives.

There must, then, be a deeper appreciation of the part played in the spiritual life by the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and by the

[1] *Wisdom*, vii, 24-viii, 1.

Holy Ghost Himself. The classic treatise on this subject is the one by the great Thomistic commentator, John of St. Thomas, which is presented here in translation.

The translation is prefaced by two introductions. The historical introduction needs no explanation. The aim of the theological introduction is to place the treatise on the Gifts of the Holy Ghost in line with the general Thomistic teaching on the spiritual life. Moreover, since John of St. Thomas treats very summarily two questions allied to that on the Gifts concerning the fruits of the Holy Spirit and the beatitudes, they will receive a more detailed consideration in the introduction.

A. Historical Introduction.

With his life given in the service of the Spanish crown, his soul devoted to God, and his pen dedicated to the whole world,[2] John of St. Thomas bore the burdens of others in fulfillment of the law of Christ. In his measure and in his time, he *filled what was wanting in the suffering of Christ* by his wholehearted devotion to God. His pen supported beleaguered orthodoxy and Thomism in theological controversies whose reverberations have not yet subsided, while his mortal life, given to the service of his adopted nation and its king, was crushed under the burdens of the crumbling Spanish empire.

In mundane affairs John of St. Thomas was a minor actor, standing half in the spotlight, half in the shadows, while the principals were dicing for the destinies of Europe. Under the Providence of God, his very entry on the scene was occasioned by the needs of the Spanish crown. To assure the devolution of that crown to a head worthy of its imperial glory and Catholic heritage, Philip II brought to Spain, as companion of his own weak and incorrigible son Don Carlos, the Archduke Albert of Austria.[3] In the archduke's company during his journey to the Iberian Peninsula—while "Don Juan of Austria was riding to the sea"—was Albert's secretary, Peter Poinsot. When Archduke Albert was made a cardinal and

[2] Didacus Ramirez, friend and earliest biographer of John of St. Thomas, as well as first editor of his work, phrased it thus: ". . . unus persona, multus officio, Deo Regi, et Orbi deservians, mente Deo, Vita Regi, calamo orbi." Preface to Volume IV of *Cursus Theologicus*, Madrid, 1645, Lyons, 1663, Cologne, 1771, Paris, 1931.

[3] Cf. James Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, II, p. 538b.

viceroy of Portugal, his secretary went with him to Lisbon. There, not later than 1583, Peter Poinsot met and married Mary Garcez. Of this union of equally noble Austrian and Portuguese families were born two sons, Luis, who is rescued from oblivion by his connection with his brother,[4] and John, who was born and "born again" on July the ninth in the parish of St. Mary of the Martyrs in the hectic year which followed the defeat of the Armada in 1588.[5] Seven years later, because of the changing fortunes of Spain, Albert and Peter Poinsot went to the Low Countries, but John remained in Portugal for almost a decade.[6]

During that space off the stage of the public activities of Albert's household, John was enrolled at the famous Jesuit University at Coimbra. There he studied the arts and philosophy while Shakespeare was writing *Macbeth* and Francis Bacon was advancing the death of philosophy with the *Advancement of Learning*.[7] During his single year of theology at Coimbra [8] he probably heard of the Jesuit-Dominican controversy on grace, begun when he was born and then entering a critical stage for the rectors of Coimbra and their confreres.[9] Moreover, it is not unlikely that he saw but never heard Francisco Suarez, since, after his unhappy visit to

[4] Luis Poinsot received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Coimbra at the same time as John (*Archiv. Conimbricensis Universitatis, Autos e graos*, Vol. 21, fol. 29v). He then entered the school of law. In 1610, already a professed religious in the Order of the Most Holy Trinity, he returned to Coimbra to study theology (*ibid. Provas de Cursos*, Vol. 8, fol. 256). After teaching in various places, he returned to Coimbra in 1637. He attained to the chair of theology named after Durandus in 1648 and that named after Scotus in 1653. He died in 1655 (*ibid. Processos das cadeiras*, Vol. 2, fol. 117v). Cf. *Cursus Theologicus Joannis a S. Thoma.*, ed. Sollemne, Paris, 1931. Appendix vii, p. lxix.

[5] July 9, 1589 is universally agreed upon as the date of his birth, but his birthplace and parentage are almost as much disputed as those of Homer. Cf. Didacus Ramirez, *op. cit.*; Echard, *op. cit.* II, pp. 555 ff. Vincentius Baron *Duo postremi apologiae libri*, Paris, 1666, and *Cursus Theologicus*, ed. Sollemne, appendix xv, p. lxxxvi.

[6] Cf. W. T. Walsh, *Philip II*, Sheed and Ward, 1937, p. 708; and *Archiv. Conimbric. Universit., Provas de Cursos*, Vol. 7, fol. 2.

[7] In unanimous agreement the examining board of Jesuit Fathers gave John of St. Thomas his baccalaureate in arts on March 11, 1605. (*Archiv. Conimbric. Universit., Autos e graos*, Vol. 21, fol. 29v.)

[8] That year (October 14, 1605 to March, 1606) was spent under Fr. Jeronimo and Fr. Salvador, Trinitarians, at Coimbra. (*Archiv. Conimbric. Universit., Provas de Cursos*, Vol. 7, fol. 113v.)

[9] Cf. Alfred Whitacre, O.P., *Dublin Review*, vol. 186, no. 372, p. 71.

Rome, Coimbra's greatest doctor did not resume his public lectures until October 1606.[10] By that time John Poinsot had left Portugal and had once more appeared upon the public scene with his father and the other intimates of Albert, then Governor of the Netherlands.

Continuing his theological studies in Belgium, John Poinsot retired deep into the scholastic life of the University of Louvain. During his two additional years of theological study John came under the influence of the Dominican master Thomas de Torres. By his life and by his profound theological discourses the Dominican professor instilled in John Poinsot a reverence for the religious life and an insatiable desire for a thorough knowledge of the doctrine of St. Thomas. For the "pearl of great price" offered him by Thomas de Torres, John Poinsot was willing to barter the company of his parents, worldly goods, and all hope of civil or ecclesiastical dignities.

Acting upon the suggestion of his Dominican preceptor, John Poinsot went to the convent of Our Lady of Atocha in Madrid. There he made his novitiate and pronounced his profession under the name John of St. Thomas.[11] Although he had already received his *Baccalaureus Biblicus* at Louvain—at the same time as Cornelius Jansenius, later bishop and heresiarch [12]—he was required to spend three years in theological study within the Dominican convent.[13] He then spent several years in Madrid, teaching as *artium lector* and exercising the important office of Master of Students, planting and watering in the minds and hearts of his younger

[10] Despite the best efforts of Father Suarez, one of his propositions on confession and absolution was condemned by a decree of the Holy Office, June 20, 1602. Suarez returned to Coimbra in January, 1606. Cf. R. de Scorraille, *François Suarez*, Paris, 1913, ii. pp. 67, 81 ff.; and Denziger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 1088.

[11] His profession took place on July 18, 1610, according to the Catalogus of José de la Concepción, Madrid, 1747, fol. 149B. His choice of a religious name indicates his devotion to St. Thomas, but the assumption of a religious name was not rare in Portugal even at that time. Cf. R. P. Mortier, *Histoire des Maîtres Généreaux de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs*, t. v. p. 435.

[12] Cf. *Archives generales du Royaume, Archiv. de l'Univ. de Louv.*, no. 507, fol. 23 and 24r in *Cursus Theologicus*, ed. Sollemne, appendix viii, p. lxvii.

[13] It does not seem possible to hold that he took the full seven-year course then prescribed, respite the statement of Gabriel de Cepeda, O.P.: ". . . solo se dispenso quando professo, de Sumulas y Logica, concurriendo con los demas estudiantes a oir Filosofia."

brethren the same Dominican spirituality which was even then germinating the first flower of American sanctity, St. Rose of Lima.

In 1620 John of St. Thomas began his formal theological expositions of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas. After teaching for a short time in Piacenza and Madrid, he was appointed associate professor of theology at the University of Alcala.[14] At this famous university, John of St. Thomas *communicated without envy* the teachings of the Angelic Doctor which he had *received without guile*. Under Dominican tutelage, John of St. Thomas, not unlike his baptismal patron at Patmos, had *received the book from the hand of the angel and devoured it.* His assimilation of Thomism was so thorough that his contemporaries thought of him as a "second Thomas," and second only to Thomas in his manner of presentation. He lectured to classes larger than any others then assembled in Spain, and he labored zealously to fashion square and solid the living stones of the "fortress of Catholicism."

During his decade or more as associate professor as well as when he succeeded his confrere Peter of Tapia in the principal theological chair at Alcala, John of St. Thomas exercised the office of Qualificator of the Supreme Council of the Spanish Inquisition.[15] To him was given the task of editing the index of prohibited books and assisting in the preparation of difficult cases.[16] With justice and charity he fulfilled his duties in that providential institution which kept from the borders of Spain the ravages of religious wars like the Thirty Years War then raging throughout most of Europe.

His judicatory and scholastic duties, however, did not prevent him from exercising the office of preacher. On solemn occasions, whether in the presence of a bishop, or before an assemblage of dignitaries of his own Order, John of St. Thomas preached the word of God in the church as he had expounded it in the classroom.[17] Unimpeachable stability in doctrine and clarity in exposition marked his sermons with the same utility for souls which was so characteristic of his counsels in the confessional.

[14] Cf. R. P. Beltran de Heredia, *Cientia Tomista*, t. xiv (1916), p. 294.

[15] Cf. Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.*; Quétif, *Synopsis vitae Joannis a S. Thoma*, Paris, 1667. Cf. Echard, *loc. cit.*

[16] Cf. *Memorial Historico Espanol* of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, t. xii, pp. 155-156.

[17] Cf. José de la Concepción, *op. cit.*, (*Cursus Theol.*, ed. Sollemne, Appendix iv, n. 8, p. lvi.)

His regency of souls in the confessional extended from King Philip IV to the poorest persons in the Spanish dominions. Affable and accessible to all, John of St. Thomas was calm and benign in difficulties but adamant in maintaining the truth. Although he was confessor to Philip IV for little more than a year,[18] he gave the troubled and vacillating monarch a determined course of moral action. Moreover, in many affairs of state it was the impartial and eminently practical judgment of John of St. Thomas which prevailed in factional disputes. Constantly at Philip's side, he was indefatigable in his spiritual labors for the king and the realm. On his advice Philip IV went to Saragossa in 1644 to encourage his troops to victory after so many defeats.[19] Accompanying the king on this campaign, John of St. Thomas gave Spain and its sovereign sound counsel and heroic example. In the midst of the tumult and rejoicing of Philip's victorious army, this holy Dominican friar, the greatest Thomistic theologian of the modern era, ended his mortal life. He died either from fever or from poison on July 17, 1644.[20] In accord with his own request, his body was taken to the Convent of Our Lady of Atocha in Madrid, where his remains now lie under the Altar of Christ.

Any evil men may recognize in the life of John of St. Thomas has, let us hope, been washed away by the blood from Christ's wounds. The good which God willed and accomplished in him and through him gives evidence that he was a son of God, led by the spirit of God.

Hunger and thirst for God's justice were characteristic of both the zeal and the patience of John of St. Thomas. Trials and con-

[18] Cf. Didacus Ramirez, *op. cit.*, and Quétif, *loc. cit.*

[19] J. J. Panzirolus, Apostolic Nuntio to Spain, wrote to the Roman Curia: ". . . Si sono fatte molte consulte se era bene che S. Maesta si muovesse da Saragozza e tutti sono stati per la negativa eccetto quella del P. Fra. Giovanni di S. Thoma. . . ." *Archiv. Vatic. Nunziat. di Spangna.* Reg. 89, April 3, 1644. Cf. *Cursus Theol.*, ed. Sollemne, appendix xiii, p. lxxxiii.

[20] T. Soueges affirms, "D'après Ramirez et Quétif, cette mort prématurée tiendrait à des causes criminelles. Jean de Saint-Thomas aurait été empoisonné." *Annee Dominicaine*, Juin, ed. Jevain, Lyon, 1893, note on p. 365. Cf. R. P. Simonin, *Bulletin Thomiste*, Sept. 1930, p. 142. Sufficient evidence has not yet been advanced to prove any criminal cause for his death, but it would be imprudent to deny that a confessor who taught "the naked truth" to Philip IV might have aroused the hostility of the fawning courtiers and unworthy favorites to whom the king had previously delegated the conduct of public affairs.

tradictions evoked from the depths of his soul a prayer for "the daily bread" of divine strength, and adversity galvanized his holy enthusiasm to even greater efforts in the service of God. When he received the command to assume the office of royal confessor which his humility dreaded, he conquered his aversion and said simply, "My life is finished, and I am dead. Pray for me."[21] Since his life was Christ and his death gain, with the strength of the holy ones of God, he welcomed his final hour. His soul was clad in the armor of Christ's sacraments and his powers of mind and heart, fortified by the Gift of the Holy Ghost, were intent upon the omnipotence and the mercy of God.[22]

The Gift of Fortitude which conquered human fear in the soul of John of St. Thomas was rooted in a filial Fear of God. That Gift of the Holy Ghost which inspires the "poor of spirit" moved him to a horror of sin. Calling upon God who "works all in all" to free him from evil, he delighted in the will of God alone and coveted only a holy disdain for earthly goods. His cell was bare and his clothing poor. He never acquired for himself the slightest profit from his labor and his publications, but with childlike simplicity he submitted all to the disposal of his superiors.[23] Moreover, before assuming the position of confessor to Philip IV, he stipulated that he and his companion should receive mere sustenance and that the remainder of his annuity should be distributed to the poor. Poverty in exterior goods was complemented with paucity in the comforts he allowed his own body. God pierced his flesh with fear, and fasts and bloody scourging drained the dregs of self-love which remained.[24] Filial fear of God was the beginning of his wisdom, but it was not its end.

[21] Cf. Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.*

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.* "Etsi pecuniis abundans quae ex tot librorum impressionibus repetitis profluebant nec sibi servabat partem . . . plena in magnitudine pauper, et plena in paupertate magnificus. . . ."

[24] *Ibid.* ". . . quadrigesimali medio tempore totam, pane contentus et aqua, studiorum laboribus, assiduaque virtutum exercitatione saginatus . . . sanguine suo sui respersi libri contestantur, disciplinarumque ac ciliciorum copiosa suppellectili perplenum scrinium proclamat." His humility was strikingly like that of St. Thomas: "Solum excanduit quando bis in Priorem Conventus Regalis de Atocha amantissimi Fratres poposcerunt, quos licet fraternali prosequeretur effectu, ardentiori tamen conatu humilitatem colebat, alia etiam extra Ordinem dignitatum (adhuc Episcopalis) munia repudians." *Ibid.*

Filial fear was germane to filial piety in the soul of John of St. Thomas. Moved by fear, he protested as a returning prodigal, that he was not worthy to be called a son of God, but in his piety he thanked God for the banquet of His graces. This banquet was but the pledge that he would "possess the land" because he was blessedly meek of heart. His meekness and humility of heart were founded upon a filial affection for God and the sons of God. By an impulse of the Holy Ghost he transcended his religious obligation of gratitude for the blessings he had received, and he "gave thanks to the Holy One and the Host High" because of His great glory. Moreover, God's glory participated in by His sons founded a new debt of justice which John of St. Thomas promptly rendered to all his consorts in divine life. Trusting in a divine victory over temptations against complete submission to the Holy Ghost, he prayed "lead us not into temptation." His piety towards those to whom God had given faith in His Son was put to a severe test in the Jansenist controversy. John of St. Thomas was called upon to judge the doctrines of some of the staff at Louvain, since he was adviser to Philip IV who held civil dominion over the University. Representations were made to him by the Apostolic Delegate of Spain and by several of the professors of Louvain.[25] However, he lacked conclusive evidence that the accused were actually promulgating the sinuous spirituality condemned by Pope Urban VIII. Until he had received ample information from impartial witnesses, he was unwilling to condemn as heretics Catholic theologians hitherto bound to him by their common piety toward their divine Father.

The solid piety of John of St. Thomas was not founded upon sentimentalism but upon the Gift of Knowledge. Led by the Spirit of God, he became supremely conscious of the depravity of sin. In this blessed mourning for his offenses against God's majesty, he was comforted by prayer for the forgiveness of his transgressions, and by hope in the mercy of God. His prayer for forgiveness was implemented by the Sacrament of Penance, which he received, as

[25] Cf. *Cursus Theol.*, ed. Sollemne, appendix xiii and xiv. There is absolutely no foundation for the statement, "Ce père leur (Jansenistes) rendoit de bons offices auprès du roy . . ." made by P. R. Rapin, S. J., *Memoires*, Paris, 1865 t. I, p. 16. The Jansenists themselves did not claim him as favorable to their position, hence he could not have given them the slightest indication of approbation.

we have said, each day before celebrating Mass.[26] His hope had its source in a living faith. His simple assent to the authority of God prepared his soul for the Gift of Understanding. By the enlightenment of the Holy Ghost he was enabled to penetrate truths hidden in Sacred Scripture and in all the realms of the spiritual life. With a pure heart he saw God in all things and he prayed for the coming of His Kingdom.

For John of St. Thomas the coming of God's Kingdom meant the fulfillment of the ardent desire of his soul. His charity impelled him towards God, and the Gift of Wisdom enabled him to taste and see the goodness of God in an experiental and mystical union. Like St. Thomas, " . . . he gazed with the gentle eye of his intellect at . . . Truth, whereby he acquired supernatural light, and science infused by grace, for he obtained it rather by means of prayer than by human study." [27] " Science infused by grace," the Wisdom which is the *light of life*, ordered his contemplation, his life and his writings. His contemplation revolved uniformly about thoughts of God, never deviating to lesser things nor requiring any reasoning process to elaborate the " savory science of the saints." Wisdom produced in his soul a connaturality to divine things, and in this prelude to future glory, he experienced an intimate and loving contact with the mysteries of salvation and the hidden things of God. By the annointing of the Holy Ghost he was taught to " hallow " the name of God and to contemplate " Divine Truth and its universal radiation." By his teaching and his writing he distributed to others the fruits of his contemplation. At his death he protested before the Blessed Sacrament that he had never taught or written anything he did not judge consonant with truth and in conformity with the teaching of the Angelic Doctor.[28] In virtue of the ordered tranquillity within his own soul, he was able to become a " peacemaker " among men.

[26] Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.* " . . . quotidianam Missae celebrationem, quam generalis fere confessio praecedebat."

[27] St. Catherine of Sienna, *Dialogue*, tr. Thorold. Treatise on Obedience, ch. cxxxix. Cf. Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.* " . . . indefatigabili semper studio desudans pro tenenda veritate, pro Angelico Doctore defendensando, cuius verbo, voce, cuius prosecutione ministerii oratione, jejuniis, frequentique disciplina communitus vigilabat."

[28] Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.* " numquam triginta annorum spatio aut scripsisse aut docuisse quod veritati consonum, atque Angelico Doctori confome non judicaret. . . . "

The peace of Christ which John of St. Thomas brought to so many souls was evidence of the inner breathing of the Holy Ghost through the Gift of Counsel. Simple as a dove and wise as a serpent, John of St. Thomas gave advice which was simple in its supernatural origin and serpentine in its adaptability to the contingencies of human life. In Christ-like simplicity he directed to God, *who works all things according to the counsel of his will*, his humble prayer, *thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven*. With apostolic constancy, he labored, as a good soldier of Christ Jesus, to bring about a realization of God's will among men. Prelates and the poor, royalty and theologians sought his counsel. To the poor he was a father by his advice and his alms, and for those who had no friends at court, he was a mendicant of mercy importuning the king.[29] Peter of Tapia and John of Palafox, as theologians and as bishops, found in the counsel of John of St. Thomas comfort in their anxieties and a secure guide in many difficulties.[30] To King Philip IV, during whose reign the etiquette of the Spanish court was more rigorous than its ethics, the advice of his Dominican confessor was salutary in both the Kingdom of Heaven and the Spanish realm.[31]

The oral advice which John of St. Thomas was able to give during his lifetime was confined to the kingdom of Spain, but the work of his pen was carried throughout the world. His innumerable replies to questions and difficulties proposed by prelates and theologians are for the most either lost or buried in the dust of diocesan or university archives. However, three of his works in the vernacular have survived, because of their popularity and wide circulation. To assist missionaries to India in the salvation of souls he wrote an explanation of Christian doctrine in 1640—the same year in which John Milton was contributing to the loss of paradise for so many souls by his second pamphlet on divorce.[32] Seven editions

[29] Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.* "Hilarior nunquam, ac nunquem ditior quam quando pauperum libellos Magno suo offerebat Regi, pro ipsis exorans usque ad ipsius taedium exorationis, Regium dicens Confessarium Patris Pauperum, qui Regale cubile facile nequeunt adire ut suas propalent Supremo Domino petitiones, nomen et vocem habere."

[30] Cf. Antonio de Lorea, O.P. *El Siervo de Dios . . . D. Fr. Pedro de Tapia*, Madrid, 1676. José de la Concepion, *op. cit.* tom. 1.

[31] Quétif, *op. cit.* ". . . sitque illi ab arcanis Confessionibus intimisque consiliis."

[32] The work is called *Explicación de la doctrina christiana y la obligacion de los fieles en career y obrar*, Madrid, 1640.

of this compendium of Catholic doctrine and practices were published in Spanish before it was translated into Italian, Latin, Gaelic and Polish.[33] For King Philip IV he wrote a directory for a general confession,[34] and just before he died he wrote a brief treatise on the preparation for a happy death.[35]

The first major Latin work of John of St. Thomas, his *Cursus Philosophicus*, was an exposition of the philosophical disciplines according to the doctrine and the order of St. Thomas.[36] In his bipartite treatment the first section, *Ars Logica*, includes treatises on dialectical disputation and logical form as well as tracts on the predicables, predicaments and logical instruments. The second section, *Philosophia Naturalis*, is concerned with movable being in general and local motion, alteration and augmentation (psychology) in particular. No *ex professo* consideration is given to natural theology or ethics, since according to the custom of the time, these matters belong to commentaries on the first and second parts of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas.[37]

Such a commentary on the *Summa Theologica* began to absorb the interest of John of St. Thomas soon after his philosophical work had been completed. The material for his *Cursus Theologicus* was accumulated during his twenty or more years of lecturing in theology. It included, besides three prefatory tracts, all his expository theological disputations arranged according to the order of the questions of the *Summa Theologica*. The work of redacting the manuscript from which he had dictated to his classes occupied a considerable part of the last eight years of his life,[38] but it was never completed. The last disputation to benefit by his final corrections was his famous treatise on the Gifts of the Holy Ghost.[39]

[33] Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, II, 539a and 761b.

[34] *Breve tratado y muy importante, que por mandano de su Majesdad excribio el R. P. Fr. Juan de St. Tomas para saber hacer una confesion general*, Madrid, 1644.

[35] *Practica y Consideracion para ayudar a bien morir*, 1645. Cf. Echard, *op. cit.*, II, 539a.

[36] Cf. Echard, *op. cit.*, II, 538b.

[37] Cf. *Cursus Philosophicus*, ed. Reiser, Turin, 1930. p. xii.

[38] Cf. *Cursus Theologicus*, ed. Sollemne, Paris, 1931. pp. ix and xviia.

[39] Cf. Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.* The inscription given by John of St. Thomas dates and locates the work. "Ad honorem Domini nostri Jesu Christi crucifixi, Beatissimae Virginis B. Dominici et Thomae, 21 Aprilis 1644, cum essemus Caesaraugustae in expeditione Catalonica."

Throughout both his *Cursus Philosophicus* and his *Cursus Theologicus* John of St. Thomas had but a single literary objective —clarity. With the truth of his doctrine guaranteed by his faithful adherence to the teaching of St. Thomas, he subordinated all purely literary elements of his work to clarity of presentation. He succeeded in presenting his thoughts clearly,[40] but at the same time he sacrificed many of the elements of style which would have made his work more readable. The solecisms and barbarisms which give a certain harshness to his writings were not the result of ignorance but a matter of deliberate choice. Under the Jesuit Fathers at Coimbra, who were even then renowned for their teaching of the humanities, John of St. Thomas studied the arts,[41] and in many of his prefaces he gave evidence of a graceful mastery of Latin. In his disputations, however, and especially in those of the *Cursus Theologicus*, he frequently allows the reciprocal affinity of words in Latin construction to be carried away by the torrent of his thought. His deliberate neglect of grammatical propriety and literary grace would be a blameworthy burying of a talent if he did not have a dominating purpose in view.

Desirous of simple clarity, he accommodated himself to the manner of theological teaching then current in Spanish universities. He chose to imitate the austere lucidity of Dominic Soto and Dominic Bañez rather than the more elaborate style which had been fostered by Melchior Cano.[42] In making this choice he was governed both by the Aristotelean Thomistic tradition [43] and by the preferences of his auditors and readers. For his disciples were for the most part that type of person—common to all ages [44]—who

[40] R. P. J. M. Ramirez, O. P. "clair et simple quique souvent diffus. . . ." *Dictionaire de Théologie catholique*, Paris, 1924, VIIIa, p. 803.

[41] Cf. Quétif, *loc. cit.*

[42] Cf. Echard, *op. cit.*, II, 176.

[43] Aristotle: "The right thing in speaking really is that we should be satisfied not to annoy our hearers, without trying to delight them: we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore, should matter except the proof of those facts." *Rhetoric*, III, 1 (1404a2), tr. Roberts.

Boethius: "Adsit igitur Rhetoricae suedela dulcedinis quae tum tantum recto calle procedit cum nostra (Ratio) instituta non deserit . . ." *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, II, 1, Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, LXIII, column 660.

St. Thomas: ". . . ex quibusdam coniecturis ad suspicionem inducendam, vel aliqualiter persuadendum; quod pertinet ad rhetoricam." *Summa Theologica*, II-II, q. 48, a. 1.

[44] St. Augustine mentions this type of person: "Sensi autem aliud genus hominum

distrusts truth when it is presented with elegance or eloquence. They condoned rhetorical vices, but they condemned the slightest deviation from truth. John of St. Thomas gave them discourses freighted with meaning, yet he often allowed the vehicle of his expression to run upon serious obstacles. The structure of his sentences was at times eliptical, anacoluthic and pleonastic. Barbarisms and grammatical devices of his own invention were not completely eliminated even from the amended texts. However, despite this lack of attention to grammatical details, the literary style of John St. Thomas remained vigorous and clear.

His use of illustration, comparison, repetition, and amplification—paralleled in English only by DeQuincey or Cardinal Newman—gave his metaphysical language force and clarity. Even his apparent prolixity and inveterate habit of digression were natural concomitants of his efforts to attain his primary objective of precision of intelligibility in the expression of truth.[45]

Singleness of doctrinal and literary purpose has suffused the whole body of his teaching with the light of eternal truth and perennial charm. Throughout the three centuries since his death his philosophical and theological disputations have been reprinted many times,[46] and for all generations they have represented one of the most profound penetrations and lucid expressions of Thomistic thought.

Of his many disputations on Thomism none was more profound in doctrine nor more eloquent of his holiness and apostolic activities than his treatise on the Gifts of the Holy Ghost. At the very time

etiam veritatem habere suspectam, et ei nolle adquiescere si compto atque uberi sermone promeretur." *Confessionum Libri tredecim*, Bk. V, c. 6. Migne, *P. L.*, XXXII, 710.

[45] In the introduction of the first volume of his *Cursus Philosophicus* he states his purpose: ". . . ut ad brevem et consciam methodum pro viribus Logicae et Philosophiae disciplinam iuxta S. Thomae sensum redigeremus. Id circo non solum visum est eius solidam sequi et imitari doctrinam, sed ordinem, brevitatem modestiamque aemulari." ed. Reiser, Turin, 1930. However, in his preface to the second volume, he seems constrained to quote St. Jerome: "Nemo cogitur legere quod non vult. Ego potentibus scripsi, non fastidiosis, gratis non invidis, studiosis, non oscitantibus." (*II Apol. ad Rufinum*, c. 33. *P. L.*, XXII, 476) ed. Reiser, Turin, 1930.

[46] The philosophical disputations were reprinted, in whole or in part, sixteen times between 1631 and 1930. The theological disputations were reprinted in Madrid, 1645-1656; Cologne, 1658; Lyons, 1663; Cologne, 1771; Paris, 1883; Paris, 1931.

he was giving his mortal life to assist Philip IV and the Spanish army at Catalonia, he dedicated to the whole world the final bequest of his theological labor for orthodoxy and Thomism. While *in all his works, he gave thanks to the holy one and the Most High in words of glory,* his treatise on the Gifts of the Holy Ghost remains as his spiritual bequest to all who in docility to the Holy Ghost bear the burdens of others in fulfillment of the law of Christ.

B. Theological Introduction.

Father, the hour has come! Glorify thy Son, that thy Son may glorify thee, even as thou hast given him power over all flesh, in order that to all thou hast given him, he may give everlasting life. Now this is everlasting life, that they may know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ.[47]

The revelation of Jesus Christ is the revelation of our eternal destiny, the clear announcement that God wills us to be happy everlastingly with Him in heaven. The life and death of Christ were ordered to opening the gates of heaven to all those who believed in Him and followed Him in the way of the Cross to eternal glory.

A little thought helps us to realize what this promised life in heaven really means, although we shall never exhaust its profundities. "We see now through a mirror in an obscure manner, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I have been known."[48] Our Divine Lord has revealed to us the overwhelming truth that God wishes His intellectual creatures to be eternally happy in possessing the same good that makes Him happy. We know that God is infinitely happy; but why is he happy? If (and this is an impossible conjecture) God did not know His own inexhaustible goodness and love that goodness, He would not be happy. For happiness is the conscious possession of a good, infinite happiness the conscious possession of an infinite good. A spiritual good can be possessed only by knowledge and love; so Christ has promised us eternal happiness in the face-to-face knowledge of the divine essence and the love that follows such knowledge. Our knowledge and love of God in eternity will be a participation in the knowledge and love that God has of Himself.

It is only through an understanding of the life of heaven that we

[47] *John*, xvii, 2-3. [48] *I Corinthians*, xiii, 12.

can grasp the meaning of the life of grace here on earth. For grace has always been considered in Christian tradition as "the seed of glory." Now the seed can be understood only by the fruit it is ordered to produce. Here we encounter another tremendous truth of Christian revelation; everlasting life begins, not when we die and enter the kingdom of heaven, but at the moment we receive sanctifying grace in our souls. "Grace," says St. Thomas, "is nothing but a beginning of eternal life in us." [49] And he is simply echoing the words of Our Lord: "He who believes in me has eternal life." [50] The life of grace, the interior life of the Christian, is an imperfect participation in the life of heaven, for it, too, is basically a life of knowledge and love of God.

These two truths can be expressed graphically through an analysis of the intimate life of God and the life of grace here and hereafter.

Life of God	*Life of Grace*	
	On Earth	*In Heaven*
Divine Nature	Habitual Grace	Habitual Grace
Divine Intellect	Virtue of Faith and the Gifts	Light of Glory and the Gifts
Divine Will	Virtue of Charity	Virtue of Charity
Divine Understanding	Act of Faith, perfected by the Gifts	Beatific Vision
Divine Willing	Act of Charity (Beatitudes)	Act of Charity, beatific love

The divisions given for the life of God are, of course, made for our understanding; in God no such divisions exist. However, we must conceive of the divine nature as the fundamental principle of all the divine operations. The intellect and will are the proximate principles, while the acts of the divine intellect and will are specified by the divine essence. We learn from faith that in knowing and loving Himself God the Father generates the Son and with the Son breathes forth the Holy Ghost. And those eternal acts of knowing and loving account also for creation and all the works that God produces outside the divine essence.

Our participation in the divine life is not a transient, fleeting thing, but permanent according to the intention of God. We must

[49] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 24, a. 3, ad 2um.
[50] *John*, iii, 36.

then be permanently proportioned to the object that is to beatify us, the divine essence as it is in itself. This is the reason why we receive so many virtuous habits at Baptism. Habitual grace is the fundamental reality of our supernatural life, for it is a formal participation in the divine nature; it is in us the remote principle of all our supernatural activities. Of itself, it does not operate immediately; for action we need proximate permanent principles, which are principally the virtues of faith and charity.

A glance at the outline will show the close relation between the life and grace on earth and in heaven; habitual grace, charity, and the Gifts of the Holy Ghost remain the same. The only change takes place in our knowledge; for faith will pass and vision will take its place. Progress in the spiritual life on earth is measured by the progress of faith and charity, in the knowledge and love of God.

We have passed over a host of other virtues that also find place in the supernatural life of man; but all these other virtues are ordered to the perfection of faith and charity, for the substance of the spiritual life rests in them. The virtue of hope is needed to keep us marching toward the goal presented by faith, desired by charity; it allows us to look forward confidently to attaining the goal of life not on our own merits but by the omnipotence of God. The moral virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, with all their parts, are required to establish order in the manifold activities of human living. Man is a complicated being; his perfection can be won only through a multiplicity of operations, which are rectified by virtuous habits. The natural perfection of man lies in the acquired moral virtues. His supernatural destiny makes greater demands on his moral life than a natural destiny would; in order to satisfy these demands he receives from the divine Mercy a full complement of infused moral virtues together with the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.

Looked at from the viewpoint of God and of the infused virtues themselves, man's supernatural life is solid and stable; looked at from the viewpoint of weak human nature, the supernatural life is held in a fragile vessel that can easily be destroyed by mortal sin. For the infused virtues alone, despite their great perfection, are proportioned by God to human ways of operating; it is *human* reason enlightened by faith and infused prudence that is the guide for our supernatural activity. As St. Thomas points out: " Human reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, by a natural perfec-

tion, according to the natural light of reason; secondly, by a certain supernatural perfection through the theological virtues. Now while this second perfection is greater than the first, the first is more perfectly possessed by man than the second; for of the first man has full possession, of the second, an imperfect possession, as it were, for we know and love God imperfectly." [51]

We have seen that the aim of the interior life on earth and of the life of glory in heaven is the possession of God through knowledge and love; certainly there is only One Who knows how to attain such an end, Who knows at each moment what choices will lead to God or from God, Who knows all the pathways to the goal, all the obstacles that can be encountered on the way. Only God Himself (by appropriation, the Holy Ghost, to whom our sanctification is attributed) can be the infallible guide to heaven. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are placed in the soul of the Christian in order to dispose him to receive the immediate direction of the Holy Ghost. Our souls, like training planes, have two sets of controls: one, human reason, illuminated by the virtues of faith and prudence, which is our own set of controls; the other, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are for His use alone. The purpose of these two sets is different from that of the controls in the plane. True the Holy Ghost, like the flight instructor, is ever ready to assist us in an emergency, when our spiritual life is in danger of being wrecked. Nevertheless, the purpose of the gifts is not simply an emergency control, for the spiritual life can never become an easy thing for us to handle. Progress in the spiritual life implies a taking over of the controls by the Holy Ghost. Human pride does not welcome the idea that we cannot advance very far in the supernatural order under our own control; yet if we desire to live supernaturally we must allow the Holy Ghost to lead the way. If we insist, consciously or unconsciously, on our own initiative, we are doomed to spiritual mediocrity. With sufficient instruction we can learn to fly a plane; no amount of instruction is sufficient for man to learn perfectly the ways of living in God.

We should note the final sentence in the above quotation from St. Thomas; and especially the reason he assigns: " for we know and love God imperfectly." That reason is always valid while we are separated from God by the veil of faith. Love is not imperfect in

[51] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 2.

itself; that is why it will remain unchanged in heaven. It is imperfect here below because of the imperfection of faith. Love is always dissatisfied with the limitations of human knowledge, even when enlightened by faith. The essential drama of the interior life is played between love and knowledge, love always seeks more knowledge, not for the sake of knowledge, but because of the object loved. And as knowledge increases love increases and requires more knowledge.

The gifts of the Holy Ghost are especially ordered to overcome the inadequacy of knowledge. Of the seven gifts four are intellectual and perfect the virtue of faith: the gift of Understanding gives faith a greater penetration of its own principles, the revealed truths of tradition and Scripture; counsel perfects faith in its practical extension to the multiplicity of human actions directed to the final end; it guides immediately the activity of the three affective gifts of Piety, Fortitude and Fear of the Lord; the gifts of Knowledge and Wisdom perfect faith in its act of judgment, whether the judgment is concerned with creatures or with God Himself. How successful love is in its search for knowledge with the aid of the gifts of the Holy Ghost cannot be adequately indicated here. The evidence of success can be found in the lives of the great mystical saints; they knew God through the veil of faith, but so thin had become the veil that it was as though they saw God. Such for example was the faith of Moses, according to the testimony of St. Paul: " By faith he (Moses) left Egypt, not fearing the fierceness of the king: for he endured as seeing him that is invisible." [52]

Further clarification of all these points will be found in the text of John of St. Thomas; there is no need to delay further on them. However, something should be added about the Fruits of the Holy Ghost and the Beatitudes. St. Thomas links these very closely with the gifts; John of St. Thomas refers to them briefly at the end of his treatise, with the remark that the text of St. Thomas needs no commentary. Nevertheless, in order to provide the reader with a complete notion of St. Thomas' treatment, a few pages will be added about his doctrine on these two scriptural points—the fruits and the beatitudes.

St. Thomas' consideration of the beatitudes and fruits of the Holy Ghost is contained in the two questions in the *Summa*

[52] *Hebrews*, xi, 27.

Theologica following the one on the gifts. In these two questions he gives us some profound insights into the spiritual life, since for him the fruits and the beatitudes are a consequence of the Holy Ghost's influence in human life. His treatment of them is not psychological, but theological and scriptural; in fact, the two questions are theological commentaries on two passages of Sacred Scripture. The first passage is in the gospel of St. Matthew, the familiar section of the Sermon on the Mount known as the beatitudes. The second passage is in the epistle of St. Paul to the Galatians: [53] "But the fruit of the Spirit is, charity, joy, peace, patience, benignity, goodness, longanimity, mildness, faith, modesty, continency, chastity."

On these two texts St. Thomas erects his framework of the spiritual life. For purposes of this introduction, a reversal of the order of St. Thomas will be made, for, as he himself says, all the beatitudes are fruits, but not all the fruits are beatitudes.

The metaphor of the Pauline phrase "fruit of the Spirit" is readily understandable. Our Lord said: "For by the fruit the tree is known." [54] The tree of human life is also known by its fruit: human action, good or evil. Now not everything that a tree produces is called fruit; only what has a certain perfection and contains a certain sweetness in itself should be called a fruit. In fact, there is only one fruit of the tree of human living—eternal beatitude, which is the ultimate perfection of man and contains in itself all sweetness. In this sense, heaven is the only fruit of the Spirit. This fruit is not produced by human action but is reached by it as a reward of merit. On the other hand, the fruit of the Spirit spoken of by St. Paul is the product of human action under the influence of the Spirit. For just as a portrait is referred to as the fruit of artistic action, a science, as the fruit of rational action, so a virtuous life is as the fruit of the Spirit.

The fruit, or more commonly speaking, the fruits of the Holy Ghost are actions that flow from the supernatural virtues planted in the soul by the Holy Ghost; they do not possess the fullness or maturity of the beatitudes, for they do not come from the special inspirations of the gifts, but from the ordinary motions of divine grace. Not every good action is a fruit, for many such actions, especially in the early stages of the spiritual life, are produced with

[53] V, 22-23. [54] *Matthew*, xii, 33.

difficulty and at great cost. When the soul delights in virtuous actions it is enjoying the fruits of its earlier sacrifices—it has its first assurance that it is sharing in the fruitful life of God.

The enumeration of the fruits by St. Paul might seem a haphazard arrangement; St. Thomas finds a definite order in it, for it manifests the aims of the Holy Ghost's activities in the soul. The Holy Ghost, through grace, orders human action—in relation to man himself, in relation to his neighbors, and, lastly, in relation to those things that are below him.

A man is rightly disposed within his own person when he has the right attitude towards good and evil. The fundamental disposition toward the good is love or *charity*, which is the first fruit of the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of love. From union with the good springs *joy*; he who has charity has the supreme good, God, and has joy in that possession. *Peace* is the perfection of charity and joy; it requires two additional elements besides simple charity and joy. No one can completely rejoice in the possession of a good unless he is in undisturbed possession of it and thoroughly satisfied by it alone. When the soul has overcome its attachment to created goods and finds satisfaction in God alone, it is rightly disposed toward the supreme good and is at peace. Yet, under the threat of evil, the well-ordered mind is *patient* and it is *longsuffering* of the evil implied in the deferment of a desired good.

The relations of a man to his neighbor are right when, first of all, he both wills good and does good to the neighbor; these are signified by the *goodness* and *benignity* of St. Paul's enumeration. Secondly, a man has the right attitude toward evil, when with *meekness* he bears any evil that his neighbor may do him; and, lastly, when in *faith*, or fidelity, he refrains from injuring his neighbor by fraud or guile.

The things that are inferior to man are his exterior actions and his interior passions. These are rectified by the motion of the Holy Ghost and bear fruit in *modesty*, *continency* and *chastity*.

St. Thomas admits that more or fewer fruits might be enumerated; he adds, however, that to these twelve all others can be reduced and that they do present a comprehensive view of the spiritual life. Nevertheless, St. Thomas seems to be more satisfied with the beatitudes as a frame for his spiritual doctrine, for his commentary on them is fuller and richer. The beatitudes are fruits of virtue brought to a riper maturity under the rays of the gifts.

In order for the reader to follow St. Thomas' exposition intelligently, several preliminary remarks must be made. First, just as ultimately there is only one fruit, so there is only one ultimate beatitude, the vision of God, wherein all the beatitudes mentioned by Our Lord find their perfection. Yet he who has the firm hope of attaining happiness is already happy to a certain degree. So the man who, by the perfection of his virtuous actions, has a solid basis for hope of eternal life is already blessed. The beatitudes, then, are actions that imitate the beatifying actions of heaven, the knowing and loving God. They are, of course, conditioned by the fact that life on earth has not the perfection of the life in heaven, that many obstacles to a full participation in happiness are found for sojourners in this world.

The second remark concerns the significance St. Thomas finds in the form of the beatitudes as they were delivered by Our Lord. Each contains two parts: the first part, except in the sixth and seventh, mentions a meritorious action; the second part promises a fitting reward. In his exposition of each beatitude St. Thomas explains the meritorious action, points out the virtue and gift that elicit it, mentions, in some cases, the obstacles that the action must overcome, and manifests the fittingness of the reward promised by Our Savior.

Lastly, as a foundation for his explanation of the beatitudes, St. Thomas presents a resumé of his doctrine on happiness. According to the opinion of men, he says, happiness is to be found in a life of pleasure, a life of action, or a life of contemplation. In the light of divine revelation, the Christian knows that the life of pleasure is contrary to true happiness; the life of action should be a preparation for true happiness, which really lies in the contemplation of God, perfectly in the next life, imperfectly and participatively in this life. The eight beatitudes are ordered in such a way as to remove the obstacles of a life of pleasure, foster the active life as a preparation for contemplation, and develop those virtues that bring about immediately the contemplative life.

I. *The Life of Pleasure.*

The life of pleasure consists in two things—an affluence of external goods, especially wealth, honor, power, and an indulgence of the passions both of the irascible and of the concupiscible appetites.

The objects that cater to man's pleasure are not evil in themselves; rather they are so good for the senses that they are easily chosen in preference to greater goods. There can be no true happiness unless the urge for temporal pleasures is moderated by the virtues; great happiness can be had only by those who, under the inspiration of the Gifts, despite the allurements of these pleasures.

It follows, then, that the desires for wealth, power and honor must be moderated, especially by the virtue of humility, which strikes at the root of these desires, our own self-esteem; by the inspiration of the gift of the Fear of the Lord one is led to despise these goods for the excellence and abundance of goodness one finds in God. *Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.*

Wealth, power, honor are fragile goods of which one is easily despoiled; yet many men place their security in them. To feel secure, they must cling to these goods, fight to retain them. All the force of the irascible appetite is aroused for the protection of these frail treasures. The virtue of fortitude moderates the impulses of the irascible passions; the gift of fortitude leaves man utterly tranquil under the providence of God and indifferent to the presence or absence of the external goods of fortune. *Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land*; according to the Angelic Doctor, it is not a question of the land of this world, but of the heavenly kingdom, a secure possession of God, here and hereafter.

The pleasures of sense, which are the object of the concupiscible passions, are sought by men as consolations for the trials of life. Temperance is the virtue that moderates the use of sensual pleasures; the gifts of knowledge and fear inspire the soul to a total sacrifice of such pleasures, when necessary for the good of one's own soul or of one's neighbor, and the voluntary acceptance of pain and sorrow with the crucified Christ. *Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted*, with the consolation of God's blessings.

In these three beatitudes the affective gifts are predominant; however, while St. Thomas assigns the intellectual gift of knowledge to the beatitude of the mournful, he says that the inspirations of knowledge and counsel are directive of the gifts of fear and fortitude in bringing the soul to this first degree of happiness.

II. *The Life of Action.*

The fourth and fifth beatitudes are concerned with the active life, which, in this context, involves the relations of one man with another. Such relations are regulated either by justice or by gratuitousness. The obstacles to man's dealing justly or gratuitously with his neighbor are his inordinate desire to possess temporal goods and his unwillingness to associate with the needy or the miserable lest such association diminish his own poor store of happiness.

Whatever is due to another is regulated by the virtue of justice; under the inspiration of the gift of piety, man conceives an insatiable desire to fulfill all the works of justice. *Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill.* He who even deprives himself in order to satisfy the demands of justice need have no fear, for God will reward him fully, " a full measure, pressed down and flowing over."

The virtue of liberality inclines a man to give his friends more than justice demands. The gifts of piety and counsel push him to seek out and alleviate all necessity and all misery wherever he can discover it. *Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.* He who has compassion for the misery of others will soon discover that God has generously relieved him of all misery.

III. *The Life of Contemplation.*

Since the contemplative life is not a merit, but a reward, St. Thomas' explanation of the sixth and seventh beatitudes is slightly different from the preceding. He maintains that in place of meritorious actions Our Lord mentions effects of the active life that immediately dispose to contemplation; and here he understands " active life " as embracing all the preceding beatitudes or the whole moral perfection of man. For the first three beatitudes perfect man in himself, subdue his rebellious passions and leave him purified and clean of heart. *Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.* An analogy exists between the clear eye that has perfect vision and the clean mind that alone is capable of seeing God, whether with the darkened sight of faith or the bright vision of heaven. The virtue of faith and the gift of understanding give the final touches to the purification of the human mind that was begun by the previous activity of the moral virtues and the gifts.

The fourth and fifth beatitudes set a man right in his relations to his fellow man; the unity begun by these beatitudes is perfected by the virtue of charity and the gift of wisdom. *Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.* A child imitates his father to the best of his ability and Our Father is a "God of unity and peace."

St. Thomas has established a correspondence between the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost and the first seven beatitudes. But there are eight beatitudes. The eighth, says the Angelic Doctor, is a confirmation and manifestation of all the others. *Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice's sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.* At first, this might seem like a poor explanation; yet there is a sign of its appropriateness in the fact that the greatest mystic saints and the greatest apostolic souls, the outstanding representatives of the contemplative and active lives, have eagerly desired martyrdom and have always suffered persecution.

In the answer to the last objection in the last article of the beatitudes, St. Thomas casts a quick glance over all of the beatitudes and manifests the progressive unification of the rewards promised by Our Lord.

> The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted, because fullness implied abundance of comfort. And mercy surpases satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son.[55]

[55] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 69, a. 4, ad 3um.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

I. In General

- A. The Treatment of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost in Sacred Scripture (Chapter I)
- B. The Distinction between the Gifts and the Virtues (Chapter II)

II. In Particular

- A. The Gift of Understanding (Chapter III)
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- A. The Number of the Gifts (Chapter VII)
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CHAPTER I *

The Treatment of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost in Sacred Scripture

1. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are not within the ken of natural philosophers and pagans. Divine Revelation alone can give evidence of them, and Sacred Scripture, enumerating seven, treats of them under the titles of *gifts* and *spirits*. Some explanation, then, of the Scriptural teaching concerning these special gifts is prerequisite to a clear scholastic treatment.

2. All the divinely inspired words of Scripture both enlighten and incline toward the formation of a spiritual man, perfect in the

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* OUTLINE OF CHAPTER I:

I. Revelation and the Gifts
- A. Revelation, the Source of Knowledge of the Gifts (1)
- B. Revelation and the Spiritual Man (2)
  - 1. The Gifts and Spiritual Progress (3)
  - 2. The Contact between the Holy Ghost and the Spiritual Man as described by Our Lord (4)
    - a) The First Condition—interior disposition (5)
    - b) The Second Element—exterior communication (6)
    - c) The Third Element—the hidden motion of God (7)
  - 3. The Exhortation of Isaias to Pusillanimous Souls (8)

II. The Reason for the Gifts Being Called *Spirits* and *Gifts* in Sacred Scripture
- A. The Texts Relative to Each Title (9)
- B. The Suitableness of the Name *Gift* (10)
  - 1. The Gifts of love to overcome the twofold defect of virtue: on the part of the person and of the virtue itself (11)
  - 2. The Virtue of Faith and the Gifts in Contemplation (12)
    - a) The heavens "opened" only through the Gifts of the Holy Ghost (13)
    - b) Luminous contemplation through the Gifts (14)
- C. The Suitableness of the Name *Spirit*
  - 1. The Inspiration of the Holy Ghost (15)
  - 2. The Spirituality or Heavenly Quality of the Gifts (16)
  - 3. The Breath of God through the Kiss of His Mouth (17)
    - a) The Gifts in the Founding of the Church (18)
    - b) The Gifts in the Life of the Church (19)

way of God, since, as the Apostle wrote to Timothy, *All Scripture is inspired by God and useful for teaching, for reproving, for correcting, for instructing in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, equipped for every good work.*[1] With even greater reason, then, this spiritual state, a subtle motion and anointing of the Spirit, in which He raises the heart on high by intimately pouring forth His own self—*The Spirit Himself raises and assumes man as the hand of God strengthening*[2]—should be distinctly understood from the very synthesis of texts and doctrinal teaching of the Bible. In its serenity and light *as the light of the morning, when the sun rises, without clouds,*[3] and by its rays, advancement is made in the splendor of charity. The mind is stimulated to drive out the allurements of the flesh and to cast off the works of darkness. This advancement is given by the illumination of the Holy Ghost, as by a master's instruction, according to the Prophet Isaias, *he wakens in the mornnig, in the morning he wakens my ear, that I may hear him as a master,*[4] and according to St. John, *His anointing teaches you concerning all things, and it is true and is no lie. . . .*[5]

3. Only one who experiences and tastes that the Lord is sweet can know the secrets of His whispering and the exaltation of His sublime breathing upon the heart, since no one knows the hidden manna and the new name written on a white pebble except him who receives it.[6] This white pebble is the live coal which, as Isaias recorded,[7] one of the Seraphim had taken from the altar with tongs and held in his hand as he flew. By its enkindling and inflaming the soul, the lips of the prophet are purged—the beginning of the spiritual life, the purgative way. Moreover, even when the prophet has progressed to the illuminative way, merely by the common manner and pattern of virtues, he is still prevented from writing the new name. For the new name is in reality a new regulative principle and obligation—" name " often designates an obligation or office. The regulation and direction of the prophet's mind in a merely human manner according to ordinary prudence is not

[1] *II Timothy*, iii, 16. (In the New Testament text exclusive use of either the Challoner-Rheims or the Confraternity edition has not been found advisable. Trans.)
[2] *Ezechiel*, iii, 14.
[3] *II Kings*, xxiii, 4.
[4] *Isaias*, 2, 4.
[5] *I John*, ii, 27.
[6] *Apocalypse*, ii, 17.
[7] *Isaias*, vi, 6.

sufficient for him to receive the new name. He receives it only when he is directed by the finger of God and the excellence of divine motion. The exact discernment of these things by experience is communicated to only a few, who have a certain connaturality to divine things. For others, any inquiry into these truths must be carried on with great difficulty, by labor and the contentious struggle of controversy.

4. As Cajetan has acutely observed, it was for this reason that Christ Our Lord described the action of the Spirit and the spiritual man in these words, *The Spirit breathes where he will; and you hear his voice, but you do not know whence he comes and whither he goes; so is every one that is born of the Spirit.*[8] The relationship of the Spirit and of the spiritual man, who is formed through the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, can be explained in no better way than by this comparison indicated by Our Lord, Who is truth itself. In His words three elements in a spiritual man are described. The first pertains to the interior dispositions. It is found in the phrase, *The Spirit breathes where He will.* The second refers to the exterior communication, *and you hear his voice.* The third is related to the hidden motion of God, that impulse which cannot be grasped with complete certainty. It is expressed in the words: *And you do not know whence he comes and whither he goes.*

5. The first condition for discerning spiritual men is explained as his interior disposition through the Gifts of the Holy Ghost. They make a man feel exceedingly free, voluntary and unimpeded in his operations. They remove confusion, impediments and restrictions, since where the *Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.*[9] For each man is constrained by the bonds of sin. He stumbles upon the shackles of his own soul. The first thing that the Spirit does upon entering a heart is to break the bonds of sin, with which man is tied, and to crush the iron covering of his hardened heart. A man then feels as though he were relieved of a great weight and ready for action. Indeed, like a dove, he takes wing and flies, and rests in solitude. Truly there is no rest for the heart which has not flown to God. The Seraphim, for example, stand still and fly at the same time.

Now, lest anyone should err by thinking that those born of the

[8] *John*, iii, 8. Cf. Cajetan, *Commentaria in Joannem.*
[9] Cf. *II Corinthians*, iii, 17.

Spirit are agitated by a frantic impulse, like those possessed by an evil spirit, the Lord requires as the very first step in the way of the Spirit that birth from the Spirit contribute to man's freedom of choice rather than take it away. For there would be a great loss in merit if the Spirit determined the will and worked in it by violence rather than by breathing and actuating its inclination. For this reason the Apostle wrote that *the spirits of the prophets are under the control of the prophets*.[10] This is interpreted by St. Thomas to mean that as far as the use of the power of announcing prophesies is concerned the spirits are subject to the will of the prophet and are not like delirious ravings.

The Gifts of the Holy Ghost, therefore, are given to the soul after the manner of habits, so that in a rational and voluntary way the soul may be moved to those works to which it is directed by the Spirit. Thus, those who are conducted by the Spirit are moved not as slaves but as free men, willingly and voluntarily, since the principles which move them, though derived from the Spirit, are inherent in their very souls. They are impelled to operations which by their character and measure exceed all ordinary human standards. Hence, the interior disposition of a spiritual man is such that he is free and voluntary in the way of the Spirit. Those who do not feel themselves unimpeded in the things of the Spirit, and in the abnegation of comforts and delights, but easily fall back into them, give evidence of not being motivated nor strongly inspired by the Holy Ghost according to His Gifts.

6. The second condition required for the spiritual state is noted in the words: *And you hear His voice*. By them, as Cajetan remarks, Our Lord indicates that whoever is born of the Spirit or moved by the Spirit, speaks by the Spirit, for *from the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks*. In anyone who is born of the Spirit, all sensible and exterior actions, and especially his conversations, are from the Spirit. They are fragrant with the Spirit, for scarcely anything other than God or the ordination of things to God is mentioned. From this it is manifest that exterior deportment—the control of the external senses, especially speech—is frequently indicative of a spiritual man. *If any one does not offend in word, he is a perfect man, able also to lead round by a bridle the whole body*.[11]

[10] *I Corinthians*, xiv, 32. [11] *James*, iii, 2.

Mortification of the tongue, moderation in speech, especially if this be confined to divine things and matters pertaining to the Spirit, is a great sign of the interior direction of the Spirit. Moreover, anyone who turns freely to pleasantries and vanities, either to hear or speak them, is still imperfect in the Spirit.

7. The third constituent is indicated in the words: *and you do not know whence he comes nor whither he goes.* This describes the profundity of the interior motion and direction of the Spirit. For the soul does not know the origin of the motion, its procedure, nor its end. The Spirit, on the other hand, knows thoroughly the inmost thoughts and secrets of the soul. *For the Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God.*[12] Thus, as Cajetan remarks, although the exterior expressions and works of a spiritual man may be observed, the sources from which they spring and the divine end to which they tend cannot be known. No disturbance therefore, should arise from the fact that it is not known whose spirit is present in these works, especially in difficult and extraordinary works. For even if the Spirit should frequently move the soul interiorly and arouse and urge it, whence this motion comes and whither it is going, its beginning and end, cannot be known on every occasion. The Spirit of God lies hidden. Many who wish to proceed in all things with excessive caution and certitude are often deterred from these motions of the Holy Ghost by their own narrowness of heart. They are not fit to be moved to great or difficult things unless their hearts are free and they have confidence in the interior assistance of God.

8. To timid souls who are crushed by pusillanimity of spirit and misfortune, and who fear and doubt, the prophet Isaias cried out, *Why sayest thou, O Jacob, and speakest, O Israel: My way is hid from the Lord, and my judgment is passed over from my God?* [13] Troubled in heart by the uncertainty of their way of life, they thought their way was hidden from God, because they do not know whence it comes or whither it leads. Yet even then they were being moved by God to find freedom in His magnitude and not to cringe in their own pusillanimity: *Knowest thou not, or hast thou not heard? The Lord is the everlasting God, who hath created the ends of the earth: he shall not faint, nor labor, neither is there any*

[12] *I Corinthians*, ii, 10. [13] *Isaias*, xl, 27.

searching out of his wisdom. It is he that gives strength to the weary, and increases force and might to those who are not. Youths shall faint and labor, and young men shall fall by infirmity (being less fit. For they are youths in their heart and are weak in sustaining the way of the Spirit). *But those who hope in the Lord* (for in Him the heart is freed by confidence) *shall renew their strength, they shall take wings as eagles* (not as men, functioning in a merely human way, but as eagles, elevated by the Gifts of the Holy Ghost) *they shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint.*[14] Not without reason, then, the wings of an eagle are promised, even though it is not mentioned that men will fly, but they will run and walk as men still living upon this earth. For although these men are impelled and moved by the wings of an eagle, which comes down from above, yet the Gifts of the Holy Spirit are put into practice upon this earth, and they have their place in ordinary actions. Moreover those who are moved and regulated by a communication of superior spirits and gifts are led by the wings of an eagle and they differ in many ways from those who merely practise ordinary virtues. The latter are regulated by their own zeal and industry. With toil, they walk upon their own feet unaided. But those who are moved by the wings of an eagle are swept along in the breath of a strong wind. Without labor, they run in the way of God.

Why the Gifts are called spirits and gifts in Sacred Scripture

9. In the Scripture these Gifts are called both by the name *spirit* and by the name *gifts*. An example of the use of the name spirit is found in Isaias: *And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom, and of understanding, the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and of godliness. And he shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord.*[15] The name gift is used in the sixty-seventh Psalm: *Thou hast ascended on high, thou hast led captivity captive; thou hast received gifts in men.*[16] St. Paul, when he was writing to the Ephesians, referred this passage to grace as given according to the measure of Christ's bestowal: *Ascending on high, he led captivity captive; he gave gifts to men.*[17]

[14] *Isaias*, xl, 28.
[15] *Isaias*, xi, 2, 3.
[16] *Psalm* lxvii, 19.
[17] *Ephesians*, iv, 8.

For although this passage may be interpreted as applying to all supernatural gifts, whether virtues or other habits, or actual helps, through antonomasia it is applied especially to the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, which Christ showered so fully upon His Church after His ascension. Note the words: *thou hast received gifts in men.* These describe most accurately the Gifts of the Holy Ghost. God so gives and distributes His gifts to men that through them men are made subject to Him and rendered easily movable by His Spirit. Ordinarily men receive gifts from God; by these special gifts, God gains men for Himself. By them men are led captive and made subject to Him. Receiving back His gifts, God accomplishes His works with profit and usury. Hence the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, divine favors in which men are gained by God, are more receptive of divine impulse than self moving.

10. The name of spirit and the name of gift are especially suitable to these most perfect gifts. First of all, these two names are most becoming to the Holy Ghost. He Himself is a spirit, for He proceeds as the breath of Love and as an intense impulse. He is also a Gift, since a will or love is communicative of itself. For a lover's first gift is his own heart, and when this gift is received and deeply appreciated by his beloved, it joins the two by an intense inner bond. David expressed this, *If you are come peaceably to me to help me, let my heart be joined to you.*[18] Those pledges or gifts, therefore, by which the Spirit in a special way joins His heart to human hearts by uniting them to Him and making them movable by Him, are called spirits, since they proceed from the intensity of His dynamic love. They are called gifts, because through them He gives Himself to men and dwells in them.

11. As St. Thomas notes in his commentary on the eleventh chapter of Isaias, these Gifts are given for the perfecting of the virtues. This consideration casts more light on how these Gifts proceed in a special way from love, and from the spirit of the heart of God. It likewise makes clear how they become perfect and enkindle the fire of love. The Holy Doctor discerns a twofold defect in virtue, one on the part of the one having the virtue, the other, on the part of the virtue itself. As regards the one having the virtue, the defect is not essential. It arises from his indisposition

[18] *I Paralipomenon*, xii, 17.

and imperfect participation in the habit. This defect is removed through an intensification or growth of the virtue. In the virtue itself, however, the defect is intrinsic, since such a habit has an imperfection annexed to it. Faith, for example, is of its very nature imperfect, inscrutable and obscure. The eyes remain enshrouded in darkness; according to Solomon, *The Lord promised that he would dwell in a cloud*,[19] that is in Faith, St. Paul prayed *that Christ may dwell by Faith in your hearts*.[20] This defect is removed by a further perfection, which is called a Gift, because it exceeds the ordinary manner of human operation. In this case it is the Gift of Understanding. This Gift enables the intellect to penetrate more clearly the suitability and credibility of the things of Faith. It enables the intellect to discern the things of Faith both from error and from things of sense.

12. These Gifts adorn and gild the virtues, making them more resplendent. This adornment comes about by extending the virtues to things which through themselves they could not attain. Solitary and naked Faith, for example, leaves the soul in obscurity. Because of this obscurity, men grow tired when they proceed by Faith alone in the ordinary way of meditation, and they do not persevere for long. Those contemplatives who desire to penetrate the mysteries of Faith need to use the Gift of Understanding. Those, however, who are not proficient in Understanding, but, nevertheless, lay claim to reasoning and contemplation by naked Faith, know little about contemplation. They wander or sleep in their meditations and are extremely tired, since Faith alone is not contemplation but only assent. To such souls the things of heaven seem to be shut rather than open—*the eye of Jacob in a land of corn and wine, and the heavens shall be misty with dew*.[21] While the eye is in the land of the Church militant, which is properly the land of corn and wine, that is the sacramental corn and nascent wine, the heavens shall be misty with dew, since they are hidden by the shroud of faith. Hence, while the heights are sprinkled with dew which blinds the soul, there can be no perfect contemplation in Faith alone.

13. The heavens must at times be opened, therefore, so that the soul will not fail in its contemplation. The Holy Ghost accomplishes this through the Gifts of Understanding, of Wisdom, and of

[19] *II Paralipomenon*, vi, 1. [20] *Ephesians*, iii, 17. [21] *Deuteronomy*, xxxiii, 28.

Knowledge. There was a sign of this at the baptism of Christ: *and immediately he came up from the water. And behold the heavens were opened and he saw the Spirit of God descending as a dove and coming upon him.*[22] Purified by baptism, the soul receives the Faith. Moreover, it receives as a gift from the Spirit a kind of understanding of heavenly things—an opening of the heavens no longer clouded with dew. The more the soul increases in Understanding, the wider is the aperture in the heavens for the soul to behold the glory of God. The most marked evidence, then, of the opening of the heavens and of the Gift of the Holy Ghost is joy and a partial understanding of the glory of God. For this reason it is said of St. Stephen, *he being full of the Holy Ghost looked up to heaven and saw the glory of God . . . and said, Behold I see the heavens open!*[23] Notice what strides the soul takes in the abundance and plenitude of the Spirit. For when it is filled with these Gifts, the heavens are torn asunder and the soul sees the glory of God. It no longer dwells in the obscurity of Faith but it now explores and contemplates the magnitude of God. Of this St. Bernard wrote: "The information that the Spouse is fast approaching will be for me a salutary exhortation and preparation for the worthy reception of the supernatural visitation. *For justice walks before him,*[24] wrote the prophet, and he added, *Justice and judgment are the preparation of thy throne.*"[25,26] The saint then adds: "If you now feel that burning eloquence and it sears your conscience into a recollection of sin, remember what the Scripture says: *Fire shall come before him,*[27] and you cannot doubt that he is close. Furthermore, if you not only feel compunction, but totally turn to God as well, vowing and determining to guard the judgments of His justice, then you will know that He is already present, especially if you feel enkindled by His love."[28]

14. It is necessary, therefore, for the soul to cast off the shroud of unadorned Faith and to leap up to run with God. Through the

[22] *Matthew*, iii, 16.
[23] *Acts*, vii, 55.
[24] *Psalm* lxxxiv, 14.
[25] *Psalm* lxxxviii, 15.
[26] St. Bernard, Sermon 57 on the Canticle of Canticles; Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, CLXXXIII, 1052c.
[27] *Psalm* xcvi, 3.
[28] St. Bernard, *loc. cit.*, *MPL*, CLXXXIII, 1053.

illumination of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, the soul enjoys a multitude of spiritual feeling and a variegated understanding of divine things. For the mind is clad in robes of many colors when garbed with the glittering clothing of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost. Faith, however, cannot, in this life, be illuminated or attain to the vision of its object. It is founded upon the testimony of authority, and it cannot extend beyond that testimony, the specific object of Faith, to vision.

Held captive by the bonds of Faith, the soul remains in darkness. The flame of Love, however, can benefit the soul in this regard, for love makes things clear. From love proceed the Gifts of Understanding, of Wisdom, and of Knowledge. They break through the mist of Faith, thereby opening the heavens. These Gifts, therefore, are attributed in a special way to love or to the Spirit (Who is Love). Hence St. Ambrose in his commentary on the words, *The fruit of the spirit is peace* [29] remarks: "They are called fruits because they refresh minds with genuine delight," [30] and in the Book on Paradise, cited by St. Thomas, he observes: "The works of virtue are called fruits because those who possess them are refreshed with a holy and genuine delight." [31] Inflamed by love, the intellect rises from the obscure knowledge of Faith to the luminous and clear contemplation of the magnitude and certitude of the mysteries, and *the brightness of a flaming fire in the night.*[32] This night is the veil of creatures enshrouding and hiding the majesty of His eternity, for *over all the glory shall be a protection.*[33] Among the nocturnal shadows of this life the mind becomes aware of that lamp burning in the darkness. The intellect is perfected by a loving heart since its objects are seen better under the light of love. St. Bernard describes this beautifully.[34] "Fire," he says, "goes forth before Him, and yet He Himself is the fire." With this difference, however, the fire which precedes brings pain but does not torment, nor does it vex. It moves, but it does not accomplish the work. It is sent in advance only to arouse, to

[29] *Galatians*, v, 12.

[30] St. Ambrose in *Galatians*, v, 22, *MPL*, XVII, 368. Cf. Cornelius a Lapide in hoc loco, ed. Vives, XVLII, 568.

[31] *Ibid.* De Paradiso, cap. 13. *MPL*, XIV, 306, 307. Cf. I-II, q. 70, a. 1, ad 2.

[32] *Isaias*, iv, 5.

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] *Loc. cit.*, *MPL*, CLXXXIII, 1053.

prepare and to recall to mind what the soul is by itself so that it may appreciate what it will be by the grace of God. The fire which is God Himself consumes, but does not cause suffering. It burns pleasantly and cauterizes with joy, for it is a very devastating ember which attacks vices, so that the soul may procure the recompense of God's anointing. In this way love brings more luminous knowledge to the intellect by bringing God more frequently before the eyes of the mind. Hence, souls understand that the Lord is present in the power by which they are transformed, and in the love by which they are inflamed. Any soul desirous of perfection should strive to have God present to itself, not only by the dark assent of Faith, but by the illumination of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost as well.

15. Furthermore, these Gifts are called habits or celestial gifts of the Spirit, because they are regulated by divine inspiration. Now, inspiration indicates a motion which comes from the outside. The help of the First Cause, of course, is needed by man and every creature for any motion, and in this sense the motions of all creatures need a help which comes from the outside. Nevertheless, a special help is needed in men when the inherent principles and virtues are not sufficient for the accomplishments of that higher sphere of activity which is made possible by the elevation of the Gifts. Moreover, on this plane men need to be perfected by an exterior principle and power both moving and adding a spirit, a new and higher force, a more sublime rule of action. For the Spirit is intimately related to power and strength. Hence, when a man is disposed to operate by more than human principles, which he can regulate and measure by principles proportioned to his human nature, it is necessary that he receive the Spirit, a higher power, moving him by a superior impulse and elevation. This accords with David's statement: *I opened my mouth and panted because I longed for thy commandments.*[35] The mouth of the soul pants. The very inner spirit of the intellect and will which recreates the heart and gives it its vital force, gasps with an open mouth. It sighs for the fountain of supernal life. Lydia, the seller of purple, is described as she *whose heart the Lord opened to give heed to what was being said by Paul.*[36] This opening of the mouth of the heart

[35] *Psalm* cxviii, 131. [36] *Acts*, xvi, 14.

is prerequisite to the reception of these Gifts of the Holy Ghost. For a closed mouth would not permit the Spirit to enter, while the mouth which is open does not resist the Spirit. These spirits, vital and divine, are given by God, so that the human heart will be compliant with the movements of the Holy Ghost in that higher sphere of action to which it is directed and elevated by God. They are called gifts of the Spirit, therefore, since they come from the outside through the inspiration of God, moving the soul to that higher manner of acting in which the ordinary virtues of mere human nature are insufficient. By such an inspiration and an opening of the heart, the Holy Ghost renders men readily movable for higher accomplishments. As Isaias remarks, *The Lord has opened my ear, and I do not resist: I have not gone back.*[37]

16. For a man to be moved, therefore, to that higher manner of acting, which is according to the measure of the Holy Ghost and not merely according to a measure attainable through human reason, these higher gifts are required. They adorn and elevate even the virtues. They govern a man and measure his actions upon a higher plane. Job testifies that *His spirit adorned the heavens, and his obstetric hand brought forth the winding serpent.*[38] By their very spirituality, the powers of the intellect and will are a sort of heaven, elevated above the bodily powers. Furthermore, through the ordination and regulation of the virtues they are directed in their motion and they revolve like heavens. Adorned by the Holy Ghost with the Gifts, the human heart may be raised to an even loftier plane. It may then be regulated not according to the constricted and impoverished standards of human reason, but according to the full scope of the Holy Ghost. When this is done, the winding serpent is brought forth from the heart. For the spirit of the devil not only dwells in the hearts of sinners, but even seeks to wend its tortuous way within the hearts of spiritual men, to deceive them with its false appearances and pretexts of spiritual elevations —visions or interior illusions. This winding serpent is brought forth by the same divine Spirit through whom the "heavens" are adorned. For the human mind is illuminated by the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, so that it may discern the machinations of the serpent and may not be ignorant of his treachery, even when he transforms himself into an angel of light. Likewise, the Gifts enable the mind

[37] *Isaias*, l, 5. [38] *Job*, xxvi, 13.

to tend heavenward by a straight course and a direct route, without error and evasions. *Thy good spirit shall lead me into the right land.*[39] To direct himself to that *right land* and not to wander is impossible for a man who lacks the breathing and inspiration of the divine Spirit. Through the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, therefore, by which the " heavens " are adorned, the winding serpent is extracted. His wiles are made manifest and laid open to view, even when he hides coiled and entangled amid the appearances of spiritual things.

17. Finally, the gifts are called spirits, because they both adorn the soul and inspire it with the very breath of God. Embracing Him as a Spouse, the soul receives the kiss of His mouth and the breath of His spirit. The powers of the soul are made perfect and elevated to a higher plane. *By the word of the Lord the heavens were established; and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth.*[40] For the spirit of the mouth of the Lord establishing powers is the spirit of those gifts coming from the kiss of the Lord. Since it is impressed upon a soul burning with heavenly desires, this kiss is so completely effective that the soul drinking in His spirit becomes totally transformed by a divine participation, and it draws away from earthly things.

Sometimes this action leads to the death of the body, for it is recorded of Moses that he *died . . . by the commandment of the Lord,*[41] which Oleaster translates according to the Hebrew, *died by the mouth of the Lord.*[42] The command of the divine mouth, then, was a kiss of the Lord so strongly impressed upon the soul of Moses that it exhausted its vitality and snatched him out of his body by the intensity of spiritual love. Many of the saints felt such a kiss, for St. Paul wrote, *For if we were out of our mind, it was for God; if we are sane, it is for you.*[43] In that passage sobriety of action is placed in contradistinction to intoxication of spirit in which the saints abandon themselves to the powers of the Lord and become mindful only of His justice. They are out of their minds for God and sober towards their neighbor. Such is the divinely ordered

[39] *Psalm* cxii, 10.

[40] *Psalm* xxxii, 6.

[41] *Deuteronomy*, xxxiii, 5.

[42] Oleaster, Jerome, O.P., d. 1563. *Commentarium in Pentateuchum Moysi.* Cf. Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, t. II, pp. 182, 335.

[43] *II Corinthians*, v, 13.

wine cellar of love. In it Charity is so ordered that the soul in its divine intoxication strives towards God with its full force and without restraint. Then with sobriety and modesty the soul allows its love to overflow upon creatures according to their worth and necessity, not giving itself over to them nor seeking them for themselves but for God.

18. Therein lies the true understanding of spiritual love and of that most obscure book, the Canticle of Canticles, which begins by mentioning the kiss of the Lord: *Let him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth.*[44] It is as if the love of the Holy Church began where the life of Moses had its end. For he died by the kiss of the Lord, but the Church began by the kiss of the mouth of God. Where the law given through Moses had its consummation, the law of spiritual love found its beginning. For its beginning was the kiss of the divine mouth which is the Holy Ghost, proceeding from the mouth of God, and embracing in His kiss the Father and the Son. This abundance of love and intoxication of the Spirit was poured forth upon the Church at Pentecost, and it flowed down over the entire body of the Church through the centuries: *Like the precious ointment on the head, that ran down upon the beard* (that is, the manly fortitude), *the beard of Aaron, which ran down to the skirt of his garment as the dew of Hermon which descends upon mount Sion.*[45] The Church is worthy to be clothed with a more abundant glory than that of Moses. Hence, Moses reached his consummation in the kiss of the Lord, which is the Holy Ghost, and from that very point on Pentecost the Church began.[46] For the Lord Jesus sent His Spirit with such abundance upon the Church that it made the disciples intoxicated, and many said of them, *They are full of wine.*[47]

19. So great and so efficacious were the Gifts of the Holy Ghost which the Lord bestowed with such abundance upon His Church, that they purified it from all wordly taint. They trans-

[44] *Canticle of Canticles*, i, 1.

[45] *Psalm* cxxxii, 2.

[46] John of St. Thomas here follows an opinion on the origin of the Church that is not traditionally Thomistic. St. Thomas teaches that the Church was born from the open side of Christ on Calvary. His opinion is followed by Pope Pius XII in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis" (ed. America Press, p. 14). The Church was brought to its perfection on Pentecost.

[47] *Acts*, ii, 3.

formed it with the purity and light of the Spirit and exalted it above every measure of human frailty and natural reason. Once the Church had tasted and drunk that wine of the Spirit, it could say with the spouse, *for thy breasts are better than wine*,[48] that is, made better by that wine of the Spirit, with which you inebriate. These breasts of the Spouse are powers adorning the soul and offering overflowing breasts both to the mind and to the will. They are made better by the wine of the spiritual gifts and are made fragrant with most precious ointments, since they proceed from the Spirit of the divine mouth. This kiss of His mouth is completely spiritual and pure, not like that of passion, which although it is done by the mouth, is not of the mouth but of concupiscence and of the flesh. The kiss of the divine mouth is the kiss of speech, of communication, of understanding, the kiss of the Word, and of splendor. *By the word of the Lord the heavens were established and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth.*[49]

(*To be continued.*)

[48] *Canticle of Canticles*, i, 1; iv, 10.
[49] *Psalm* xxxii, 6.

BOOK REVIEWS

The New Testament in English. By RONALD A. KNOX. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944. Pp. 573. $3.00.

Translation? Paraphrase? Commentary? The triple question is bound to rise when one reads Msgr. Knox's "New Testament in English." In the preface he hints at a departure from "ordinary methods" and indeed the result is far from ordinary.

It is no pleasant thing to strike consciously a dissonant note in the harmony of praise that has gone up about this book. It deserves a great many of the nice things that have been written about it. However, the publishers, in their house organ, give us to understand that "critics may differ as to whether this latest translation is very good or merely good, or perhaps not so good," and a number of reviews so far seen also draw a line between the "critic" and the "layman": the latter obviously being expected to approve; the former, to disapprove. The "critics" ought to be the most competent judges in this matter, and if they are so confidently expected to disapprove, it would seem that there must be somewhere "the little rift within the lute." And there is!

Good Latin and Greek scholarship is essential to a good translation of the Vulgate, but there are other ingredients that enter into a good translation. There must be, and it seems to me that it is the most important of all, a high degree of accuracy, by which I mean fidelity to the original. A translation ought to reproduce as closely as is possible within the limits of the newer language, the thought and expression of the original. Words in any language represent mental concepts, and the concepts caused by the language of the version ought to be the same as those caused by the language of the original. Where that is not true, we have no translation but a paraphrase or a commentary. And a translation ought not to so interpolate and substitute that a merely possible interpretation is woven into the text as the actual text itself. The proposal of a particular sense in a disputed passage ought to be left to the commentaries and not interpolated into the text. It is fidelity to the original that, in the last analysis, distinguishes a translation from a paraphrase or a commentary. It is its fidelity to its original that we have praised so long in the Douai-Rheims Bible, maintaining that that fidelity more than compensated for the supposedly superior English style of the King James Version. The same defense cannot be made of this new version.

One finds in this work an extraordinary number of minor interpolations; modifying words and phrases that have no justification in the original text.

Repeatedly such temporal particles as *soon, afterwards, still, already, when,* and the like, are inserted to give the text involved a precise modality that is lacking in the original. John I, 1 reads: "At the beginning *of time*"; Romans VIII, 38: "The height *above us*, and the depth *beneath us*"; Acts I, 8: "*Enough for you*"; Romans V, 6: "*Were that hope vain*"; I Cor. XIII, 4: "Charity is *never* perverse *or proud.*" In Romans V, 8, the simple affirmation "*Commendat autem charitatem suam Deus pro nobis,*" becomes "*As if* God means to prove how well he loves us." Serious enough for one who is interested in the true sense of Sacred Scripture is, for example, the interpolation of the phrase *of time* in John I, 1 and I, 3. "Which command is more lightly given" (Matt. IX, 5) is but one of several possible interpretations of "*quid est facilius dicere.*" As with the *in principio* of St. John, I think it the most probable interpretation, but I know that it is not certainly the correct interpretation and that it is certainly not an exact translation of either Vulgate or Greek. As has been said, the proposal of possible interpretations ought to be left to a commentary.

There are a great many passages that must be called mis-translations. By what transmutation of language can the "*mollibus vestitum*" of Matt. XI, 8 become "clad in *silk?*" Or what authority is there for rendering Luke II, 52 as, "And *so* Jesus advanced in wisdom *with the years?*" In Romans VI, 4, "*per gloriam Patris*" becomes "by His Father's *power,*" but if St. Paul had in mind precisely that attribute of the divinity which is *power*, why did he write "*glory*"? Neither *doxé* of the Greek nor *gloria* of the Latin means *power* in English. "*Qui autem discernit*" of Romans XIV, 23 means something quite other than "He who *hesitates.*" In Romans V, 4 "*Patientia* (*operatur*) *probationem, probatio vero spem,*" is rendered "Endurance *gives proof of our faith*, and a *proved faith* gives *ground for* hope," and it is difficult to understand how Msgr. Knox gets "faith" out of either the Latin *probatio* or the Greek *dokimé.* No one familiar with the precision of speech of St. Paul and the exactness of the theological concepts that underly his words, can condone such alterations of his text. The Vulgate in Romans VIII, 3, has "*Nam quod impossibile erat legi, in quo infirmabatur per carnem,*" but here we have "there was something the law could not do, because flesh *and blood could not lend it the power,*" and the text is thereby given a perspective quite alien to it in the original. It is not, in St. Paul, a question of the law seeking or lacking the help of the flesh, but of the flesh being a positive impediment to the fulfillment of the law.

I do not intend to multiply examples. These are typical of far too much of the translation, so much in fact that all sense of security in reading is lost.

It may be said that the "critic" or the theologian who wants the exact wording of the text can always have recourse to the Vulgate or the Greek, and that, as has been hinted, this is a translation for the "layman." Such

a defense would be a sin against good Catholic English tradition as well as against the science of Biblical translation and interpretation. We want accuracy and fidelity above all else, laymen as well as theologians. That was the thesis of the Douai-Rheims translators and, if I mistake not, it is still the desire of English-speaking Catholics. We want to read in our English versions exactly what the hagiographer wrote and not what a translator thinks he may have meant. If we want a particular private interpretation of his meaning, we can always have recourse to a commentary.

Msgr. Knox's version has been praised for its clarity, and there is no doubt that his style is lucid—one never has any difficulty in understanding what Msgr. Knox means. One reads with pleasure and is tempted to forget that faithful rendition of the divine word ought to take precedence over all else.

I think that Msgr. Knox could write a splendid commentary on the New Testament, and I sincerely wish that he would. I think also that if he had respected more the "ordinary methods," he would have produced a distinguished and valuable translation—there are evidences enough of that in this work—but I am not at all satisfied with this latest English version of the New Testament.

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History of Psychology from the Standpoint of a Thomist. By ROBERT E. BRENNAN. New York: Macmillan, 1945. Pp. xviii + 277. $3.00.

It is an extremely difficult task to describe, even in its most general outlines, the history of psychology from its beginnings to the present time. Dr. Brennan has solved this difficulty amazingly well. Of course, one may wish that this or that name would appear, or that some chapters were shorter so as to leave more space for others. But such ideas are probably the result of one's personal predilections and may not be objectively justified.

However, some names that ought to appear are missing: one is the name of the great French neurologist, Marie, whose work inaugurated the restatement of our whole theory of aphasia and, therefore, of cerebral "localization"; another is that of Dilthey, who is more rightly to be considered as the first to introduce the concept of an "understanding" as set over against an "explaining" psychology. Spranger, who is credited with this, is, in fact, wholly dependent upon Dilthey.

There are two other figures in the history of psychology, more important and influential, whose names are not mentioned. More than any other writer, Nietzsche is the inspiration for many current notions on human

nature; and his counterpart, Kierkegaard, has already gained a marked influence on certain philosophies and psychologies. No doubt the latter's importance will be recognized more adequately since his works have been translated into English.

This reviewer would also take issue with the author's presentation of the psychology of Wolff; this thinker was much more sensible than he appears in the usual disparaging statements about his system. Moreover, the philosophies of Kant and Hegel are not quite accurately characterized. It ought not to be forgotten that the "thinking subject," either in Kant or in Hegel, is not the individual mind: hence, it is not correct to say that "Hegel . . . rejected all reality beyond the thinking subject"; Hegel's reality is primarily the "absolute idea" of which "the subjective spirit" is only a passing manifestation.

Furthermore, the author characterizes Külpe's antecedents in the statement: "he worked in the spirit of Brentano though he was influenced undoubtedly by Wundt"; rather, he began as Wundt's pupil and follower and later came under the influence, not so much of Brentano, as of Husserl (whose name also deserved mention).

The author sees, running through the history of psychology, and active today, three main trends: one, materialistic, originating with Democritus; two, idealistic, stemming from Plato; three, the combination of the two into a true "anthropological" approach, the source of which is Aristotle. It is in the light of this conception that he views the various schools and ideas. In fact, the history of psychology cannot be written unless seen against the background of a comprehensive philosophical view. The differences between the many "psychologies" are primarily of a philosophical nature. Dr. Brennan remarks that there is no such history conceived from the Thomistic viewpoint. But there is none conceived from any other systematic viewpoint either. Thus, this little book is indeed something of a pioneering work. Its author has succeeded in what he purposed to do: he has given us a succinct survey of the main phases and ideas in the history of psychology; he has also made clear the advantage which, viewed merely from the angle of usefulness in research and formation of theories, the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of man has in comparison with the many varieties of other philosophies which he manages to characterize.

As the author himself points out, his book is not all too easy reading, because of the wealth of matter compressed in so little space. But it is highly profitable reading and may well serve not only as an introduction to the history of psychology, but also as a manifestation of the essence of psychology itself.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Speaking of How to Pray. By Mary Perkins. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944. Pp. 276. $2.75.

Certainly we must welcome any book that really helps us to pray; such is the latest book of Miss Perkins. She has accomplished this end, not so much by telling us what prayer is, but rather by pointing out the need for prayer and giving us, in generous quotations from the liturgy, the matter for prayer. Her explanation of prayer comes rather late in the volume; an earlier introduction of this would have been helpful to most readers. Though she might be excused from any explicit discussion of the important distinctions between the prayer of petition and meditative or contemplative prayer, a firmer grasp of these distinctions in her own mind would have added to the value of the work.

In an otherwise extraordinarily accurate doctrinal introduction, there is one serious theological slip. The author is discussing the Incarnation in relation to our Redemption. She points out that God might have redeemed us in many ways: "Yet He chose, in His infinite Love, to make a human nature capable of satisfying His Justice, repaying the debts of mankind; capable of loving Him with a Love so great that it would undo the wrong done to His Love by all sin; capable of meriting, for all mankind, the life of grace and glory and everything necessary to achieve that life in its fullness; capable of giving that life of grace to all mankind" (p. 41). Not even God could make such a human nature; even the human nature of Christ had no such capabilities; all that Miss Perkins attributes to Christ's human nature must be attributed to grace. It is true that without human nature, Christ could not have accomplished all these things for us, but it is not the principle of the accomplishment.

The Bond of Peace. By Michael Kent. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1945. Pp. 186. $2.00.

Despite the assertion of the publisher's blurb to the contrary, this is a work of apologetics, one of the most mature works to have appeared in recent years from an American pen. The author has chosen a rather simple device; he has chosen at random three history text-books by Non-Catholic authors, selected from them passages about the medieval world, the Lutheran reform, the gradual disintegration of European culture since the reform and the prospects for the future. These passages are given in an Appendix. The text of the work itself is a brilliant exploitation of the admissions that these rather anti-Catholic historians had to make.

The author's first work was a novel, *The Mass of Brother Michel*; this present volume is thoroughly factual, but as gripping as a novel. In fact it rises to a climax which is as startling as the solution to a mystery story; it would be unjust to the author to reveal it. We can say that we agree with it whole-heartedly.

The Bone and the Star. By DOROTHY DONNELLY. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944. Pp. 205. $2.25.

This is another adult piece of apologetic literature. Miss Donnelly has been criticized for the difficulty of the matter, especially in the first part. However, there are any number of bright young Catholics who read Frazer, Wundt, Freud, and other modern writers; for them the present book should not be too difficult. The author has given in the first part of her work a faithful account of the world and human development in modern terms. The data of ethnology and anthropology are carefully expounded. Having presented the usual picture, she goes back to the biblical account and explains the same data from the standpoint of Genesis. She makes no dogmatic assertions; she simply manifests the fact that the Bible can more rationally account for the known facts about human development. Her work is a satisfactory refutation of the Freudian explanation, for it shows that Freud had to invent any number of myths to explain the known facts, while the facts can be easily explained in terms of Paradise and the Fall.

Medieval Studies: Volume VI—1944. Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1944. Pp. 354. $5.00.

This issue of *Medieval Studies* contains the following articles by well-known scholars: "The Mind of St. Augustine," by Anton Pegis; "Bonum Commune Melius est Quam Bonum Unius: Eine Studie über den Wertvorrang des Personalen bei Thomas von Aquin," by Ignatius Eschmann, O. P.; "The Moment of Consecration and the Elevation of the Host," by V. L. Kennedy, O. S. B.; "The Hexameron of Robert Grosseteste. The First Twelve Chapters of Part Seven," by J. T. Muckle, C. S. B.; "An Inquiry into the Origins of Courtly Love," by A. J. Denomy, C. S. B.; "The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth Century," by G. B. Flahiff, C. S. B.; "The Pilgrim Diary of Nikulas Munkathvera: The Road to Rome," by F. P. Magoun, Jr.

Catholic Art and Culture. By E. I. WATKIN. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944. Pp. 266, with index and illustrations. $4.50.

We certainly need a readable account of Catholic art and culture, one that is based on sound principles of criticism and presents us with a broad

view of the impact of the faith on cultural life. Mr. Watkin has attempted such an account. It makes difficult reading, for he tries to sustain throughout the work three distinct metaphors, which are rather mixed up at times, at least in the mind of the reader. It is not a comprehensive account, for it omits altogether music and touches lightly on literature. The emphasis is on architecture and painting. One gets the impression that the book was written to prove a thesis—a private conviction of the author: viz., that the baroque culture was the perfection of Catholic culture. The usual view is that the baroque was the beginning of a decay of medieval culture. It is not at all clear that Mr. Watkin has proven his thesis. In fact, quite the contrary appears from his statements. For he has had to accuse the Middle Ages of Puritanism and dismiss many of the saints as unnatural in order to bolster his claim that the compromise with the world that made baroque possible is the perfection of Catholic Culture.

The Nature and Origin of Scientism. By JOHN WELLMUTH, S. J. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1944. Pp. 60.

Father Wellmuth frankly admits that his lecture is based on the researches of Gilson and the Abbé K. Michalski. We are fortunate to have the researches of the latter made available in this form. However, the works of both Gilson and Michalski present a problem. Gilson, in his *Unity of Philosophical Experience*, links St. Bonaventure with some unsavory predecessors in the error of "theologism." Michalski, if Father Wellmuth's presentation is correct, links him with some even more unsavory successors. For the thesis of the lecture is that St. Bonaventure, by his lack of trust in human reason, nullified to a great extent the influence of St. Thomas and became the progenitor of modern scientism. The difficulty that presents itself is the fact that St. Bonaventure is a Doctor of the Church. Does that mean simply that he never erred in faith or morals? And are not the errors attributed to him by Gilson and Michalski rather serious from the viewpoint of the faith? Would it not be truer to say that St. Bonaventure's method of presenting the truths of faith and philosophy is perfectly legitimate, but easily distorted; that it was distorted by his disciples? It is also easy to distort St. Thomas' method.

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Bittle, C. N. *The Whole Man.* Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1945. Pp. 687, with index. $3.50.

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De Brito, D. *La Philosophie du Droit des Gens.* Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 1944. Pp. 254, with index.

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Giles of Rome. *Errores Philosophorum.* Edited by J. Koch, translated by J. O. Riedl. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1944. Pp. lix + 67, with index. $3.00.

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Krzesinski, A. J. *Religion of Nazi Germany.* Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1945. Pp. 48. $ .50.

Langraf, A. *Commentarius Cantabrigiensis in Epistolas S. Pauli e Schola Petri Abaelardi.* Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1944.

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